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 This dissertation explains how the politics of visibility affect relations among 
states and the political power of marginalized people within them. I show that the key 
to understanding processes of social change lies in a closer examination of the ways in 
which—and the degree to which—marginalized groups make governments and 
societies see and interact with their ideas. Specifically, I explore the politics of lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) visibility. For a group that many observers 
have referred to as “an invisible minority,” the newfound presence and influence of 
LGBT people in many different nation states offers fresh opportunities for the study of 
socio-political change and the diffusion of norms.  
Despite similar international pressures, why are the trajectories of socio-legal 
recognition for marginalized groups so different across states? This question is not 
answered by conventional explanations of diffusion and social change focusing on 
differences in international pressures, the fit between domestic and international 
norms, modernization, or low implementation costs. Instead, specific transnational and 
international channels and domestic interest groups can make visible political issues 
that were hidden, and it is that visibility that creates the political resonance of 
international norms in domestic politics, and can lead to their gradual internalization. 
 A state’s openness to international organizations and information flows has 
demonstrable effects on norm diffusion. It affects the ability of new ideas to enter 
domestic discourse. Furthermore, the degree to which domestic actors are embedded 
in transnational advocacy networks illuminates the issue and shapes the speed and 
direction of diffusion. Visibility has engendered the interactions between movements 
and states that empower people—mobilizing actors to demand change, influencing the 
spread of new legal standards, and weaving new ideas into the fabrics of societies. It is 
this process of “coming out” that leads to the socio-political recognition of rights that 
alters the situation for such groups. Ultimately, the politics of visibility is located at 
the intersection of international relations and social movement politics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Politics of Visibility and LGBT Rights in the European Union 
 
 
“The tide of history only advances when 
people make themselves fully visible.” 
 
—Anderson Cooper1 
 
 
This dissertation explains how the politics of visibility affect relations among 
states and the political power of marginalized people within them. I show that the key 
to understanding processes of social change lies in a closer examination of the ways in 
which—and the degree to which—marginalized groups make governments and 
societies see and interact with their ideas. It is this process of “coming out” that leads 
to the socio-political recognition of rights that alters the situation for such groups. The 
attainment of rights by Swedish women, for example, originated in their demand for 
nationally subsidized childcare—active labor market participation facilitated their 
political emancipation.
2
 German women achieved less (and much later), as they 
remained in their homes, relatively invisible to the larger political culture. Similarly, in 
2006, the organizers of unprecedented episodes of immigrant collective action in the 
United States borrowed the term “coming out” to describe their mobilization. Fear of 
deportation had silenced undocumented immigrants for decades, but visibility gave 
them a voice as they began to engage political elites (Zepeda-Millan 2010). By 
contrast, invisibility has rendered marginalized groups weak in their efforts to demand 
                                                 
1
Quoted in Stelter (2012). Thanks to Matt Evangelista for suggesting this epigraph.  
2
 In the United States, Mary Katzenstein (1999) finds that women’s activism could influence even such 
staunchly traditional intuitions as the Catholic Church and the military. Rose (2012) finds that visibility 
for women in higher education has led to enhanced citizenship in terms of equitable treatment by the 
state, social inclusion, and political incorporation. 
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change. Poor people’s social movements in the United States, for example, were 
eventually silenced in the wake of widespread incarceration (Piven and Cloward 
1977). To be sure, history is ripe with examples of “weak” groups influencing states, 
but only under conditions of visibility.  
Visibility has engendered the interactions between movements and states that 
empower people—mobilizing actors to demand change, influencing the spread of new 
legal standards, and weaving new ideas into the fabrics of societies. For many 
marginalized groups, such visibility has its roots in both domestic and transnational 
sources. Specifically, this dissertation explores the politics of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT)
3
 visibility. For a group that many observers have referred to 
as “an invisible minority,” the newfound presence and influence of LGBT people in 
many different nation states offers fresh opportunities for the study of socio-political 
change and the diffusion of norms.
4
 I use the LGBT case to explore how actors are 
mobilized across borders and explain why the outcome of their mobilization varies 
across national contexts.  
                                                 
3 
Scholarship on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex and asexual (LGBTQIA) peoples 
defines its subjects in diverse ways. For simplicity, I use the terms “LGBT” and “sexual minority” to 
encompass all those peoples marginalized because of sexual relationships among consenting adults 
and/or gender identities that are deviant from the hetero-normative framework. More specifically, my 
organizational data refer to LGBT people and my policy and attitudinal data are often limited to LGB 
people. It should be noted that international norms of appropriate behavior concerning transgender 
peoples are far less established as those concerning lesbian and gay people. Unfortunately the scopes of 
the study did not collect data to extensively explore the situations of queer, questioning, intersex or 
asexual peoples. Historically, queer movements have focused less on institutional change (Eleftheriadis 
2013).  
4
 For example, Hillary Clinton referred to LGBT people as “an invisible minority” in her December 6, 
2011 Human Rights Day Speech, delivered at the United Nations in Geneva. Text: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/06/hillary-clinton-gay-rights-speech-geneva_n_1132392.html 
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BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Why, despite similar international pressures, has the social and legal 
recognition of minorities changed to such differing degrees and at such different rates 
across states? My answer is simple: I argue that differing degrees of visibility have, in 
large part, produced different outcomes for socio-political change across states. 
Building on theories of international relations and contentious politics that deal with 
international norm diffusion, my dissertation focuses on variation in the changed legal 
status and societal perceptions of sexual minorities. Put most broadly, this dissertation 
seeks to explain changing ideas among state and society in world politics, using the 
case of norms governing LGBT rights. It deals with the existential conflict between 
various actors and two sets of norms: the tension between new international ideas and 
rooted traditional ones that do not coexist harmoniously.
5
 As Alison Brysk (2000, 1) 
has noted, it is “from the clash of identities and social systems [that] we learn how 
worlds change;” the LGBT rights revolution provides an ideal platform from which to 
study such interaction.  
To answer my question, I focus specifically on Europe, a region that exhibits 
great variety in the degree to which states adopt international norms governing LGBT 
rights. The fall of the Berlin Wall and European integration resulted in an 
                                                 
5
 I wish to note early on that I do not view domestic politics as passive and reactionary to “progressive” 
international norms. Seybert’s (2012) work made headway by contesting what she calls the false 
dichotomy between enlightened civil society and norm-violating governments. Looking across different 
types of particular and universal norms, she shows that these roles are often reversed. Similarly, this 
dissertation is about interactions between actors—both progressive and traditional—at both domestic 
and transnational levels. Norm politics are never a one-way street and many of the most forward 
thinking proponents of LGBT rights are domestic actors within target states who champion the issue, 
often seeking out transnational ties to further their cause. As Seybert argues, norm evolution does not 
stop once it reaches the international realm. By contrast, the process of norm evolution continues 
through interaction with domestic spheres. The idea of contemporary Europe as LGBT friendly, for 
example, is itself an evolutionary process. The link between LGBT rights and Europe has become 
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unprecedented exposure of former Communist Bloc states to norms and institutions 
developed in response to the early politicization of sexual identity in several ‘Western’ 
European states.
6
 The rapidly increased social and political interaction between new 
European Union (EU) member states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with older 
member states is a natural experiment for international norm diffusion theory, which 
stipulates that state and non-state actors spread ideas from areas where they are more 
accepted to areas where they are not. An international norm is “a standard of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (P. J. Katzenstein 1996, 5) that 
governments or NGOs wish to export (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891) or receiving 
actors feel they ought to adopt or emulate.
7
 By diffusion, I refer to the “political 
process in which actors at different levels use adoption and adaptation of foreign 
examples to make national and transnational claims and change institutional and legal 
settings, [as well as] build alliances and exert pressure” (Roggeband 2010, 19). 
In Europe, a series of transnational actors—the EU institutions, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and a transnational network of activists—have 
                                                                                                                                            
increasingly pronounced and further cemented as activists in new adopter states engage frame it this 
way (Ayoub and Paternotte 2012).   
6
 Throughout the dissertation, I use the terms ‘first-mover/leading’ and ‘new adopter’ to distinguish 
states that have politicized LGBT issues earlier from those where the issue has become visible more 
recently. Proponents of LGBT rights refer to the former set of states as leading, because they are 
generally ‘first mover’ states, who are endowed with more norm entrepreneurs, more comprehensive 
LGBT rights, and more favorable attitudes. I use the leading/new distinction for analytical purposes, 
merely as a heuristic device to acknowledge differing levels of LGBT norm development across states. 
The distinction is not meant to conceal the intolerance and injustice that LGBT people still experience 
in those states that are labeled as ‘leading’—even in the Netherlands, which holds the top spot globally 
on my measures of social tolerance towards LGBT people, 40% of Dutch respondents expressed 
discomfort to seeing two men kiss in public, as opposed to 13% who object to seeing a man and a 
women kiss in public (Council of Europe 2011, 31; Keuzenkamp and Ross 2010, 355–356). Nor is this 
distinction intended to deem ‘new’ states of lesser worth or to ‘other’ them as a new type of 
abnormality to ‘Western’ scripts (Binnie and Klesse forthcoming; Kulpa and Mizielińska 2011; Stychin 
1998). Finally, the labels are not to be conflated with old and new EU member states—while the 
general trend is that older EU states are more likely to be ‘leading’ states (see Figures 1.6 and 1.7 in 
Appendix A), there are exceptions (notably, Italy and Greece). 
7
 According to my understanding of the norm diffusion, purposiveness is not always necessary for 
diffusion. 
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fostered change by propagating an international norm
 
of LGBT rights and introducing, 
or at least amplifying, the issue in the domestic discourses of various European states 
(Kollman 2007). The norm that LGBT people are entitled to fundamental human 
rights, deserving of state recognition and protection, is clearly articulated in both the 
rhetoric and legal framework of the EU and Council of Europe (CoE) institutions.
8
 
Despite strikingly similar exposure to European norms and regulations, however, 
newly admitted member states differ greatly in both societal attitudes and in the 
introduction of legal protections that states are willing to extend to sexual minorities. 
Figures 1.1 shows the mean value for attitudes toward homosexuality (by state) across 
three time points (1990, 2000 and 2010) in ten new EU member states. Figure 1.2 
illustrates the variation in the adoption of pro-LGBT legislation across EU member-
states.
9
 All states meet the EU’s requirements for membership (decriminalization of 
same-sex acts, employment non-discrimination and asylum on the basis of sexual 
orientation), but some go much further than others, for example, by introducing 
parenting and partnership rights.  
                                                 
8
 Examples include Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, a 2000 Employment Anti-Discrimination 
Directive, the European Charter for Fundamental Rights, the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, various 
European Parliament Resolutions (e.g. European Parliament Resolution on homophobia in Europe 
2005/2666 and 2007/2543), official statements and ECtHR (e.g., Bąckowski and others v. Poland, 
1543/06) and European Court of Justice (ECJ) (e.g., C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council) 
court rulings. See also the work of Kelly Kollman and David Paternotte on European norms governing 
same-sex unions (Paternotte and Kollman forthcoming). 
9
 The combined legislation score is a count of the following provisions: antidiscrimination in 
employment, goods and services, and constitutional recognition; hate crimes based on sexual 
orientation recognized as an aggravating circumstance and/or incitement to hatred based on sexual 
orientation prohibited; same-sex partnership recognized for cohabitation, registered partnership and 
marriage; same-sex couples’ parenting rights for joint adoption, second parent adoption, and fertility 
treatment; and sexual offenses provisions for equal age of consent and same-sex activity legal (cf. Table 
3.2, Chapter 3). 
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Figure 1.1. Variation in Attitudes towards Homosexuality Across New EU Member States 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Variation in LGBT-Friendly Legislation Adoption Across EU Member States 
 
  7 
 
Previous research has emphasized differences in international pressures, the fit 
between domestic and international norms, modernization, or low implementation 
costs for successful diffusion and change in world politics. As a baseline, these 
theories are useful for understanding how and why norms change in a multitude of 
states. Most, though not all, societies find homosexuality more acceptable today than 
they did in 1989. From this baseline, existing theories cannot adequately explain, 
however, why the LGBT norm does not permeate different domestic contexts at 
similar rates. For example, why do some traditional Catholic countries blaze new 
ground on LGBT rights while some modern, wealthy democracies remain laggards? I 
find that these questions are not answered by traditional explanations. Instead, my 
research suggests that the degree to which international norms resonate in various 
states—and become internalized within them—depends on specific transnational 
channels and domestic interest groups that make political issues visible. I show that 
the extent of a state’s openness to international organizations and information flows 
(the exchange of ideas and images with other countries) has demonstrable effects on 
diffusion because it allows new ideas to enter the domestic discourse. These social and 
political channels prime a context for diffusion by making the issue visible. 
Furthermore, the degree to which domestic actors are embedded in transnational 
advocacy networks illuminates the issue and shapes the speed and direction of 
diffusion. These transnational actors mediate between the international and domestic 
norms to frame the message to fit locally, and to quell the perceptions of threat that 
some states assign to LGBT norms.  
  8 
In building this argument, my findings suggest that norm visibility is a 
necessary requirement for diffusion—both to governments and publics—in world 
politics, since elites and publics within states do not always see or care about issues 
that first develop elsewhere. By norm visibility, I refer to the relative ability of publics 
and governments to see and interact with the ideas and images that define standards of 
appropriate behavior. By defining new standards of acceptability, these international 
sources of normative change introduce “new ways of understanding oneself” (Altman 
1999, 563).
10
 Visibility is critical for mobilizing the necessary norm entrepreneurs,
11
 
influencing the timing and likelihood of the diffusion of law, and determining the level 
of internalization in society.  
A unique aspect of the LGBT rights norm is that it is inherently contentious in 
most societies, to the point that it is often portrayed as violating the moral foundation 
on which nationhood is structured (Stychin 1998). Even after the issue was initially 
politicized, first-mover states required decades to introduce legislation, such as 
antidiscrimination protections, akin to the legal protections won by other groups 
represented in the rights revolution.
12
 This calls into question why new EU member 
                                                 
10
 Though Altman’s has been more concerned with economic globalization and HIV AIDS, his work 
has been path breaking in considering the international dimensions to queer politics.  
11
 I refer to the activists involved as norm entrepreneurs, because they attempt to “mobilize popular 
opinion and political support both within their host country and abroad,’ ‘stimulate and assist in the 
creation of likeminded organizations in other countries,’ and ‘play a significant role in elevating their 
objectives beyond its identification with the national interests of their government’” (Acharya 2004, 
248; Wolters 1999; Nadelmann 1990; Checkel 1998). This concept is related to the term “policy/issue 
entrepreneur” used in Americanist research on interest groups, which defines the efforts of actors who 
have a specific interest in getting specific policies adopted (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). 
12
 I consider LGBT rights to be part of the broader rights revolution. Both the 2006 Yogyakarta 
Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity and a couple UN resolutions have established LGBT rights firmly within discourses of 
the rights revolution. This marks a change from the 1960s and 1970s, when gays and lesbians were 
excluded from the rights discourse (Skrentny 2002). Their exclusion was a combination of failure on 
both sides, the discomfort among other groups in including LGBT people as part of their movements 
(with exceptions—for example, Heuy Newton's pioneering speech on the intersection of race and 
homosexuality), and the gay liberation movement's slow progress in connecting its experience to those 
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states have so quickly begun to digest this contentious issue at home—politicized only 
recently—and respond to it within their legal and social structures. The visibility 
explanation presented here assumes that these states want to identify as part of 
‘Europe.’ Europe perceives itself, on the macro-level, as adherent to the rights 
revolution—and LGBT rights as part of those rights—that has transformed world 
politics. Adopting the LGBT norm, then, is part of what it means to be a member of 
contemporary Europe.
13
 For this process to happen, however, states must be able to 
see that to which they are meant to conform. For new EU member states, their efforts 
to identify as members of this community have been a driving force behind making 
the issue visible.
14
 While much of the literature takes deliberation and learning for 
granted, I will argue that the norm needs to be made visible in the domestic context 
before actors can deliberate on it and internalize it. The felt intensity of a norm varies 
across cases, depending on its visibility. 
Alternative Explanations 
The argument builds on the foundations of a vast literature on diffusion and 
social change, but the spread of norms concerning the rights of sexual minorities also 
complicates existing explanations. First, the expectation that international norms 
diffuse successfully when they are congruent with domestic beliefs and 
understandings does not hold (Checkel 2001; Cortell and Davis 1996; Finnemore 
1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 204; Legro 1997; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). 
                                                                                                                                            
of other minorities. Leaders of the rights revolution feared that societies were not yet ready for the 
radical gay issue, and thus it was to be sidelined until the other movements made gains (Bernstein 2002, 
546). 
13
 This conceptualization draws from John Meyer and colleagues (J. W. Meyer et al. 1997), who argue 
that states adopt standards to remain/become legitimate. My theory adds agency to process by arguing 
that deliberation, which comes with visibility, is a key mechanism for diffusion and change.   
  10 
Despite the contentious element of the norm, surprising ‘misfits,’ such as more 
religious and less democratic states, do change. Among the states with the most rapid 
social and legal change in terms of embracing LGBT rights are Catholic Spain and 
Portugal, two of Europe’s most religious states (Casanova 2009, 209; Greeley 2004, 
71). Furthermore, secularization theories do not explain why Estonia is more intolerant 
than the equally secular Czech Republic. Or why attitudes among more secular, 
former East Germans are not more favorable to LGBT people than they are in western 
Germany. Other types of misfits involve post-socialist success stories, like Poland, 
which despite strides in democratization and compliance with many costly EU 
regulations (Petrova 2012), has struggled with adopting basic measures to protect 
rights of LGBT minorities.  
The diffusion of LGBT norms also challenges the widely held assumption that 
modernization correlates with the adoption of post-material values, such as accepting 
homosexuality (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart 1997). While the first states to 
expand LGBT rights were often the type of wealthy states that modernization theorists 
expect to change (e.g., the Nordic states), the condition of economic wealth does not 
hold for the LGBT norm’s diffusion to new adopters. Level of GDP is not a robust or 
reliable predictor of change as poorer states often adopt the norm before wealthier 
ones. Studies that combine data from dissimilar world regions in one model 
overemphasize the importance of economic wealth for social change (Inglehart and 
Norris 2003). Several of the field’s dominant explanations lose traction when we 
                                                                                                                                            
14
 This argument applies more to new member states than it does to older ones, like Italy, which feel 
secure in their standing as European and have not adopted the European norm on LGBT rights. This 
interpretation has to do with a state’s self-perception in the social hierarchy of states (Towns 2011). 
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tighten the scope conditions to study a region bound by strong supranational 
institutional structures. 
Contrary to common knowledge, I also find that universal low-cost norms do 
elicit powerful reactions from states and societies. Scholars have argued that states 
should always take low-cost moral action (Kaufman and Pape 1999), especially when 
such actions help facilitate access to the bundle of economic benefits that come with 
EU membership (Vachudova 2005). Since states can enhance their international 
reputations by recognizing and protecting sexual minorities without accruing direct 
monetary costs to the state or individuals in society, it raises the question of why some 
low-cost moral norms are difficult to transmit.
15
 Moreover, why does the same norm 
meet forceful resistance in some cases and not in others? The uneven rate of diffusion 
across states is puzzling in light of previous scholarship that cites human rights norms 
as the most successfully and uniformly adopted norms in the EU accession process 
(Checkel 1997, 480; Seybert 2012), especially since the EU exposes accession states 
to similar material incentives.
16
  
LGBT actors have also mobilized when domestic political opportunities are 
most closed, which contributes to our understanding of new multi-level opportunities 
                                                 
15
 Here low cost to the state or individuals is measured monetarily, but there may of course be political 
costs, or presumed political costs, to individual political leaders who stake their domestic reputations on 
recognizing and protecting sexual minorities (Putnam 1988). My research has found that some states, 
like Germany, have opposed a European Directives for LGBT people, even if their own domestic 
standards exceed those of the European requirements (i.e., the Directive involves no implementation 
costs).  
16
 Rational institutionalists attribute domestic change to the incentives that international organizations 
provide (Martin and Simmons 1998; Mastenbroek 2003). Constructivists focus on informal processes of 
transnational actors’ influence and argue that international norms define the contours of appropriate 
behavior and exert influence on states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995; Legro 1997; Price 
1998; Risse 2000). 
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in social movement theory.
17
 In Poland, for example, public assemblies by LGBT 
activists went forward—as they did when former Mayor Lech Kaczynski banned their 
public assembly in Warsaw—despite the lack of a domestic political opportunity. This 
constitutes an exception to what traditional conceptions of social movement theory—
rooted in the nation state—would predict. Scholars of the political process approach 
have emphasized the importance of “1) the opening of access to participation for new 
actors; 2) the evidence of political realignment within the polity; 3) the appearance of 
influential allies; 4) emerging splits within the elite; and 5) a decline in the state’s 
capacity or will to repress dissent” (Kriesi 2004; McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998, 76). 
While these important insights apply, the multi-level structure of the European Union 
can shift the opportunities described by this approach to various levels (Imig and 
Tarrow 2001; Sikkink 2005). 
Other explanations predict that states and societies will respond to the external 
environment in the same way, regardless of transnational channels or domestic 
differences.
18
 The world polity school in sociology posits that a global civil society, 
comprised of organized and rule-like models, is an institutional system that constitutes 
the capabilities and interrelationships of societal actors (J. W. Meyer et al. 1997). This 
global society advances general universal truths, rather than functional needs or actor 
interests, which lead to a global isomorphism in institutions and norms (Frank, Camp, 
and Boutcher 2010; Soysal 1994). While this school has influenced my argument, its 
basic postulate requires refinement in order to explain the diffusion of the LGBT 
rights norm. This is because the postulate portrays global culture as secular and 
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 Scholars of LGBT mobilization have noted the “high risk” of mobilization in “culturally closed” 
contexts (Blumenfeld and Raymond 1988). 
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rational, slighting the tensions that derive from domestic norms when they are 
incompatible with international norms. Furthermore, the scholarship side-steps norm 
internalization (J. W. Meyer et al. 1997, 154) and under-specifies agency, making it 
difficult to explain the mechanisms of the diffusion processes. Too often, this 
literature explains how domestic politics bend in response to international pressure, 
but it struggles to explain varying outcomes across states. A visibility argument builds 
on the foundations that these scholars have laid, filling gaps where their explanations 
fall short.  
Research Questions and Dependent Variable 
I support my argument by explaining what accounts for differences in social 
attitudes and state laws toward sexual minorities across European states (Figures 1.1 
and 1.2). Is change due to heightened exposure to individuals and groups in states that 
have previously adopted the norm? Under what domestic preconditions (of the 
recipient state) do international norms of sexual minority rights successfully spread? 
Who are the agents of change, and how are they mobilized? Finally, what are the 
transnational pathways of diffusion? My dependent variables tap into two dimensions 
of international norm diffusion: change in the behavior of the state, and change in the 
behavior of individuals within society. Academic research often overlooks the 
distinction between legal compliance and societal internalization (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998; J. W. Meyer et al. 1997), which are related but analytically separate 
processes.
19
 This omission is regrettable since legal protections do not necessarily 
                                                                                                                                            
18
 Other scholarship highlights geographic proximity to the norm holder to explain the diffusion of 
democratic ideals (Kopstein and Reilly 2000) and pro-EU attitudes (Berezin and Diez-Medrano 2008). 
19
 Lucia Seybert’s (2012) work, which makes a distinction between particular and universal norms, is a 
notable exception. By the term internalization, I refer to the internalization of constitutive identities, 
which is “the process by which the collective expectations of the members of an identity group come to 
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correlate highly with decreasing levels of social stigmatization. Furthermore, the 
commonly used dependent variable measure of the socialization of state elites 
(Checkel 1997) does not capture an attitudinal shift (or lack thereof) in the major part 
of a society.  
My study looks at both indices of the norm diffusion—legal compliance and 
societal internalization—because “norms are about behavior, not directly about ideas” 
(Florini 1996, 364).
20
 Since norms are difficult to observe directly, I look to two 
behavioral measures to analyze consequences of changed norms. To measure change 
at the state level, I collected data on and analyzed the number of LGBT rights laws 
adopted by states. These include protective and equality laws that go beyond 
decriminalization. To capture change at the individual level, I look to survey data on 
social attitudes toward sexual minorities. Both measures focus on the years between 
1970 and 2010.  
As I demonstrate in the next section, the variation and causes of change I 
observe contribute to many of the established findings in mainstream international 
relations and social movement research. The next section presents my theory as to 
why and how visibility influences socio-legal change concerning sexual minorities. 
Thereafter, I describe the methods of inquiry I use to support my argument. I close the 
chapter with a brief overview of the dissertation.  
                                                                                                                                            
feel taken for granted by new members” (Abdelal et al. 2006, 697). My definition is not to be confused 
with the definition of internalization scholars of the transnational social movement literature, which 
uses it to mean the domestic internalization of transnational issues (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; 
Tarrow 2005b).   
20
 As Katzenstein and Byrnes (2006, 683) note, “[t]he behavioral dimension is shaped by the regulative 
and constitutive effects of rules that operate at the individual level through internalization and 
habituation and at the collective level through various sanctioning mechanisms.”   
  15 
LGBT PEOPLES AND THE POLITICS OF (IN)VISIBILITY IN EUROPE 
I define the core concept of norm visibility as the relative ability of 
governments and publics to see and interact with the ideas and images that define 
standards of appropriate behavior. Likewise, interpersonal relations and interactions 
with individuals are related to this broader diffusion of images and ideas. The premise 
that visibility leads to change is not new among LGBT rights activists, many of whom 
adopted San Francisco Supervisor Harvey Milk’s theory that gays and lesbians should 
publicly declare their orientation if they wished to see society accept them (Herek 
2004, 14). Most of the activists I interviewed mentioned the centrality of (in)visibility 
to their work, because in many European contexts LGBT people find it difficult to 
show themselves openly. Being visible is a privilege (Bernstein and Reimann 2001, 
10). Fearing rejection from family, friends, and employers, LGBT people conceal their 
sexuality, rendering part of themselves invisible. Thus, much of the LGBT identity has 
been built in safe spaces—such as, cafes, bars, and private homes—that remain 
secluded from society and state (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002, 726). While these 
spaces have been transformational by fostering an awareness of collective grievances 
and social solidarity,
21
 they lack the public dimension that scholars have found to be 
important for a group’s democratic participation (Evans and Boyte 1992). Private or 
designated safe spaces remain invisible to society at large, almost by definition, as 
they exist to shield the identity of LGBT people from out-group members.
22
 While 
invisibility can provide security, it stifles domestic movements for change, because 
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 Stockdill (2003, 17) reminds us that “the transformation of collective consciousness is a crucial 
aspect of social movement development: people in marginalized groups must be able to see their 
situation as shared before they can collectively challenge both cultural and institutional symbols.” 
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there are few actors to mobilize in public and too few openly LGBT people for the 
nation to perceive the issue as local.
23
 While these fears exist in every EU member 
state, several interviewees claimed that it is more difficult to come out in a context like 
Poland’s, where surveys from 2000 found that only 10% of Poles claimed to have ever 
encountered a gay person (interview no. 9). Visibility can tap into the movement 
potential of these once clandestine groups (in abeyance) by triggering their ability to 
rise (Taylor 1989).
24
 In this sense, the concept also affects within-group dynamics by 
making members visible to each other.  
The European context of social sanctions changes standards of conduct and 
connects LGBT actors across states with differing degrees of LGBT visibility. While 
the extent of change depends on both international and domestic normative structures, 
in states that have recently begun learning about the norm, widespread visibility 
depends especially on transnational interactions. This is because other European states 
have defined the issue earlier through developments that produced visibility, such as 
the 1960/70s sexual revolution and the politicization of the HIV-AIDS crisis in the 
1980s (Chetaille 2011, 122–123; Owczarzak 2009). The EU furthers norm visibility 
by connecting states through channels of social information and political rules, as well 
as connecting LGBT actors across states to help broker and interpret the norm. Put 
                                                                                                                                            
22
 The movement’s increasingly public profile is represented in the change in movement goals. For 
example, the marriage equality movement has shifted a key movement goal from the attainment of 
individual rights to equality in a larger social construct typically occupied by heterosexual people. 
23
 Activists interviewed in Poland also described difficulty in recruiting activists at the turn of the 
century because of fears and discomfort associated with coming out to family members (interview nos. 
8, 9, 129, 131, 139, and 140). According to one activist in Warsaw, “The problem in Poland at the time 
of EU accession was that no one was coming out—everyone stayed in their closets. In terms of 
socialization, there is a strong correlation between knowing a gay person and being agreeable towards 
gay rights” (interview no. 9). Many potential LGBT activists had to keep low profiles because they did 
not want their families to see them in the media. This is common in a country where the discourse is 
new. 
  17 
simply, transnational and international channels of visibility provide for interaction 
among social actors that lead to a change of ideas.
25
 Through mechanisms of learning 
and deliberation, these ideational changes can influence the way the norm becomes 
adopted in the legal and social structures of the state. Other mechanisms of EU 
influence, such as pressures of competition and political sanction via hard law, also 
play a role, but the following analyses will demonstrate that these mechanisms are 
more limited in their ability to produce change. The mechanisms most central to this 
argument are framing, brokerage, deliberation, and learning. 
Through social and political channels, European institutions play a role in 
socialization by linking the LGBT norm to membership in modern Europe by setting 
rules of compliance and by dispensing ideas and images about LGBT people that 
make them visible.
26
 
 
 Framing: the process of “presenting and packaging ideas” to fashion meanings 
for a given audience.
27
  
 
                                                                                                                                            
24
 Taylor (1989) has called such groups as movements in abeyance, because they have they have 
potential to mobilize under the right conditions, when new opportunities arise. 
25
 I use the customary definitions for transnational and international: I think of transnational relations as 
involving the cross-border activities of non-state actors. Non-state actors can include, for example, 
activists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious actors, multinational corporations 
(MNCs), and terrorism rebels. International relations involve the activities between states or states and 
international institutions. While most the channels I refer to are transnational, they were often facilitated 
by processes of political internationalization (e.g., increased mobility via the EU’s Schengen Treaty) 
and continue to be supported by international channels between state and international institutions. For 
simplicity, I occasionally use the terms ‘transnational channels’ or ‘channels’ to refer to both sets of 
transnational and international channels. I do this especially when I contrast the international/ 
transnational from the domestic.  
26
 Checkel (2005) has noted that the ability to persuade is increased when “the socializing agency or 
individual is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the target belongs or wants to belong” 
(Checkel 2006, 364). 
27
 Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002, 10). On framing, see also Snow and Benford (1992), and 
Roggeband (2010). 
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 Norm Brokers: the actors, endowed with local knowledge, that mediate 
between often-divergent new international norms and domestic norms. They 
aid diffusion by framing the international elements of the norm—in a 
domestically familiar discourse—so that they resonate with the domestic 
traditions of the society. They also connect disparate actors across contexts to 
politicize and draw external attention to the domestic situations of LGBT 
people. 
28
  
 
 Deliberation: the communicative and thought processes by which groups (sub-
national, domestic, and transnational) weigh and debate conflicting norms after 
new norms become visible.
29
 
  
 Learning: the process by which communities reassess their fundamental 
beliefs, values and ways of doing things through interaction with new ideas 
and norms.
30
  
 
I find that under conditions of visibility, these mechanisms of socialization “can 
transform dominant behavior and institutions—including the state” (Brysk 2000, 29). 
                                                 
28
 The first part of my definition of brokerage is a slight variation of Tarrow’s (2005) emphasis on the 
brokers who connect actors in different contexts.  In my conceptualization, brokers, connect domestic 
LGBT organizations to a transnational network of actors and to European institutions. Thus, brokers are 
not only the umbrella organizations that connect disparate actors, they are also domestic LGBT groups 
and rooted cosmopolitans, that frame and graft international scripts to make them fit to specific 
domestic contexts. 
29
 My understanding of deliberation draws from Risse’s (2000) work on argumentation.  
30
 My broad definition of learning draws upon a vast literature on processes of learning, both individual 
and collective (Deutsch 1963; E. B. Haas 1991). Learning can refer both to the transfer of knowledge 
between and to international organizations, governments, societies, and individuals. It can also refer to 
simple learning, leading to instrumental change, and to complex learning, leading to change in beliefs 
change (Checkel 2005; Zito 2009).  
  19 
To theorize that the visibility of international norms can lead to social and legal 
change, I draw from evidence in social psychology suggesting that engagement leads 
to a reduction in prejudice among individuals. This research makes clear that 
conditions of invisibility, such as those I described in pre-accession Poland, are not 
conducive to change. Studies have repeatedly found that respondents who know at 
least one person in their in-group with friendship ties to an out-group member report 
decreased levels of prejudice toward that out-group (Wright et al. 1997).
31
 Allport’s 
(1954) contact hypothesis rested on this same idea: interactions among different 
groups could change inter-group relations by leading to positive perceptions of the 
other. A long tradition of research in social psychology largely finds support for the 
negative relationship between contact and prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).
32
 
Recent experiments show that even imagined interactions, if they are positive, can 
significantly reduce negative feelings toward unfamiliar out-groups (Crisp and Turner 
2009; Mazziotta, Mummendey, and Wright 2011). These findings hold for studies of 
interactions between heterosexual and homosexual groups, with heterosexual 
participants displaying more positive attitudes and fewer stereotypes about gay people 
after imagining an interaction (Turner, Crisp, and Lambert 2007). Imagined contact is 
entirely cognitive, referring only to an image or story of interaction. While these 
studies usually measure change at the individual level, there is also some evidence for 
                                                 
31
 Another study of the Watts race riot in Los Angeles, by Jeffries and Ransford (1969), found that 
middle-class white respondents “who had prior interracial contacts were significantly less fearful of 
blacks, less punitive and less likely to view the riot as caused by outside agitators” (Pettigrew 1998, 70). 
32
 The finding is especially true under conditions of cooperation, common goals, equal social status, and 
institutional support. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006)analyze 515 studies concerning contact theory in social 
psychology, concluding that the relationship between contact and lowered level of prejudice is, in 
general, a robust and significant finding in their field.  
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the understudied effect of contact on societal change (Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux 
2005). 
Both imagined and direct contact studies have found that a positive interaction 
is more likely to reduce prejudice than a neutral one (Stathi and Crisp 2008). Crisp and 
Turner (2009, 234) point out that “[a] positive tone is also important to guard against a 
possible negative tone, which might emerge if the participants are left to their own 
devices.” The authors go on to note that participants are left to their own devices under 
conditions of segregation, or arguably under conditions of invisibility. Anxiety about 
interaction, in which an in-group associates threat with the ‘other,’ “can arise when 
there has been minimal previous contact” (Crisp and Turner 2009, 235; Stephan and 
Stephan 1985). Yet, psychologists note that anxiety—or perceived threat—is likely to 
lessen after contact, “as [adopters] come to realize they have nothing to fear from such 
interactions” (Crisp and Turner 2009, 235). Learning through interaction is a central 
mechanism for change because it reduces the level of threat associated with the out-
group.  
While this psychological work provides evidence to support the general theory 
that visibility, through interaction, produces change, the argument here moves beyond 
cognitive mechanisms. Psychological studies are confined to labs, devoid of politics, 
and removed from the relational ties between actors across states. My argument also 
accounts for the fact that similar interventions, like the ones described in 
psychological experiments, mean different things in various contexts. As Crisp and 
Turner (2009, 232) suggest in their call for future research, “[C]ontact can only work 
where the opportunity for contact exists.” The support of institutions, law, or custom 
can have a strong effect on individual shifts in prejudice. According to Pettigrew 
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(1998, 79), under conditions of “explicit social sanction, intergroup contact is more 
readily accepted and has more positive effects. [Support by authorities] establishes 
norms of acceptance.”33  
Acknowledging that these norms are contested requires us to rethink the 
traditional set of mechanisms that drive diffusion processes. Constructivist scholars 
highlight the mechanisms of argument and persuasion to explain political and social 
outcomes. The first has to do with the ongoing discourse between norm entrepreneurs 
and followers, which fosters “shared understandings” (Risse 2000). The second has to 
do with the expectation to conform to international universalistic, liberal values—
interactions with international society socialize states to alter policies and practices 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
34
 I will argue that the effectiveness of these cognitive 
mechanisms of appropriateness is limited when transnationally embedded domestic 
LGBT organizations do not exist to make the issue visible and clearly interpret it. 
Deliberative mechanisms of diffusion are complicated when the moral hierarchy 
between contending norms is difficult for states and societies to establish. This 
dissertation deals with these shortcomings by bridging cognitive mechanisms (learning 
and deliberation) with relational ones (norm brokers and channels of visibility), and by 
theorizing negative cases of norm acceptance and contending norms.  
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 As Pettigrew (1998, 79) laments in his survey of the field, “Situations are embedded in social 
institutions and societies. Thus, institutional and societal norms structure the form and effects of contact 
situations… societal norms of discrimination [can] poison intergroup contact. [Referring to study during 
apartheid in South Africa, he notes that] even [t]here, modest improvements emerged in white attitudes 
toward their neighbors of color. Yet the larger social context constrained these effects. Alternatively, 
when a society embraces intergroup harmony, equal-status contact between groups is no longer 
subversive. Normative support makes attainment of other optimal conditions far easier.” 
34
 Socialization is “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community;” it 
implies “that an agent switches from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness” (Checkel 
2005, 804). One type of socialization is role-playing, whereby actors learn what is appropriate and 
behave accordingly. A second type involves actors adopting the interests and identity of the 
community—in such a case, “instrumental calculation has now been replaced by ‘taken-for-
  22 
The mechanisms presented in this section come together to prime the contexts 
for diffusion. They signal to society and state that they (as publics and governments) 
must react to the norm. For the LGBT norm to resonate in various states, the issue 
must be clearly associated with Europe and visible within the domestic contexts of the 
state. In this dimension, new member states vary in important ways. While European 
directives set a minimal hard law standard,
35
 I find the diffusion of the issue beyond 
these basic measures relies largely on both the extent to which transnational channels 
make the issue visible and on the effectiveness of transnational actors who identify the 
issue as one of singular importance to membership in modern Europe. Activists act as 
norm brokers to help the state and individuals in society give meaning to the issue—
which constitutes a ‘new’ idea in many of the domestic spheres analyzed—by framing 
the LGBT norm as a ‘European’ value of human rights. The premise of a visibility 
argument is that, for states and societies to understand how to behave “appropriately,” 
they must see the norm and receive cues about how to interpret it.  
Channels of Visibility and State Compliance  
I posit that norm diffusion is a transnational process, first by specifying that 
LGBT rights diffuse to states in which channels of social transnationalization and 
political internationalization are most established and to states with transnational 
actors who have relational ties to leading states. Second, I will show that the ability of 
these channels to engender norm internalization is moderated by the degree to which 
people socialized within the receiving state perceive the norm as a threat. Drawing 
from the social movement literature, I argue that the nature of the channels between 
                                                                                                                                            
grantedness’” (804).   
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the originator and the receiver of a social norm influences diffusion (Givan, Roberts, 
and Soule 2010; Soule 2004a; Tarrow 2005b).
36
 Channels can be relational (direct) or 
non-relational (indirect).
37
 Within direct channels, ideas diffuse most rapidly to new 
European states with domestic LGBT rights activists who are in close and frequent 
contact with their counterparts in leading European states (where the issue became 
visible earlier). Relational ties to transnational organizations provide domestic LGBT 
groups with credibility, funding, and expertise, legitimizing domestic political and 
social campaigns to make the issue visible in their respective domestic contexts.
38
 
Transnational organizations provide resources that domestic actors are then able to use 
to enhance visibility by organizing demonstrations, engaging the press, lobbying 
government, and demanding outside intervention when necessary. In turn, 
transnational activism leads to deliberation and socialization in the target state.  
The presence of local LGBT actors who are embedded in transnational 
networks makes the norm visible by sending signals to state and society. As shown in 
Figure 1.3, in contexts with transnationally embedded actors who send strong and 
clear signals on how to approach the issue, visibility is higher. On signal strength, 
Lohmann’s (1993, 1995) argument attributes political might to special interest groups 
                                                                                                                                            
35
 It should be noted that European Union’s Directives on antidiscrimination reflect the late emergence 
of LGBT issues in the international rights revolution. EU antidiscrimination standards cover one 
category for gays and disabled persons (employment), three for women, and four for race.  
36
 Soule (2004) isolates four attributes required for diffusion: a transmitter, an adopter, an innovation, 
and a channel that passes the innovation from transmitter to adopter (Soule and Zylan 1997).  In my 
case, the transmitters are transnational LGBT organizations in leading European states, the adopters are 
societies and states, the innovation is the LGBT rights norm, and the channels are networks of activists 
and channels of social transnationalization and political internationalization.  
37
 Channels of diffusion can be direct and personal, indirect and impersonal, or brokered by institutions 
or organizations (Tarrow 2005).  
38
 Powerful and resource rich transnational organizations can set the agenda around certain functional 
goals. As Carpenter (2011, 72) and Bob (2010) find, the endorsement of these powerful “gatekeeper” 
organizations is necessary for issues to get transnational traction. 
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that send disproportionately strong signals (Gillion 2013).
39
 She finds that political 
authorities respond to grievances most in cases where large protests fuel deliberation 
(Lohmann 1993). Fassiotto and Soule (2012) build on this work by focusing on the 
clarity of the signal. Like my emphasis on visibility, they show that social movement 
actors can help state authorities interpret messages. Especially when embedded in 
transnational networks, I find that European LGBT networks disperse guidelines and 
rules of best practice that converge to send clear and strong signals.
40
 In addition, 
transnational LGBT rights groups mediate diffusion when they act as brokers 
connecting disparate activists and grafting international ideas to domestic ones, which 
accelerates the diffusion of information and frames the message appropriately—
especially when confronted with domestic resistance (Acharya 2004b; Tarrow 
2005b).
41
 This is a necessary step, because when left to its own devices to interpret 
new contentious ideas, a society's reactions will tend to be more negative (Pettigrew 
1998, 79).  
The visibility of the LGBT rights norm also diffuses through political and 
social channels (both relational and non-relational) between first-mover and target 
states. First, the extent of relational ties between the state and international 
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In his recent book, Gillion (2012) also finds a strong connection between the signal strength of 
minorities and voting patterns in the United States Congress, as well as having effects on the other 
branches of American government.  
40
 O'Dwyer and Schwartz (2010) correctly privilege the influence the socialization mechanisms of 
Europeanization in the realm of LGBT rights in their case studies of Poland and Latvia. However, they 
are largely indifferent to the importance of transnational advocacy networks in this process. They 
briefly refer to the International Gay Lesbian Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA)-Europe 
as a “small” NGO in Brussels, side stepping its importance as an instigator of social change. As Chapter 
2 demonstrates in detail, it is precisely the work of a wide network of norm entrepreneurs that help 
establish the mechanisms of social change that O’Dwyer and Schwartz find to be important.  
41
 Herek (2004, 13) notes a similar psychological process of grafting the issue to local contexts by 
“appeal[ing] to the values consistent with the self-concept of [out-group] individuals and supported by 
their important reference groups.”  
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organizations furthers norm visibility (political channels).
42
 Second, I also identify two 
mechanisms of indirect diffusion in Figure 1.3: (1) a sense of shared political 
identification between adopter and transmitter can foster the transmission of an 
innovation; and (2) social information flows can broadcast the actions of the 
transmitter to potential adopters, both of which lead to issue visibility (social channels) 
(Soule 2004a). These transnational and international channels prime the contexts by 
providing legitimacy and scripts for interpretation of the issue, both of which are 
critical for the transnational actors trying to make their case.
43
 Transnational actors are 
better able to mobilize and to credibly diffuse their arguments in an environment 
where the visibility of the issue has been fostered by these channels. It is under these 
conditions of visibility that actors can harness ideas and adapt them to manufacture 
resonance in their domestic contexts, even when the ideas did not previously have 
appeal locally. A visibility argument thus dovetails with research of social problems 
theorists, who emphasize that issue salience leads to public and social action 
(Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). The visibility of a problem—or the construction of LGBT 
rights as a problem—explains much about the timing of state actions to combat 
homophobia, despite the persistent marginalization of sexual minorities for past 
centuries.  
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 These relational ties include state membership in international organizations, the signing of bi- and 
multi-lateral treaties (since 1945), the number of host embassies and high commissions, and 
involvement in UN peace missions (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009). 
43
 For simplicity, I often use the terms ‘transnational channels’ or ‘channels’ to refer to both sets of 
transnational and international channels. I do this to avoid writing out ‘transnational and international 
channels.’ I do this when I contrast the international/transnational from the domestic. When I am 
referring specifically to international political channels, I use the term ‘international.’ 
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Note: + (channel exists), - (channel does not exist).  
In sum, direct and indirect channels of visibility prime the domestic contexts 
by introducing images and ideas about the LGBT norm to the state. If domestic LGBT 
organizations become transnationally linked to organizations in leading states, they 
fuel domestic norm visibility, in large part through engaging state and societal 
institutions (e.g., by lobbying the state, staging demonstrations, and attracting media 
attention). They act as brokers between the movement and the state, framing and 
interpreting the norm to make it fit locally. Varying degrees of visibility lead to 
diverse outcomes in regard to institutional recognition of the norm. 
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Perceived Threat and Internalization 
What we know about mediated, direct and indirect channels of norm diffusion 
offers plausible concepts and mechanisms for understanding the spread of new ideas 
from one state to another, but the contentious element of the LGBT rights norm 
requires us to pay special attention to resistance in the domestic realm.
44
 My 
theoretical framework deals also with diffusion cases that fuel an active social 
opposition, such as the mobilization of resistance movements that challenge and 
externalize the positions endorsed by proponents of LGBT rights.
45
 To do this, the 
second element of my theory takes into consideration the domestic political and social 
contexts in which actors operate and how these contexts affect the diffusion and 
reception of ideas (Roggeband 2010). For example, how might the Catholic Polish 
context mediate the influence of a well-networked LGBT organization? Not all 
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 Snow and Benford (1999) suggest four agential relationships: (1) reciprocation: cases of diffusion in 
which both the transmitter and the adopter favor the item being diffused; (2) adaptation: cases with an 
active/copying adopter and a passive transmitter; (3) accommodation: cases of diffusion in which the 
transmitter promotes the diffusion of a foreign practice by tailoring it to the needs of a passive adopter; 
and (4) simple contagion: cases in which neither party wants to diffuse the innovation. Often times the 
adopter is welcoming or passive. Above, I am also describing adopters, as larger social entities—who 
are in fact resistant to it. I am thus also interested in a relationship not suggested by Snow and Bedford: 
active transmitter, resistant adopter.  
45
 My argument requires expanding the pool of usual actors and rethinking what part of the domestic 
context matters for diffusing contentious norms. In particular, transnational actors are often 
conceptualized as “good” norm entrepreneurs, often overlooking contention in the domestic sphere. 
Instead, previous literature usually focuses on one type of transnational actor responsible for the 
emergence and diffusion of ideas across borders, such as intergovernmental organizations (Finnemore 
1996), transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), or epistemic communities of experts 
(Adler 1992; P. M. Haas 1992). At the domestic level, the actors are state elites and/or civil society 
organizations (Checkel 1997). This is incomplete. The actors most effective at engendering change in 
this case are domestic LGBT rights organizations that can command transnational resources from first 
mover states. At the domestic level, the relevant actors go far beyond state elites to include societal 
actors and counter movements. This project adds such a dimension by exploring the following agents of 
norm diffusion: (1) European institutions, (2) transnational and domestic LGBT rights advocacy groups, 
and (3) anti-LGBT rights groups.   
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societies will find the imported norm equally threatening, depending on the perception 
of social institutions within the domestic context.
46
  
While states do nod to the LGBT norm by complying with some level of 
legislation, the process of internalization is more complex.
47
 The domestic context in 
which individuals are socialized mediates the ability of international norms to become 
internalized by society. Different societies associate different levels of threat with the 
LGBT norm, and threat perception facilitates the interaction between domestic and 
international norms. I define threat as the anticipation of danger to a set of values that 
define a group, and perception as the process of apprehending by means of the 
senses.
48
 It is important to note that this definition assumes that threat can have a 
symbolic value at the collective level, in that threat is socially constructed through 
discourse among political authorities and publics (C. O. Meyer 2009; Rousseau 2006; 
Stein forthcoming).
49
 This sociological interpretation of perceived threat stipulates that 
social understandings within the domestic realm define the way state actors respond to 
international pressures (Andrews 1975, 524–535).50 Thus, similarly strong channels of 
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 By viewing states as “undifferentiated” rational actors, we ignore variety among states on a plethora 
of issues that are important to international security (P. J. Katzenstein 1995, 92).  A better 
understanding is that “the identity of states emerges from their interaction with different social 
environments, both domestic and international” (93). 
47
 Internalization must also take into account a distinction between state and national identities. 
Whereas state identities “are primarily external; they describe the actions of governments in a society of 
states,” national identities “are primarily internal; they describe the processes by which mass publics 
acquire, modify, and forget their collective identities” (Katzenstein 1998, 20). 
48
 This IR definition can be related to the social movement literature’s definition of threat, where it 
denotes that “threat denotes the probability that existing benefits will be taken away or new harms 
inflicted if challenging groups fail to act collectively” (Almeida 2003). 
49
 Collective identity refers to the “shared sense of ‘we-ness’ or ‘one-ness’ anchored in real or imagined 
shared attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity and in relation or contrast 
to one or more actual or imagined sets of ‘others’” (Snow 2001, 2213). 
50
 Drawing on Schmitt’s (1996) 1932 thesis, Katzenstein (2003, 736) argues that “conceptions of 
identity, of self versus other, are always part of threat perceptions. The norms and identities that trigger 
different threat perceptions are not merely derivative of material capabilities … The threat perceptions 
of groups and states are embedded instead in systems of meaning that affect what is and what is not 
defined as a threat.”  
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LGBT visibility will have differing effects depending on the level of threat that 
societies attribute to the norm. I find that the degree to which the LGBT norm is 
perceived as a threat is at its highest in domestic contexts in which religion is deeply 
embedded in the national identity.
51
 Where this relationship exists, contending actors 
can better cast external LGBT rights norms as threatening.  
At the domestic level, the strength and legitimacy of competing (traditionalist 
and LGBT rights) norms in distinct domestic environments explain the variation in the 
internalization of LGBT norms. Due to the religious and national basis of much LGBT 
rights denial, I expect anti-LGBT rights mobilization to be politically effective when 
narratives of nation hinge on religious identity, because sexual politics then become 
indirectly linked with nationalism. Take, for example, a 1927 quote from Roman 
Dmowski, an ideologue of modern Polish nationalism:  
Catholicism is not an appendage to Polishness...it is embedded in its essence, 
and in a large measure it is its essence. To attempt to dissociate Catholicism 
from Polishness, and to separate the Polish nation from its religion and the 
Church, means to destroy the very essence of that nation (cited in O’Dwyer 
and Schwartz 2010, 236). 
In this sense, societies and social groups define their domestic identity and use this 
identity to evaluate and determine which outside norms are acceptable to internalize 
(Rousseau 2006, 211). Not all societies will find the norm import equally threatening, 
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 This concept builds on the notion that the institutional makeup of a nation—“the normative and 
organizational arrangements which form the ‘state,’ structure society, and link the two in the polity”—
influences (a) the availability of channels for transnational actors to enter the political realm and (b) the 
ability of these actors to form winning coalitions that change policy (Evangelista 1999; Risse-Kappen 
1995, 6). However, the emphasis here is on normative structures that facilitate legitimacy, as opposed to 
state structure, conceived of as central versus fragmented governance models. This is because evidence 
does not suggest that governance structure determines success for LGBT rights activists. Checkel has 
argued that norm diffusion is “more rapid when… a systemic norm… resonates with historically 
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depending on how domestic social institutions perceive the norm import. The EU’s 
standards of appropriate behavior on LGBT rights norms smack of outside imposition 
to some societies and of welcome modernity to others. I do not argue that all 
historically religious states will oppose the norm. By contrast, I find that traditionalist 
religious scripts are only legitimate—and subsequently effective—if they are tied to 
the popular nation.  
Religious institutions—when they have mobilized to challenge EU pressures 
on behalf of LGBT rights—have varying degrees of social legitimacy in different 
states. By this, I mean that the constitutive effect of secularism and tradition varies 
across nations (Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006). In particular, the Vatican has framed 
these “external” norms as threatening to the national identity of the state (Ramet 
2006).
52
 Whereas in some Catholic cases, the Church has moral authority and has been 
successful in fueling resistance and framing a message of threat to resonate with 
popular beliefs (e.g., Poland, Lithuania, and Ireland), in other plausible cases it has not 
(e.g., Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain). In the latter cases, LGBT groups, using their 
European frames, found earlier success. To explain this difference, I employ case 
studies work to show that the Church’s moral authority depends on its history as a 
political actor in the domestic realm. In Poland, the Catholic Church, as a champion of 
                                                                                                                                            
constructed domestic norms” (1998, 243). 
52
 IR theories of diffusion are largely silent about such counter-movements as an element of domestic 
and transnational opportunity structures, which hinders their ability to explain international norms that 
elicit active resistance.  As one critic put it, much of the research “overestimate[s] diffusion to the 
domestic level and underestimate[s] possible domestic conflict between norms” (Landolt 2004, 585). 
Those scholars who are sensitive to the misfit between the international and domestic almost naturally 
assume non-contentious issues (Acharya 2004). However, it is almost always difficult to make LGBT 
rights norms congruent with the local beliefs (Manalansan 1995), which is why framing the issue as one 
of European standards becomes an attractive tool at the disposal of transnational activists. Finally, 
scholars of transnationalism generally address the “common good” (Risse-Kappen 1995), which says 
little about the many transnational issues that deal with minority rights. This omission is critical because 
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the Solidarity movement, created a role for itself as an autonomous, progressive moral 
entrepreneur with deep ties to the popular nation. In contrast, the Slovenes linked the 
Church to Nazi-German occupation, the Slovaks linked it to state socialism in 
Czechoslovakia, and Spaniards linked it to Franco’s regime in Spain. Strong resistance 
is less likely in states where the Church fell on the “wrong” side of democratic 
transition and lost its moral authority as a constitutive part of national identity.  
In sum, state and societal responses to European norms concerning LGBT 
rights developed differently depending on levels of the LGBT norm’s visibility and on 
the different domestic perceptions of threat associated with the norm. Figures 1.4 
(process) and 1.5 (outcomes) predict a set of internalization outcomes leading to norm 
visibility moderated by threat perception. Since norm visibility is a function of both 
transnational and domestic factors, one can anticipate an initial backlash in new states, 
where the issue is made more visible from the periphery.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
minorities, arguably more than others, have incentives to look beyond their states to join forces with 
those who share a common identity.    
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Table 1.5: Internalization Outcomes based on Conditions of Threat and Channels of Visibility 
 Channels of Visibility 
Low High 
Domestic 
Perceived 
Threat 
Low Type I: Minimal Change, 
Following an Upward 
Regional Trend 
Type II: Internalization 
High 
Type III: Resistance 
Type IV: Cautious 
Internalization after Phase of 
Resistance 
 
Type I: Minimal change 
 Few channels of visibility in states with low perceived threat will have little 
deliberation and minimal change. 
 
Type II: Societal attitudes improve (internalization) 
 The LGBT norm generates deliberation once visible; norm brokers illuminate 
historical narrations of LGBT people in their own respective countries.  
 International ideas of democratic responsibility/human rights resonate; states 
conform to the standards of a community to which they belong.  
 
Type III: Societal attitudes worsen (resistance)  
 Intensification of anti-LGBT politics by some religious and nationalist sectors 
of society; few channels of visibility can let discourse of threat go unchecked.  
 
Type IV: Societal attitudes improve post-resistance (cautious internalization) 
 Transnationally embedded domestic actors call attention to resistance and 
transnational and international attention heightens, fueling even more visibility 
and active deliberation in target state. This process suggests a strategic 
relationship, where resistance leads to more visibility—but only if 
transnationally embedded domestic groups exist.  
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Figure 1.4 reaffirms the importance of strong transnationally connected 
domestic actors to broker and frame the message according to context. Whereas high 
levels of perceived threat foster active resistance, in the long run it is only effective if 
the presence of transnationally embedded LGBT groups in the domestic realm is 
weak. Where they have existed, transnational LGBT groups have channeled 
international EU attention that has led to the deployment of additional outside 
pressures on states for breaching appropriate standards.
53
 Ironically, the mobilization 
of anti-LGBT groups creates a type of visibility on its own, which in most cases has 
proved to be self-defeating.
54
 Chapter 5 presents the findings of my organizational 
survey, showing that the large majority of respondents described Type II or Type IV 
outcomes.  
While my research gives credence to the optimism that proponents of LGBT 
rights express for change—even in hard cases, like Poland—it remains attuned to the 
struggle they describe in many facets of their work. Just as feminist scholarship has 
critiqued simple progress narratives, rigid and sequential theory is not well suited for 
explaining change related to LGBT rights. While broad societal visibility is indeed 
new and different in the time period that I analyze, history reminds us that previous 
advances for LGBT people were followed by repression. Germany is a key example: 
despite relative tolerance and path-breaking research on homosexuality in the 1890s, 
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 In the case of LGBT rights, pro- and anti-LGBT groups are mutually constitutive because they exist 
partly on their own initiative, but also as a response to opposing actors (Fetner 2008). They compete to 
define the nation according to their perceptions of what is appropriate and legitimate in their particular 
society.  
54
 As will address in Chapter 5, the Church no longer monopolizes the anti-LGBT issue during phases 
of resistance, when the populist far-right adopts an anti-LGBT politics as its central issue in opposition 
to outside influences (e.g., Jobbik in Hungary, or the League of Polish Families and the All Polish 
Youth in Poland). Gradually, Church leaders become more careful not to associate themselves with the 
  34 
Germany revised Paragraph 175 of its Criminal Code in 1935 to more broadly 
criminalize homosexuality, leading to the internment and deaths of thousands of gay 
men. Thus, both variation in threat perception and careful attention to particularities of 
the state are important moderating components of this argument. There are also 
institutional and regional scope conditions to my argument, which make certain 
aspects of the visibility theory work uniquely in this set of EU states. The introduction 
of an LGBT norm has fueled only resistance and no change in Ecuador, a state in 
which actors have struggled to frame the norm successfully in the local context—
globalization was seen as an external imposition. In Europe transnational actors have 
an important frame at their disposal: “we are all European”—there regionalization can 
at least sometimes be seen as self-reflection and internal learning, not external 
imposition. Indeed, Estonians are both Estonians and Europeans, just as Swedes are 
both Swedes and Europeans. Finally, the interactive models above describe a 
framework for the processes involving the introduction of norms, both in terms of 
transnational channels and domestic structures. While the model suggests an analytic 
sequence, its focus remains on mechanisms of change, which do not depend on an 
empirical sequence.  
CASE SELECTION AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
 
I addressed my research questions by collecting data on (1) the set of post-
2004 members of the EU (today these are 10 ex-Communist Bloc countries, plus 
Cyprus and Malta) and (2) the case studies of Germany, Poland, and Slovenia. Europe 
offers the ideal laboratory for testing and refining my theory due to the EU norm of 
protecting sexual minorities and the presence of states on both ends of the “gay 
                                                                                                                                            
far-right articulation of the issue, as discourse by extremists becomes unpalatable to the tastes of the 
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friendliness” spectrum.  Furthermore, the EU is a likely case for diffusion (Checkel 
1997, 480) because it provides the mechanisms that regularly function to constrain 
states to conform to international norms (P. J. Katzenstein 2005; Tarrow 2011).   
The dissertation includes large-n analyses that use quantitative methods to test 
correlations between predictors in all EU member states and small-n analyses that use 
qualitative methods to trace channels of diffusion from Germany and the EU to Poland 
and Slovenia.  Consistent with my theoretical proposition, I select the first set of states 
based on three criteria: all states were members of the Soviet Bloc, experienced 
greater exposure to advanced norms on homosexuality (originating in the EU, the 
United States, etc.) after 1989, and were successful in gaining membership to the EU. 
On average, these states score markedly lower on rates of acceptance of sexual 
minorities compared to the EU-15 (see Figures 1.6 and 1.7 in Appendix A). They 
emerged from transition having had little discourse on the LGBT rights issue prior to 
beginning the EU accession process, which subjected them to the only internationally 
recognized legal protections for sexual minorities in the world (Swiebel 2009). Even 
in the most secular of these states, discussion of homosexuality was rarely public 
(McCajor Hall 2009). In contrast, the 1960s sexual revolution and the 1980s 
HIV/AIDS epidemic politicized LGBT rights much earlier throughout several states in 
Western Europe.  
The second set of states represents ideal cases for understanding the 
mechanisms by which ideas diffuse. I compare Poland and Slovenia on their different 
rates of change along both indicators of the dependent variable: social attitudes and 
                                                                                                                                            
average citizenry and anti-LGBT politics loses legitimacy. 
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laws toward sexual minorities (refer to Figure 1.1 and 1.2).
55
 Poland’s 2004 accession 
challenged the power of EU leverage within national borders, as religion and national 
identity stood opposed to granting sexual minorities their social recognition. Despite 
some minimal institutional change, the Polish government showed itself resistant to 
European norms on LGBT rights and societal attitudes toward sexual minorities 
remained overwhelmingly negative (O’Dwyer and Schwartz 2010; Amnesty 
International 2006). The Polish experience stands in contrast to that of Slovenia, 
where social attitudes and legislation have changed at a remarkably accelerated pace.  
In 2004, about 60% of Poles felt homosexuality was never justifiable, while only 
about 20% of Slovenes agreed (EVS). Slovenia, along with the Czech Republic, also 
extends the most far-reaching LGBT rights legislation in Central and Eastern Europe, 
including protections that surpass those of many older member states. The different 
outcomes in these two historically Catholic countries merit analysis (Chapter 5).  
Germany represents the central “norm entrepreneur” case for the analysis (the 
norm also originates elsewhere, a fact I explore in the large-n analysis of channels to 
recipient states). In particular, the cases of Germany and Poland make explicit the 
connection between the “norm entrepreneur” and the “target state” by illustrating how 
ideas moved from Germany to Poland, a process in which actors based in Germany 
became involved in Poland leading up to accession in 2004. This involvement occurs 
in a type of activism similar to what Imig and Tarrow call “cooperative 
transnationalism,” in which the actors involved are transnational but the foreign target 
of contention is a state (2001, 17).
56
 For example, in 2005, the illegal gay rights march 
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 Consistent with case selection guidelines, I have variation on the dependent variable (Collier and 
Mahoney 1996; Geddes 1990). 
56
 Collective transnationalism (cf. Imig and Tarrow 2001) is rare for LGBT rights groups. ILGA-Europe 
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in Warsaw was largely composed of German citizens (Chapter 2). In fact, a 
transnational group of activists at an LGBT rights organization in Germany organized 
the protest. Many of these activists were expatriate Poles—“rooted 
cosmopolitans”57—who were empowered by resources available to them in Berlin. A 
year after the protest, the ECtHR decided in favor of the organizers in the case they 
brought against Poland (for prohibiting the protest), making similar parades legal in all 
Polish cities. Many analogous examples exist, making the involvement of groups 
within and across German borders a valuable case for the study of the 
transnationalization of activism concerning LGBT rights.   
Finally, the LGBT norm lends itself to cross-national analysis because it 
applies to a minority that exists in all societies and often shares the same ethnic and 
cultural background of the rest of the society. The data suggest that individuals in 
society-at-large rarely take a middle-ground position on the issue
58—thus, there is 
little contention about specific content of the norm, which is an important precondition 
for norm implementation (Dimotrova and Rhinard 2005). In other words, people either 
embrace or reject equal rights for sexual minorities. On a scale of 1 to 10, respondents 
usually position themselves at the ends of the spectrum by answering that 
homosexuality is either “always” (1) or “never” (10) acceptable (EVS 1989-2010). 
LGBT rights are thus a case of a contentious norm at an early phase of development 
and a symbol of socio-cultural modernity (Carillo 2007) from which we can generate 
                                                                                                                                            
is the only direct pressure point on the EU Commission and it functions almost exclusively through 
legal challenges (Marks and McAdam 1996). 
57
 Rooted cosmopolitans refer to “people and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts, but 
who engage in regular activities that require their involvement in transnational networks of contacts and 
conflicts” (Tarrow and della Porta 2005, 237; Tarrow 2005, 35-71).   
58
 Using a different dataset by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), a report by the 
William’s Institute finds a similar bimodal trend in attitudes towards homosexuality across the globe (T. 
W. Smith 2011). 
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theory to explain other contentious norms—for example, those concerning gender and 
immigrant politics.   
Operationalization—Overview of Research Methods and Data Collection  
I developed a research design through which I sought to understand diffusion 
processes by exploring both the transnational actors and transnational channels that 
carry international LGBT rights norms and the domestic structures that welcome or 
reject them. The dissertation employed an eclectic multi-method (quantitative and 
qualitative) approach to increase confidence in the findings. I followed guidelines for 
multi-method research using “nested analysis,” which begins with a large-n statistical 
test of correlation between variables and then, depending on the results, proceeds to 
either “model-testing small-n analysis,” or to “model-building small-n analysis” 
(Lieberman 2005, 436). Qualitative interviews allowed me to confirm or question the 
validity of the correlations I observed in the large-n analysis. They also allowed me to 
observe the mechanisms that connect the independent and dependent variables 
(McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Data collection in Europe involved over two years 
of on-site fieldwork from July 2010 to August 2012, as well as several weeks of 
preliminarily fieldwork in 2008 and 2009. My methods included semi-structured 
interviews, participant observation, and/or archival research in Berlin, Bratislava, 
Brussels, Budapest, Cracow, the Hague (host of the 2010 ILGA-Europe
59
 Meeting), 
Madrid, Prague, Turin (host of the 2011 ILGA-Europe Meeting), and Warsaw. I also 
conducted an organizational survey of 291 transnationally linked LGBT organizations.  
While the brunt of the qualitative research focused on my case studies 
(Germany, Poland, Slovenia, and the European institutions), I interviewed 82 actors 
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representing European institutions and the following states: Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey. Interviews ranged between 45 
minutes and 4 hours. Most interviewees were organizers at LGBT rights advocacy 
groups and policymakers that work with the issue at hand. These interviews 
investigated several questions: How is change stimulated and what are the various 
state responses to activism? Do actors use ad campaigns, lobby governments, and/or 
take to the streets in protest? Where does resistance originate? How much do actors 
rely on external aid and expertise? These questions shed light on the conditions that 
have led to divergent outcomes across the cases. My interviews explored the 
transnational ties between actors and the types of local obstacles that they face. I 
selected and interviewed organizers from the universe of transnational LGBT rights 
organizations in my cases. These interviews also helped me identify a sample of 
opposition groups and individual policymakers who oppose the introduction of LGBT 
rights norms, whom I approached for further interviews. The purpose of this set of 
interviews was to observe the strategy and rationale underlying the opposition towards 
liberalization and to supplement the information I obtained at LGBT rights 
organizations.   
Archival research uncovered qualitative and quantitative data for all EU 
member and applicant states. This research allowed me to code LGBT legislation 
across states and by year (1970-2010), a count of LGBT free spaces across time in 
Poland and Germany, and a series of other rich contextual data relevant to the 
analysis. It also allowed me to identify the network ties of all LGBT rights NGOs in 
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 The European branch of the International Gay Lesbian Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association. 
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Europe using membership lists and funding flows. To do this, I used a combination of 
online archives (e.g., those of ILGA, the European Parliament, the European Council, 
the European Fundamental Rights Agency), as well as on-site archives in LGBT 
museums, centers, and organizations.  
Participant observation centered around two types of events. First, I attended 
LGBT strategic activist meetings and conferences, including the 2010 and 2011 
ILGA-Europe Annual Meetings, the 2011 Organization for Cooperation and Security 
in Europe Meeting, the 2010 Europride Warsaw conference, a 2013 US State 
Department international videoconference on transgender rights, and several activist 
workshops. Issues covered at these meetings included the tactics behind transnational 
LGBT activism in Europe—for example, sessions on strategic litigation, organizing 
demonstrations, and creating synergy in transnational cooperation. Transnational anti-
LGBT rights activists also participated in order to voice their positions at some of the 
meetings I observed. This type of participant observation greatly informed my analysis 
by allowing me to listen to and interact with various representatives from states where 
I did not schedule formal interviews, providing additional valuable information to 
support the large-n analysis. Second, I invested time in attending countless political 
demonstrations for and against LGBT rights (both those that targeted their own states 
and those that drew attention to LGBT repression in foreign states
60
), pride 
parades/marches for LGBT rights, and nationalist demonstrations. Participant 
observation took place in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland, 
beginning with the early inspiration for this project at Polish-German demonstrations 
in 2005. 
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Finally, I sent out a survey (using Qualtrics Survey Software) to one expert at 
each of the 291 transnational LGBT organizations that my research has identified in 
the 47 Council of Europe countries (cf. Appendix A for survey questions). By 
transnational LGBT organizations, I refer to domestic organizations that are members 
of transnational umbrella organizations (i.e., ILGA-Europe and the International 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer Youth and Student Organization). Of the 
291 organizations I surveyed, 180 responded, bringing the response rate to 62%. 
While there is no standard response rate, compared to previous research that employed 
organizational surveys, a 62% yield is substantially above the average yield (Baruch 
and Holtom 2008; Hager et al. 2003).
61
 
My original data collection, coupled with data derived from five existing 
databases, resulted in three new datasets: an original Europe-wide dataset of five 
different pieces of LGBT legislation across states and time, an original survey of the 
291 transnational LGBT organizations in Europe, and an international survey of 
attitudes toward LGBT people. The quantitative large-n analysis compares diffusion 
across all EU member states using various statistical modeling techniques: ordered 
logistic, event history, and multilevel random intercept iterative generalized least 
squares (IGLS) regression models (Chapters 3 and 4). The qualitative component uses 
process-tracing techniques to study the change in carefully selected case studies 
described above (Chapters 2 and 5). This ‘analytically eclectic’ research design 
follows a pragmatic, problem-driven approach to scholarship, in which the pursuit of 
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For example, a February 15, 2012 demonstration by LGBT activists and German parliamentarians at 
the Russian Embassy to protest an anti-LGBT propaganda law in St. Petersburg (group no. 208).  
61
 One study comparing 16 publications (that used organizational surveys) reported an average response 
rate of 42% (Hager et al. 2003). Another study, analyzing over 490 publications using survey research, 
found that organizational surveys yield a smaller response rate—35.7 % with a standard deviation of 
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understanding complex realities drives the selection of methods—even if they are 
rooted in ostensibly incompatible academic traditions (Sil and Katzenstein 2010a). 
Combined, the various methods I employ shed light on the processes behind the 
adoption of and resistance to LGBT rights norms in various domestic contexts. 
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter 2 sets the stage for the rest of the analysis by exploring how 
internationalization influences the mobilization of marginalized citizens. It focuses on 
the mobilization of norm entrepreneurs—the agents behind diffusion—building upon 
the theoretical concepts and background information introduced above. Specifically, 
the chapter addresses the question of how marginalized actors are mobilized across 
borders and introduces the mechanisms that these actors employ in their attempts to 
influence state and society. I use the cases of Germany and Poland, within the 
European institutions, to trace cross-border connections between norm entrepreneur 
and target state. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 then present the large-n, cross-national empirical analyses 
and findings. Both chapters revolve around the central research questions. 
Respectively, they ask what accounts for differences in state laws and national 
attitudes toward sexual minorities across European states. Chapter 3 employs event 
history and ordered logit techniques to analyze the timing, rate, and adoption of 
various LGBT rights laws in EU states across 40 years. Chapter 4 uses multilevel 
random intercept IGLS models to explain the differences and to make inferences about 
the state’s contextual influence over individual attitudes towards homosexuality across 
three points in time. 
                                                                                                                                            
18.8%—to that of individual-level surveys (Baruch and Holtom 2008). 
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 Chapter 5 encompasses the second core qualitative component of the 
dissertation. Using the case studies of Poland and Slovenia, I compare differences in 
domestic norm reception and socio-legal outcomes for LGBT people across two target 
states, asking why resistance and acceptance of norms governing LGBT rights 
developed differently across those contexts. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with a 
discussion of my findings and their implications for theory and practice in world 
politics. The chapter also outlines those elements of my argument that are limited to 
Europe, as well as those that are generalizable to issues of global change on sexual 
minority rights. It closes with reflection on the project’s importance in light of current 
events, both within the EU and in relation to those beyond Europe.  
Throughout, I find that a politics of visibility is important for understanding 
how and when social and political systems change in response to the mobilization of 
“weak” groups. Several theories in international relations and comparative politics rest 
on the idea that social institutions and actors can transform the lived experience of 
marginalized peoples, but we know too little about why such groups have wielded 
power in some states while lacking power in others. In highlighting the importance of 
visibility for change in world politics, the following chapters help us to understand 
why the trajectories of socio-legal recognition for marginalized groups are remarkably 
dissimilar across states. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Mobilizing Norm Brokers:  
Actors, Opportunities and Mechanisms Driving Transnational Activism
62
 
 
When the late Polish President and former Mayor of Warsaw, Lech Kaczynski, 
banned marches for LGBT equality in 2004 and 2005, LGBT organizations began 
generating press by contacting international authorities and media outlets to organize 
and hold the event illegally on June 11
th
, 2005. What was unique about illegal Parada 
Równości (Equality March), compared to similar gay pride events in other major cities 
where LGBT visibility has become common, was that a transnational group of 
activists organized the event from both Poland and neighboring Germany. Many of 
these activists were expatriate Poles who used resources made available to them in 
Berlin. Of the 5,000 illegal marchers in the streets of Warsaw almost half of those 
demanding the right of assembly for sexual minorities in Poland came from foreign 
contexts and included prominent European politicians (interview no. 125). In 2007, an 
expatriate Pole working from Berlin, and four other Polish-based activists, brought a 
case against Poland (for prohibiting the protest) before the European Court of Human 
Rights, which decided in his favor and made similar parades legal in all Polish cities. 
According to Tomasz Bączkowski, the activist who organized the march and later took 
the case to Strasbourg:  
It was organized in Berlin because I lived there … I had a lot of experiences in 
Germany, I knew how to do this—or how one should do it—and I thought, in 
these times … it shouldn’t be a problem organizing from the outside. 
  45 
Naturally, through the personal contacts with Claudia Roth and others, it was 
much easier for me to organize it from [Germany] then for Polish activists in 
Poland, where the environment in general is very hostile. In retrospect, these 
international political pressures were much more important than if I would 
have just done this in Poland (interview no. 124).
63
  
The illegal march provided the political opportunity to link the social situation 
of Polish sexual minorities to Poland’s recent accession to the EU through the frames 
of democratic values and human rights. Many activists remember it as one of the most 
important public assemblies for the rights of LGBT Poles and a turning point for 
Polish LGBT activism amidst an oppressive political environment.
64
 Polish LGBT 
activism—one experience within a larger campaign for LGBT rights in Europe—
illustrates the increasing influence that Europeanization has on the political 
mobilization of norm entrepreneurs and their tactics. This chapter reflects on 
transnational LGBT activism in Europe, emphasizing the role Europe plays in 
facilitating the mobilization of these actors. It also highlights the mechanisms that 
these actors engage in their attempt to impact both society and state. Highlighted 
throughout the dissertation, these socialization mechanisms include brokerage, 
framing, learning, and deliberation. 
INTRODUCTION 
To what extent do processes of Europeanization facilitate the political 
mobilization and influence the strategies of LGBT norm entrepreneurs in the European 
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 An adapted version of this chapter will appear as a stand-alone article in the European Political 
Science Review.  
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 Translated from German by author.  
64
 The Kultura dla Tolerancji 2004 and 2005 also generated attention. The Warsaw March was also 
banned in 2004, to which activists responded by organizing an illegal rally. 
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Union? The answer that this chapter proffers emphasizes that European integration 
changes the ramifications and tactics of LGBT activism by altering political 
opportunity structures for mobilization. As a result, transnational European networks 
of LGBT activists are formed, which in turn employ mechanisms of socialization to 
push for the social and legal visibility of LGBT people in various member states.  
I analyze Europeanization by looking at both vertical opportunities provided by 
European institutions and horizontal ones provided by specific EU member states. The 
EU’s multi-level system offers a host of political opportunities for advocacy groups to 
mobilize around social issues. These opportunities, however, crucial as they are for an 
understanding of LGBT activism in the EU, are more complex than traditionally 
thought. I argue that the Europeanization of LGBT activism is facilitated by a vertical 
(top-down and bottom-up) interaction between domestic states and Brussels; it also 
functions horizontally by facilitating networks of actors across member states. I 
demonstrate this by focusing on the discrepancies in the opportunity for LGBT 
mobilization in two member states, one open to norm entrepreneurs and thus 
facilitating mobilization, the other a closed target state. This phenomenon occurs in a 
type of activism similar to what Imig and Tarrow (2001, 17) call “cooperative 
transnationalism;” the actors are transnational and the foreign target of contention is 
domestic. Furthermore, I contend that vertical and horizontal opportunities for 
mobilization bring together different types of actors who rely on mechanisms of 
socialization and frame their demands in a European discourse.  
This chapter’s argument proceeds in three steps. First, I argue that the 
Europeanization of LGBT rights begins primarily as a vertical process in which the 
EU imposes formal rules on member states and builds the capacities of civil society 
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organizations to lobby domestic institutions. This engenders new domestic discourses 
and generates media attention around the LGBT issue which domestic groups then use 
to draw attention from external actors. Second, I make a case for looking at the 
Europeanization of LGBT mobilization horizontally. I argue that Europeanization 
facilitates transnational activism around LGBT issues through the free movement of 
peoples and through transnational advocacy networks, granting actors from the ‘new,’ 
target states access to important mobilizing structures in other member states. The 
abundance of social spaces and organizational resources in a ‘leading’ member state 
were very important for bringing together the main actors and empowering them with 
the resources for transnational activism in another. These factors provided the 
ingredients for mobilization that were not available in the target state. Third, in 
arguing that much LGBT activism is mobilized among member states, I show that 
mechanisms of socialization through EU-level frames and elites almost always 
accompany such mobilization. Employing socialization mechanisms that highlight 
appropriate behavior, actors frame their demands tactically in a European discourse by 
making the issue of LGBT acceptance one of human rights and democratic 
responsibilities as members of the EU community. They use these frames to broker the 
issue across various contexts.  
In developing these arguments, I focus on the case of European transnational 
advocacy networks and cross-border German-Polish LGBT activism. As described in 
Chapter One, the EU provides an ideal setting for analysis because we observe a norm 
of protecting sexual minorities and the only internationally binding legal protections 
for such minorities (Swiebel 2009). At the same time, it houses states with differing 
levels of LGBT recognition. Hence the focus on the member states of Germany and 
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Poland: they make explicit the connections between a ‘leading’ and a ‘new’ state, with 
Polish and German activists—norm entrepreneurs—using resources available to them 
in Germany to mobilize in Poland. Next, Section 1 lays out the theoretical framework, 
argument and methods by engaging literatures on Europeanization and political 
opportunity structures for mobilization. Section 2 discusses the varying contextual 
settings of German and Polish gay life and how the resources and networks in Berlin 
were used to horizontally mobilize for the recognition of sexual minorities in Poland. 
In Section 3, I present the set of norm entrepreneurs involved in transnational 
European LGBT activism, using the case of Poland, and describe how they came 
together. The actors mobilized across member states are more numerous and different 
from those elite actors mobilized vertically with the support of the EU. Section 4 
describes the tactics and processes behind transnational LGBT activism and reflects on 
how activists use EU-level discursive frames and mechanisms of socialization to 
achieve their goals. The chapter closes by reflecting on the strengths and limitations of 
Europeanization processes concerning LGBT mobilization, and sets the stage for 
analyzing the effect of such outcomes in the following chapters.  
I. EUROPEANIZATION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRANSNATIONAL 
ACTIVISM 
The Europeanization of a Norm 
The aims of this chapter are both to introduce the relevant types of norm 
entrepreneurs and mechanisms central to this dissertation, and second, to contribute to 
the literature on Europeanization and political opportunities for transnational 
movements by looking at the mobilization of LGBT activists across borders in Europe. 
Scholars broadly define Europeanization as “processes of (a) construction, (b) 
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diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms, which are first 
defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic 
of domestic discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli 2004, cited in 
Krizsan and Popa 2010, 382). Most research emphasizes vertical interactions between 
Brussels and the member states, focusing on processes of formal institutional politics 
between elites at both levels. Theories based on both rational and sociological 
institutionalism are used to explain outcomes in policy changes across European 
member states. Rational institutionalism advances a logic of consequences, whereby 
domestic actors make cost-benefit calculations based on external incentives provided 
in Brussels. Sociological institutionalism purports a logic of appropriateness, 
according to which actors internalize EU norms and rules as part of their identity as 
members of an international society (Checkel 1997, 2005). Both mechanisms are top-
down processes, with the EU facilitating change by imposing sanctions and/or through 
persuasion, capacity building and promotion of transnational cooperation.   
Indeed, as in most other realms of European policy, both rational and 
sociological mechanisms are at play in furthering LGBT rights (Börzel and Risse 
2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). A series of European actors—the EU 
institutions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and a transnational 
network of activists—have fostered change by propagating an international norm on 
LGBT rights and diffusing the issue into the domestic discourses of various European 
states. European institutions have actively championed the norm of protecting sexual 
minorities directly through accession requirements. Examples of this include Article 
13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, the 2000 Employment Anti-Discrimination Directive, the 
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European Charter for Fundamental Rights, the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for 
accession, and various official statements. While European institutions contribute to a 
minimum level policy change across all member states directly (i.e. decriminalization 
of adult same-sex relations, anti-discrimination in employment, and asylum), most 
other changes come about indirectly through the facilitation of transnational advocacy 
networks. As the expert survey results of European LGBT organizations in Figures 2.1 
and 2.2 show, the effect of European institutions is substantial, but leaves much to be 
explained, especially in terms of change in social attitudes (Figure 2.2). Figure 2.1 
illustrates a strong direct link between European institutions and domestic LGBT 
politics and policy, with representatives of 138 (82%) LGBT organizations reporting 
“some” (53%) or “a lot” (29%) of influence. Figure 2.2 demonstrates that the direct 
nature of this link is less pronounced when the outcome concerns domestic attitudes 
toward LGBT people, with only (43%) reporting “some” (37%) or “a lot” (6%) of 
influence.  
Figure 2.1: Organizational Responses to the Question: In your opinion, how much influence do 
European-level institutions – that is, institutions like the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, the European Court of Justice, or the European Court of Human Rights – have on your 
country’s politics and policies related to the rights of LGBT people?
65
 (N=169) 
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 This question is adapted from a question formulated by O’Dwyer (2010, 236–237), and used in his 
survey (N=28) of Polish activists and politicians.  
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Figure 2.2: Organizational Responses to the Question: In your opinion, how much influence do 
European-level institutions – that is, institutions like the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, the European Court of Justice, or the European Court of Human Rights – have on what 
people in your country think about the rights of LGBT people? (N=169) 
 
 
As Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) make clear, Europeanization as a process 
is not always directly tied to the EU institutions. Instead, Europeanization leaves 
substantial room for a series of other indirect processes to affect change. In line with 
Krizsan and Popa’s (2010, 384) work on the Europeanization of policies against 
domestic violence, I observe “a logic of consequences [that] dominates before 
accession, while appropriateness becomes the predominant logic post-accession.” The 
EU does require states to make changes to accompany accession, but it becomes 
cautious about “embarrassing its own members” once they are in (interview nos. 15 
and 138), bringing into question the successful implementation and promotion of new 
LGBT policies (O’Dwyer 2010).66 Instead, the brunt of the effort to induct “actors into 
the norms and rules of a given community… [so] that an agent switches from a logic 
of consequences to a logic of appropriateness” (Checkel 2005, 804) is left to a 
transnational network of activists. 
As scholars of the European woman’s movement have observed, transnational 
advocacy networks play a central role in Europeanization because EU competences in 
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 “The EU is most effective when it has a carrot to dangle” (interview no. 126). 
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sanctioning states for infringing upon the rights of LGBT peoples remain limited 
(Krizsan and Popa 2010; Roggeband 2010). “The formation of transnational advocacy 
networks links actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations in a way 
that can multiply the opportunities for marginalized groups to mobilize” (Montoya 
2008, 360). A European network of LGBT activists exists, composed of 
transnationally linked domestic NGOs, international human rights NGOs and 
sympathetic policy elites. ILGA (International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Intersex 
Association) Europe—the largest and richest of ILGA International’s six regional 
organizations—connects 291 domestic and local organizations across the EU and 
Council of Europe member states. It “serves as a conduit for knowledge and best 
practice for national LGBT groups and, perhaps more importantly, lobbying European 
institutions to adopt decisions and policies that enhance the legal standing of LGBT 
people in European law and policy” (Kollman 2009, 42). With the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the Brussels-based organization became an official partner of the 
European Commission and has received its core funding from that EU institution since 
then (Paternotte 2012). Similarly, the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT 
rights grew out of the cooperation between ILGA-Europe and sympathetic members of 
the European Parliament (MEP), providing an elite EU response to LGBT issues 
around Europe. These networks share resources and pool information to develop 
tactics for promoting the visibility of LGBT people in Europe.  
Such advocacy networks are brought together via new political opportunities 
provided by the EU’s multi-level framework. For LGBT mobilization, my 
understanding of Europeanization departs from the traditional literature above in some 
respects, as it is less concerned with elite-driven processes concerning (non-) 
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compliance and policy outcomes. Most research has a top-down, vertical 
understanding of Europeanization, which neglects that fact that Europeanization also 
facilitates a space for horizontal interaction.
67
 By horizontal, I mean the pressures and 
actors mobilized across member states, using European frames. For LGBT actors, who 
have long relied on safe spaces to express their identity, such horizontal interaction is 
an important pre-condition for their mobilization because the EU does not directly 
offer such public spheres. Furthermore, despite the higher level of legitimacy that the 
EU often holds on the issue, some member states are more advanced than others in 
their experience and legal understanding of LGBT rights. A useful theoretical lens to 
think about horizontal and vertical processes of Europeanization is that of political 
opportunities, which social movement scholars have explored at various levels.  
Varied Political Opportunities in Leading and New States 
Political opportunity structures (POS) were traditionally defined as the 
circumstances surrounding a political system, in particular, the availability of alliances 
and the strength of opponents in a given context. Most opportunities, however, are not 
structural, but rather subject to attribution and situational in that they need to be both 
perceived and visible to potential actors (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 43). As 
Princen and Kerremans (2008, 1132) synthesize, “the actual effects of political 
opportunities on social movements depend on (1) the identification of those 
opportunities, (2) the existence of collective identities and frames that are favorable to 
specific forms of political activity, and (3) organizational resource and capabilities that 
allow social movements to take advantage of those opportunities.” 
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For important exceptions, cf. work on EU networks (Montoya 2008, 2009, 2010; Roggeband 2010), 
work on EU cooperation, scale shift and brokerage (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Tarrow 2005b), work on 
EU up-, down- and lateral-loading in the women´s movement (Banaszak, Beckwith, and Rucht 2003). 
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While the foundational social movement literature treats the nation state as its 
natural arena, Europeanization deals with the supranational level and therefore has 
implications for POS. Recent literature on transnational social movements suggests 
that social movement actors in one state increasingly have ties to those in another and 
that actors in one state can target another’s government (Della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht 
2009; J. Smith 1997; Tarrow 2005b). Furthermore, scholars have explored how the 
political opportunities and constraints provided by the EU affect movement 
mobilization and tactics at local, national and supranational levels (Imig and Tarrow, 
2001; della Porta and Caiani 2007).
68
  
As with Europeanization literature, many of these studies are vertical in nature, 
exploring the presence (or absence) of transnational mobilization targeting Brussels. 
For LGBT activism, the assumption that “the growth of the EU as an important 
political center is likely to provoke political activities against it” does not hold (Marks 
and McAdam 1999, 251). By most accounts, the relationship between the EU and 
LGBT activists is harmonious, where activists see Brussels as an ally in a struggle 
against sometimes-hostile domestic governments. In line with earlier findings, LGBT 
activists use formal avenues of insider lobbying to address EU institutions rather than 
protest it (Marks and McAdam 1996). Indeed, the European Commission generously 
funds ILGA-Europe with the primary purpose of lobbying EU institutions. 
Europeanized opportunity structures become interesting for LGBT mobilization 
because they have an effect on the types of transnational and domestic actors 
                                                 
68
 This type of contention—and the mechanisms of brokerage and diffusion that this dissertation 
highlights—is closely related to the social movement concept of “scale shift,” the “process through 
which contention at one level is transposed to a higher (or a lower) one” (Tarrow and McAdam 2005). 
See also Soule (2013). 
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mobilized at various levels and on the strategies these actors implement in various 
member states.  
LGBT advocacy groups operate in an interactive environment that requires one 
to account for the openness of POS at domestic and international levels. Sikkink’s 
(2005) understanding of openness is receptiveness to NGO activity. For instance, 
when the domestic level is closed and interacting with an open international 
opportunity structure, she expects Boomerang or Spiral Model patterns, wherein 
domestic actors sidestep their governments to pressure from above (Risse, Ropp, and 
Sikkink 1999). If both domestic and international levels are open (e.g. Germany), 
activists will “privilege domestic political change, but will keep international activism 
as a complementary and compensatory option” (Sikkink 2005, 165). This forms what 
she calls insider-outsider coalitions, where activists in an open domestic context can 
aid those in a closed one. Poland, Germany and the EU are all open to advocacy 
groups, and at first glance do not differ on the variable of openness that is key to 
Sikkink’s framework. Yet the framework remains useful if we think of openness in 
terms of the social and legal acceptance of LGBT people, where there is still 
considerable variance. The discrepancies in visibility for LGBT people across Europe 
have led other observers to re-conceptualize open and closed opportunity structures for 
LGBT people. Holzhacker (2012), for example, has argued that the openness such 
structures for LGBT mobilization should be measured in terms of a context’s legal 
standing toward LGBT people, and its societal and elite opinion of them. In turn, 
political opportunities for LGBT need to be re-conceptualized, since the group is often 
invisible and fears both social and political costs associated with mobilization. 
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Argument, Case Selection and Methods 
Taking all the above considerations on Europeanization and POS into account, 
I pursue a twofold approach, according to which I explore both vertical and horizontal 
opportunities for the Europeanization of political mobilization by norm entrepreneurs. 
I will contend that horizontal and vertical Europeanization have differing effects on 
LGBT mobilization, but come together to make it effective. The former provides 
access to social spaces and organizational resources in open member states that 
mobilize LGBT publics (both elite and ordinary citizens) from one member state to 
another. Horizontal opportunities are particularly useful for non-institutionalized 
mobilization in a target state’s public sphere. Vertical opportunities provide the 
legitimacy and institutional clout to mobilize European political elites and socialize 
authorities in the target state as well as the frames and socialization mechanisms that 
activists use to make their message effective there.  
For the purposes of this analysis, I conceive of the POS for LGBT mobilization 
around the time of Polish accession (2004) as closed in Poland and open in Germany 
and at the macro EU-level. Poland emerged from transition having had little discourse 
on the LGBT issue prior to beginning the EU accession process, during which the state 
was subjected to new EU standards on LGBT rights. In contrast, the 1960s sexual 
revolution and the 1980s HIV/AIDS epidemic politicized LGBT issues much earlier 
throughout the Federal Republic of Germany. 
I use three measures based on Holzhacker (2012) to compare legal standing 
and societal and elite opinion in Germany and Poland. To measure legality at the state 
level, I collected data on the LGBT laws adopted in each state by 2005. These 
protective and equality laws go beyond decriminalization and score countries on six 
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measures of LGBT legal standing, such as the status of recognized partnerships, anti-
discrimination protections, and adoption rights (cf. Table 3.2 in Appendix C). With all 
27 EU states scoring between 2 and 12 points, Poland (2 points) scores comparatively 
low, and Germany (7.5) scores comparatively high, in the top-third.
69
 To compare the 
societal situation, I use available survey data on social attitudes toward sexual 
minorities (European Values Survey 1981–2008 2011).70 The percentage of Poles who 
approve of homosexuality (by selecting 1-5 on a scale of 1-10) was 15.63% in 2008, 
compared to 51.03% of Germans surveyed that same year (EVS).  
For elite opinion, I rely on interviews with politicians and national LGBT 
experts in Poland, Germany and at the EU institutions. Here again I recognize 
discrepancies in elite opinion between Germany and Poland. In Germany, all five 
federal political parties have LGBT committees that represent LGBT constituencies. 
While some members of these parties clearly hold homo/trans-phobic views, a taboo 
exists against expressing them. In Poland the situation is changing, but all 
interviewees explicitly cite openly hostile rhetoric among political parties in 2005 
(Bączkowski 2008). Political elites went so far as to propose a bill to remove 
homosexual schoolteachers from schools because of their supposed threat to 
children—this type of public discourse no longer has credibility among elites in 
Germany.  
Since the EU, as an international organization, has different competences than 
nation states, the same measures do not apply. That said, there is evidence that the EU 
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 In 2005, Poland had introduced anti-discrimination employment measures (2004) and equal sexual 
offenses provisions (1932); Germany had introduced the same, plus registered partnership (2001), 
second-parent adoption (2005) and anti-discrimination in goods and services (1992/2006)—
furthermore, some German Länder (including Berlin) had introduced anti-discrimination measures into 
their constitutions (ILGA-Europe 2009; Waaldijk 2009). 
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is the most LGBT progressive organization of nation states, when compared to the 
United Nations (Swiebel 2009).
71
 As in Germany, a taboo against elite homophobic 
rhetoric exists—this was particularly evident in 2004, when the prospects of a favored 
Commission Presidential candidate were scuppered after he expressed religious views 
that conflicted with the acceptance of homosexuality. The EU institutions have a clear 
mandate to promote LGBT rights in member states and abroad. Table 2.1 provides a 
sketch of what will follow. 
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 The 2008 survey wave (4
th
) was selected because it is the wave closest to the 2005 Equality March. 
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 In her provocative work, Angelia Wilson (2012) also outlines the differences that make Europe stand 
apart from the United States in being LGBT-friendly, which she attributes primarily to Europe’s 
political economy of care.  
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Table 2.1. Political Opportunity Structures for LGBT Mobilization, Mobilizing Structures, Types of 
Transnational Actors, and Tactics  
 Poland Germany  EU 
I. POS Type    
Legal Standing of LGBT 
People in 2005 (0-12) 
Low (2) High (7.5) N/A 
Societal Opinion 
Approving of 
Homosexuality in 2008 
Low (15.63%) High (51.03%)  N/A 
Elite Opinion Toward 
LGBT Equality in 2005 
Opposed/Split Supportive Supportive 
 Closed (New Target 
State) 
Open (Leading 
Horizontal Norm 
Entrepreneur) 
Open (Leading Vertical 
Norm Entrepreneur) 
II. Mobilizing Structures  
Social Spaces (Average 
# 1990-2005) 
Low (5.5) High (117.5) N/A 
LGBT Organizational 
Resources (Average # 
1990-2005) 
Low (4.9) High (48.5)  
Resources for protest in 
the public sphere 
High (EU Linked 
Umbrella 
Organizations)  
Resources for 
institutionalized 
lobbying of government 
III. Types of External Transnational Actors Horizontal Vertical 
Mobilization of Polish Expatriates/ 
Rooted Cosmopolitans  
+ - 
Mobilization of Foreign Political Elites  + + 
Mobilization of the Foreign Publics  + - 
IV. Mechanisms    
Norm Brokerage†  + -/+ - 
Legitimate Frames for 
Deliberation in Target 
State 
+ - + 
Legitimate Frames for 
Learning in Target State 
+ - + 
 
Note: 
†
Norm brokers connect the often-contrasting international norms and domestic traditions, to aid 
diffusion by framing norms—in a domestically familiar discourse—so they fit better locally. In this 
case study, they are local actors in Poland and specifically the Polish rooted cosmopolitans in Germany.  
 
 
The research methods employed in this chapter include expert interviews, 
archival research and participant observation. Many of my 82 semi-structured 
interviews dealt specifically with key players in Polish LGBT activism in Germany, 
Poland, and Brussels. The interviews were primarily conducted with activists and 
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politicians who were asked about their motivations and the strategies behind their 
mobilization, as well as their perception of the outcomes of that mobilization. Archival 
research uncovered organizational documents, mission statements, grant applications 
and press releases relating to transnational activism in Poland. Finally, participant 
observation at various LGBT marches, prides, street fairs, and strategic activist 
meetings in Poland and Germany since 2005 also informed this analysis. 
II. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES IN LEADING STATES 
Differing Opportunities for Gay Life in the EU and the Importance of Access to 
“Horizontal” Social Spaces and Organizational Capacities and Leading States 
This section makes the case that the abundance of social spaces and 
organizational resources in neighboring Germany were critical variables for bringing 
together the main actors, defining their common identity, and empowering them with 
the necessary resources for transnational activism in Poland. By LGBT social spaces, I 
refer to the centers for gay life that make the community visible and serve as safe 
spaces where LGBT people can meet and express their identity. Social spaces 
facilitate ties “by demonstrating the co-presence of others, thus showing people that 
issues they thought taboo can be discussed, and strengthening collective identity by 
providing tangible evidence of the existence of a group” (Polletta 1999, 25).72 Social 
spaces can foster collective consciousness by making the issue visible to potential 
movement actors (Stockdill 2003). For LGBT people, these spaces traditionally exist 
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 Drawing on James C. Scott (1990, 118), Chris Zepeda-Millan (2010) notes “the importance of 
autonomous social spaces created by marginalized groups for the development of political action on 
their behalf. [Scott] asserts that ‘the practices and discourses of resistance’ cultivated by the oppressed 
cannot exist ‘without tacit or acknowledged coordination and communication within the subordinate 
group.’ For this interaction to occur, [Scott] says that ‘the subordinate group must carve out for itself 
social spaces insulated from control and surveillance from above.’” In the EU, insulated social spaces 
for activists can exist in foreign member states.  
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in the private sphere or take the form of cafes, bars and clubs (Kane 2003). 
Organizational capacity refers to the presence of LGBT organizations that endow 
LGBT communities with resources and capabilities, including “money, expertise, 
legitimacy, and (pre-) existing networks” (Princen and Kerremans 2008, 1131–1132). 
Organizational capacity also exists at the European level (e.g. ILGA-Europe), but it 
serves a different function, as these umbrella organizations are more likely to pursue 
formal lobbying than domestic organizations who are often devoted to public sphere 
work (Lang 2009, 2012). Social spaces and organizational capacity in open EU 
member states provided the mobilizing structures—which “include family units, 
friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and elements of the state 
structure itself” (McCarthy 1996)—that engendered a process not available in Poland.  
The difficult social situation for LGBT Poles made headlines in Europe, as 
activists and media highlighted the paradox that Poland’s successfully democratizing 
state and society was struggling to recognize sexual minorities. Despite some 
institutional changes associated with accession, like passing the anti-discrimination in 
employment directive, Poland showed itself resistant to many protective policy 
measures, societal attitudes toward sexual minorities remained largely negative, and 
cases of state-sponsored discrimination abounded (Bączkowski 2008; O’Dwyer and 
Schwartz 2010). Several city governments violated the freedom of assembly for 
LGBT marches, despite the fact that the march has a long history within the tactical 
repertoire for expressing political grievances in Poland.
73
 Alongside more formal 
advocacy work, LGBT activists stress the importance of mobilization in the public 
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 Both those on the right and the left of the Polish political spectrum note the importance of public 
assembly in various stages of Polish history and its role in the Polish national tradition (interview no. 
141). 
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sphere as an important type of Europeanization, because LGBT activism is geared 
toward both society and state. While other EU countries (old and new) also 
experienced troubles with recognizing sexual minorities, a homophobic government, 
coupled with an emerging civil society and several engaged LGBT organizations made 
Catholic Poland a prototype for improving the situation of sexual minorities in the EU 
(Chetaille 2011; European Parliament Resolution on Homophobia in Europe 2006, 
European Parliament Resolution on Homophobia in Europe 2006). Polish LGBT 
activists made progress in the three years leading up to accession by implementing 
innovative campaigns and founding a new national LGBT organization, Kampania 
Przeciw Homofobii (KPH).
74
 The euphoria associated with EU membership was not 
long lived, however, as hostile political and social opposition began forming in 
response (interview nos. 9 and 140). In large part, allies from abroad aided local Polish 
activism by organizing demonstrations and placing demands on the Polish state from 
foreign contexts during this time.  
The topography of LGBT recognition—both socially and legally—is complex, 
with stark variation from one state to another and within states from rural to urban 
areas.
75
 In Europe, Europeanization processes facilitate the access to centers of gay 
life through the free movement of people, goods and services, making established gay 
communities, such as those in Berlin, more accessible to non-nationals. This creates 
dense nodes of gay social spaces and activist kinships in specific national contexts and 
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 According to the former President of KPH, the debate on homosexuality most visibly entered the 
public realm leading up to EU accession (interview no. 8). In 2003, the Niech Nas Zobaczą [Let them 
See Us] campaign—where 27 billboards funded substantially by the Swedish, Danish and Dutch 
embassies showed same-sex couples holding hands—fueled national debate on the issue. 
75
 LGBT movements also consider legal recognition to be deeply intertwined with socio-cultural 
recognition, which is more about the acceptance of specific identities and LGBT visibility in everyday 
contexts.  
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urban areas that outpace their surroundings—for example, Amsterdam, London, and 
Berlin became known as “gay capitals” at various points in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s.
76
 European integration accelerates access to such spaces, where openly gay 
populations and social spaces are more present. This is especially true for post-
socialist countries, where social spaces and organizational resources are comparatively 
less developed. Thus, the political opportunities for transnational LGBT mobilization 
lie not only in Brussels, but also in member states’ centers of gay life.  
In Germany, openly LGBT people have a long history as part of the state’s 
fabric—including both persecution and tolerance—which has resulted in long-term 
LGBT organizations and visibility in some parts of the public space in cities such as 
Berlin, Cologne and Hamburg. Berlin, in particular, became a hotbed for activism 
focused on Poland, providing a host of opportunities for mobilization absent in Poland 
that were also different from those available at the EU level.
77
 Berlin’s large Polish 
expatriate community, its geographic proximity to the Polish border, and its status as 
an LGBT-friendly European city (which endows the city with dozens of LGBT social 
spaces and organizations) provided fertile ground for transnational activism to take 
root there beginning in the late 1990s. First, a long history of immigration by Polish 
workers to Germany has left a visible mark on German demography.
78
 Berlin’s second 
largest immigrant group is Polish, numbering nearly 41,000 registered Polish citizens 
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 “Gay capital” is a colloquial term used to describe cities that have a large visibly gay population and, 
in general, a society comparatively tolerant towards LGBT people. Amsterdam, London, Berlin, Madrid 
and Paris are examples of European “gay capitals.” 
77 
While I focus on Berlin and Warsaw here, similar connections exist between other cities in Germany 
and Poland. For example, the mayor of Nuremberg addressed the importance of LGBT rights as part of 
cooperation on a visit to Cracow—one of Nuremberg’s sister cities (interview no. 103). Activists from 
Cologne—another center of gay life with a large Polish community—were also engaged in Poland. 
Alongside Warsaw, targets included Cracow, Poznan and other cities with banned marches.  
78
 Similarly, the work of Binnie and Klesse (forthcoming) shows that Polish migration flows in other 
European countries have developed activist networks. 
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(Amt fuer Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2011). The estimated population of Berliners 
of Polish descent is estimated to be 130,000, counting both undocumented Polish 
immigrants and those who were born and raised in Poland but have since taken 
German citizenship. In particular, Berlin is appealing to Polish sexual minorities who 
seek it out as a destination to reside in and travel to because of the comparatively high 
level of LGBT visibility within the city (interview no. 5). A Polish presence—for 
example, flags, pamphlets, information booths—is renowned and visible at all of 
Berlin’s major LGBT events, including the annual Christopher St. Day Parade and the 
Gay-Lesbian Street Fair. Second, geographic proximity is a critical factor, since Berlin 
is just over 60 kilometers from the Polish border, and train connections such as the 
Berlin-Warszawa Express make travel between the two capitals quick and 
affordable—the 5.5-hour journey to Warsaw costs about 40 euros.   
Alongside Berlin’s Polish population and geographic convenience, a third 
factor for LGBT mobilization is the city’s long history as a center of gay life. Magnus 
Hirschfeld’s Wissenschaftlich-humanitäre-Komitee (Scientific Humanitarian 
Committee) and the Weltliga für Sexualreform (World League for Sexual Reform)—
founded in Berlin in 1897 and 1928, respectively—were the earliest precursors to 
modern LGBT organizations (Kollman and Waites 2009, 3). Even the first official 
American organization for homosexuals, the Society for Human Rights, was founded 
by Hirschfield protégé and Berliner Henry Gerber in Chicago in 1924 (Dececco and 
Bullough 2002, 25). Especially after German reunification, “Berlin has 
developed…into a gay Mecca in which the richness of ideas and diversity is hardly 
able to be surpassed” (Gmünder 2003, 323). In 2001, the newly elected mayor, Klaus 
Wowereit, ended speculation by saying, “Ich bin schwul und das ist auch gut so” (“I 
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am gay, and it’s alright that way”). In sum, the LGBT issue is highly visible, both 
socially and politically. The city’s gay history has led to an abundance of LGBT social 
spaces and organizations, which I will argue are mobilizing structures for local, 
national and transnational activism.  
Compared to Warsaw, the center of gay life and activism in Poland, the 
differences in social spaces and organizational capacity are sharp (see Figures 2.3 and 
2.4). I use fifteen years of issues of Spartacus, an international gay travel guide, to 
measure the number of gay social spaces and organizations leading up to the 2005 
Equality March (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010).
79
 The Spartacus guides have 
appeared yearly since 1970 and provide a systematic way to measure the presence of 
gay life across cities in over 160 countries, because they use the same categories to list 
the presence of LGBT organizations and businesses. For Figure 2.3, I code “LGBT 
social spaces” by counting the presence of LGBT restaurants, cafes, bars and clubs in 
each city. For Figure 2.4, I code “LGBT Organizations” broadly by counting all 
political, religious and health/counseling LGBT organizations and groups in each 
city.
80
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 Thanks to David Frank for suggesting this method to me (2008). 
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 While the comparison in Figure 2.4 is intended to highlight the discrepancy in the quantity of 
organizations between Berlin and Warsaw, it is also worth noting that the number of organizations in 
Berlin has declined over time. There are two reasons for this. The first is German reunification, which 
consolidated organizations and centers that had counterparts on the other side of the wall. The second is 
the general trend of mainstreaming gay culture and assimilation across Western gay capitals, which has 
led to a reduction in the amount of specifically LGBT spaces and organizations. 
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Figure 2.3. Number of LGBT Social Spaces (Restaurants, Cafes, Bars, Clubs) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Number of LGBT Organizations (Political, Religious, Health Groups) 
 
 
 The figures show the cleft between two European member states—one leading, 
one new—in terms of potential for LGBT mobilization.81 The purpose of these figures 
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 Spaces for LGBT activism and LGBT organizations certainly also existed in Poland (Chetaille 2011) 
but they existed in far smaller quantities than in Germany (and many other EU member states). Other 
EU member states had more resources, experience and openly LGBT publics that could be used to work 
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it to highlight the stark difference in LGBT organizations and social spaces between 
Berlin and Warsaw. In the last 20 years, Europeanization has made this cleft between 
Warsaw and Berlin less relevant by increasing the mobility of European citizens and 
by providing new channels to access foreign contexts within the EU’s institutional 
framework. As a result, the above variables—available social spaces and 
organizational capacity in some member states—have established the necessary 
personal networks that brought together a new group of transnational actors involved 
in Polish LGBT activism.  
III. THE ACTORS: TYPES OF NORM ENTREPRENEURS MOBILIZED 
I define transnational activists “as individuals and groups who mobilize 
domestic and transnational resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of 
external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common 
with transnational allies” (Tarrow 2005b, 8–9). While European institutions have 
established norms on LGBT rights, these norms do not diffuse freely, they need actors 
and channels to carry them (Soule 2004a). This section discusses the transnational 
activists that have aided this process across channels that function vertically and 
horizontally. Different channels mobilized different types of actors involved in the 
Equality March. First, it discusses those mobilized horizontally (primarily between 
Germany and Poland), which include expatriate Poles and German activists, 
celebrities, and ordinary citizens. Second, it discusses those who were mobilized both 
horizontally and vertically, which include European and German parliamentarians.  
Especially among the non-political elite actors, the transnational activists 
interviewed cited the importance of horizontal spaces and resources since they connect 
                                                                                                                                            
with local activists in a closed context like Poland. Polish accession to the EU enabled access to these 
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European LGBT people, solidifying a transnational dimension of their identity. Binnie 
and Klesse (forthcoming) in particular, have argued that solidarity networks fuel the 
transnational engagement of LGBT people.
82
 This phenomenon aligns with a body of 
research that posits that many openly LGBT people share, at least in part, a common 
experience—such as ‘coming out’ to family—that connects them across borders 
(Altman 1996; Tremblay, Paternotte, and Johnson 2011). At times, this connection is 
stronger than national identity and can transcend class and race to connect otherwise 
disparate actors. For example, Allen (1996) argues that shared “life experiences and 
innate personality traits … connect gays more closely with gays from other countries 
than with … heterosexual citizens of their own country” (Allen 1996; Binnie 2004). 
According to Allen, an openly gay German may identify more with an openly gay 
Pole, than s/he does with a heterosexual German. However contested the social 
construction of identity across contexts may be, the horizontal opportunities described 
above are important for giving LGBT people, who remain invisible in many domestic 
contexts, a space for interaction.
83
 
                                                                                                                                            
mobilizing structures. 
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 In their excellent work, Binnie and Klesse critically explore notions of solidarity in network ties. 
While it is true that the activists mobilized refer to moral shock and solidarity as a motivation for their 
activism, such an explanation alone does not produce a mobilization outcome. The moral outrage 
associated with the Kaczynski Government’s treatment of LGBT Poles was widely publicized in 
Europe and resonated in with people in many contexts. Moral shock does not explain why some locals 
become more involved than others, which is why I privilege the social spaces and organizational 
resources that my interviewees cited in actually mobilizing those who felt connected to LGBT Poles in 
solidarity. 
83
 A large part of LGBT identity develops later in life in interaction with other LGBT people. Social 
spaces provide the foundation for such interactions to take root and for networks to form. In Europe 
they are important for LGBT people becoming politically active (interview nos. 5, 12, and 16).   
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Horizontal Mobilization of Domestic Actors and Rooted Cosmopolitans from Target 
States 
Expatriate Polish activists discussed the strength they felt to become politically 
active after leaving Poland. According to one activist from the Fundacja 
Równosci/Stiftung für Gleichberechtigung (Equality Foundation
84
), she now holds 
hands with her girlfriend when she visits Warsaw, which she attributes to socialization 
in Berlin and the comfort she takes in knowing that she can “escape” back to Berlin 
(interview no. 5). “When you leave a country, you suddenly feel more brave [pause] to 
show yourself” (5). Like her, many of the actors involved were expatriate Poles who 
used mobilizing structures available to them in Berlin. The role of expatriate Poles and 
their interactions with German allies is crucial because they provide a competent 
understanding of the Polish domestic context—through their personal experiences, 
language competence and associational ties to Polish activists—and draw attention to 
the Polish situation by putting it on the agenda of German LGBT organizations.  
In line with the argument that horizontal opportunities mobilize a distinct type 
of actor, I use Tarrow’s definition of rooted cosmopolitans to elaborate that:  
the special characteristic of these activists is … their relational links to their 
own societies, to other countries, and to international institutions … What is 
“rooted” in the concept … is that, as individuals move cognitively and 
physically outside their spatial origins, they continue to be linked to place, to 
the social networks that inhabit that space, and to the resources, experiences 
and opportunities that place provides them with ... Most rely on domestic 
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 It should be noted that the Fundacja Równości was funded by three domestic Polish organizations, 
whose presidents at times were at odds with Bączkowski leadership of it (interview no. 129). 
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resources and opportunities to launch their transnational activities and return 
home afterwards (Tarrow 2005a, 1–8, see also Hannerz 1996). 
One such activist, Bączkowski, came to Berlin in the 1990s to continue his 
studies in economics, international relations, and European law. At this time, the NGO 
field in Poland was weak and offered little in terms of LGBT rights (interview no. 
125). By contrast, the visibility of LGBT life in Berlin fueled his engagement there, 
with “the background thought that these skills can be … transported to Poland later” 
(interview no. 124). His partner, a volunteer at Maneo (a local Berlin LGBT 
organization that focuses primarily on community issues), introduced Bączkowski to 
the organization’s president. At this point in the late 1990s, Maneo’s president—who 
had previously worked as part of a transnational campaign to combat violence in 
Northern Ireland—was hoping to deepen the organization’s political cooperation 
abroad, and Bączkowski’s volunteer work brought Poland to the forefront of the 
discussion (interview no. 125). In 1998, Maneo organized its first roundtable meeting 
in Warsaw with Polish activists, establishing a lasting transnational network of LGBT 
organizations in five European capitals called Tolerantia.
85
  
As Maneo expanded its realm of activities to address Poland-related issues, it 
acted as a magnet for the involvement of Berlin’s expatriate Poles. “Roughly 100,000 
Poles live in Berlin and then, if roughly 5-10% are gay, there should be 5,000 to 
10,000 gay Poles … as Maneo started having more contacts to Poland, expatriate 
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 Around the same time, Maneo established ties to France, because of a Francophone colleague who 
was informed about the activist scene in Paris. Together, these ties have formed Tolerantia, which 
brings together organizations in Berlin (Maneo), Warsaw (Kampania Przeciw Homofobii and Lambda-
Warszawa), Paris (SOS-Homophobie), Madrid (COGAM), and soon Dublin (interview no. 125).  Their 
mission statement reads: “We unite our power for the building of a civil society in Europe ... In the 
spirit of the European Human Rights convention we oppose hatred, violence and discrimination against 
social minorities … We want to fight against discrimination and isolation of homosexuals in a unified 
Europe” (Tolerantia Declaration 2010).  
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Poles approached us wanting to be involved” (interview no. 124). What emerged in 
2005 was Tolerancja po Polsku/Toleranz auf Polnisch, a subsidiary of Maneo, which 
provided both a social space for expatriate Poles to gather and a mobilizing structure 
for using resources in Berlin to address LGBT politics in Poland. It encouraged 
“[g]ays and lesbians from both countries to meet regularly to cooperate against 
violence and discrimination towards homosexuals in Germany and Poland, and to 
exchange information and develop projects” (Maneo-Tolerancja 2005). Similar 
projects fostering transnational dialogue and cooperation between Germany and 
Poland have been organized since 1998. Alongside the personal and symbolic support 
provided by expatriate networks, they generate material support for transnational 
activism. Through Maneo’s organizational connections to Berlin’s Gay-Lesbian Street 
Fair, for example, Fundacja Równosci was given rent-free spaces to sell beverages 
and raise funds for the marches. This type of material support began in the 1990s and 
continues today. 
Expatriate Poles were connected to allies in Germany. In 2006, an estimated 
2,000 of the 5,000 participants at the Warsaw March were foreign nationals—of those, 
most were German (Bączkowski 2008, 37; interview nos. 124 and 125).86 In Berlin, 
personal networks garnered the involvement of various German celebrities who aided 
Polish activism, such as the Warschauerpakt (Warsaw Pact) organization. This group 
was founded in 2005 by German media personalities—Thomas Herrmanns, Georg 
Uecker, Wolfgang Macht and Holger Wicht—who knew the organizers through their 
personal networks and wanted to support their cause by increasing awareness and 
collecting material funds for Polish demonstrations. Their mission statement reads:  
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The Warschauerpakt is a consortium of convinced Europeans, who volunteer 
to support the Equality March in Warsaw. We stand for the emancipation of 
LGBT Poles, whose chartered rights are continually ignored by the 
Administration. Since 2005 we successfully support the Polish movement by 
building solid networks, which remain strong today. Through this network we 
foster the partnership and cooperative engagement of institutions between 
Germany and Poland (Warschauerpakt 2007).
87
  
From 2006 to 2009, the group grew to include the support of over 300 German 
celebrities who sponsored activism in Poland through (1) press work in the German 
media, (2) fundraising for the Warsaw Marches, (3) organizing the participation of 
Germans at those marches, and (4) collecting signatures for various petitions of 
solidarity with LGBT Poles (Warschauerpakt 2007). These efforts included printing T-
shirts and hosting concerts to generate funds, as well as organizing buses to take 
Berliners to attend Polish marches. They promoted their campaign to Berlin’s LGBT 
community. Posters calling for involvement in Poland were visible at many of the 
social spaces described above, including gay bars and clubs, LGBT health and social 
service centers, and at the yearly Gay-Lesbian Street Fair and the Christopher Street 
Day (CSD) Parade—where floats and information booths were adorned with flyers 
calling for action in Poland (interview no. 2, 4, 6, see Image 2.1 in Appendix B). 
Berlin’s LGBT community is also connected and accessible through free magazines, 
such as Die Siegessäule and Blu, which published interviews and press releases on the 
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 “Z Europy idzie armia gejów,” (2006) Życie Warszawy. 
http://forum.legionisci.com/showthread.php?t=5259 (Accessed March 1, 2010). 
87
 Translated from German by author. 
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Polish situation. Such press releases, framed in a language of European solidarity, are 
explicit in their call for action. For example:  
On the occasion of President Kaczynski’s visit, we invite all brave and 
engaged persons who care about German-Polish relations and European 
solidarity in the struggle for equality for all, to come to Cracow and Warsaw 
with us. Polish NGOs are organizing CSDs and need international support. 
Marches will be held in Cracow on April 28
th
, 2006 and in Warsaw on June 
10
th
, 2006 (Maneo-Tolerancja 2006).
88
 
When asked what fueled the involvement of prominent Germans, and if they 
had connections to Poland, an organizer responded: “No, they were simply gay” 
(interview no. 124). Above, I emphasized that social spaces bring LGBT people 
together and can introduce a political dimension to LGBT identity. The remark on 
personal networks above supports this: “The most important role from my experiences 
are personal contacts, and in Poland they would not have been possible” (124). These 
personal contacts resulted in continued funding opportunities and organizational ties 
between Germany and Poland.  
Vertical and Horizontal Mobilization of Outside Actors from Leading States 
The organizers of the equality marches explained their connections to the 
prominent European politicians who supported them through networks of European 
LGBT organizations and friendships that were formed at social events in Germany 
(interview nos. 124 and 125). Connections to German politicians, such as Claudia 
Roth, Volker Beck, Renate Künast, and Klaus Wowereit, were established first 
because of their accessibility to the organizers, who were based in Berlin and Warsaw. 
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According to Beck, a German Green Party parliamentarian who attended Warsaw 
marches in 2005, 2006, and 2010, he first became involved in the Polish equality 
marches after a friend at the German Lesbian and Gay Union (LSVD) contacted him 
(interview nos. 1 and 127). Activists said shared ideas on LGBT rights brought them 
into contact with Beck and Roth: “We have similar political ideas. They knew what 
[we were] working on … We became friends over beers and dinner” (interview no. 
124). They went on to describe the peculiar ease of such interactions, saying that “… it 
is very easy in Berlin to meet people…you get in all over, there is less security, gay 
parties are open. You can meet ministers in the street; this is very different in Poland” 
(124).  
In turn, these politicians had connections to sympathetic colleagues at the 
European level and in other EU member states. Alongside the German 
parliamentarians, representatives from Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom attended the march. This support was organized through the contacts of 
German parliamentarians (Roth was active on LGBT issues as a member of the 
European Parliament from 1985-1998) and activists within the network of European 
LGBT organizations, such as ILGA-Europe’s umbrella network (interview no. 124). 
ILGA-Europe regularly writes letters to authorities in states where marches will take 
place, to “point out safety problems and to let them know they will be watched from 
the outside” (interview no. 143). The EU Parliament’s Intergroup, which has 115 
members, can also financially support the attendance of some MEPs at LGBT marches 
(interview no. 126). While the efforts of groups connected to EU institutions primarily 
involve lobbying, they can be active in mobilizing a political elite—especially after 
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the 2005 Equality March generated so much attention among domestic LGBT 
organizations. By 2006, 32 representatives from 15 different European parliaments 
attended the Warsaw Equality March (interview no. 124).   
This section has shown that transnational actors involved in Polish LGBT 
activism are diverse. Where vertical EU networks provided elite political support, 
horizontal networks—in this case, primarily from Germany—mobilized expatriate 
Poles and a German public (activists, politicians, celebrities and ordinary citizens). 
This was possible because the EU provides the social spaces necessary to connect 
expatriate Poles and German allies. The transnational network of the above actors has 
created enduring transnational constellations. Domestic Polish organizations remain 
well connected in Europe, both horizontally and vertically. The majority of the 
funding for KPH (the largest Polish LGBT organization) is transnational, and foreign 
embassies in Poland fund many of the campaigns organized by local LGBT groups 
(interview no. 129).  
IV: MECHANISMS:  
EUROPEAN BROKERS, FRAMES AND SOCIALIZATION IN THE TARGET 
STATE 
Transnational and local Polish activists rely heavily on European frames and 
mechanisms of European socialization to press for LGBT recognition in Poland. This 
section describes the tactical frames and socialization mechanisms used by the 
transnational activists and emphasizes that activists legitimized the LGBT issue 
through the constitutive effect of shared EU membership, not through their ties to 
advanced member states (even if their legal standing surpasses EU competences). The 
first half of the section discusses the discursive frame used by transnational actors at 
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the Polish LGBT events. The second half explores how the transnational LGBT 
mobilization, and the discourse it uses, begins processes of deliberation and learning 
that engage Polish state authorities and the domestic media.  
EU Framing and Norm Brokerage  
The actors involved in Polish LGBT activism had to develop innovative and 
appealing frames in order to deliver a coherent message on LGBT recognition to state 
and society (Kuhar 2011; Snow and Benford 1992).
89
 For Polish LGBT activists, my 
research shows that such appeal remains predominately with the EU and the values it 
disseminates on LGBT rights. The literature assumes it is possible to make frames 
resonate with dominant cultural values or to “graft” the new idea to pre-existing 
norms. While LGBT activists usually use agreed-upon human rights frames 
(Seckinelgin 2009; Waites 2009), finding resonance is exponentially more difficult for 
a norm that is for a large part of most societies unnatural and associated with disgust 
(Nussbaum 2010). This critical distinction alters the strategies that LGBT activists use 
to approach the issue, since they have to be highly cognizant of the domestic context. 
The process requires the presence of LGBT activists with deeply rooted local 
knowledge, working as brokers between the international and domestic ideas to make 
the norm fit locally.  
Transnational activists involved in Poland faced a dual challenge. Because 
Polish nationalism is largely grounded in Catholic values and anti-German sentiment, 
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 Transnational activists play an important role in framing and disseminating the norm, persuading 
international organizations (IO) to endorse it, and shaming states into compliance, thereby fueling 
public deliberation and beginning the process of issue ownership (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Roggeband 
2010). For an excellent nuanced analysis of LGBT frames cf. Kuhar 2011.   
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both sexual deviance and German influence resonate poorly in Poland.
90
 According to 
organizers, “In 2005 and 2006 we were afraid that too many Germans would come. 
And we would again have the same propaganda, that the Germans want to come here 
and destroy [Polish] values” (interview no. 124). A central concern for LGBT activists 
is that transnational demonstrations bring together a community that is accustomed to 
different types of expression in other member states, which can be counterproductive 
in societies where sexual minorities are largely invisible. According to the chairman of 
Lambda-Warszawa, local activists were worried that Germans would bring the same 
level of public sexual expression to Warsaw that they were accustomed to at the CSD 
in Berlin (interview no. 139). In Poland, she says, “we are not looking to throw a 
party, but a political demonstration” (Götsch 2006). Open expressions of sexuality are 
easily stigmatized by the right-wing opposition—from political parties, for example 
the League of Polish Families, and right-wing media, such as the Catholic Radio 
Maria (Ramet 2006)—and some Polish activists find them counterproductive to their 
goals, fuelling a debate about the effect of cultural misunderstandings between Poles 
and Germans (Götsch 2006).  
Despite the usual right-wing critics, however, activists were able to 
successfully reframe the message as one of European responsibility, purposely shifting 
attention away from the fact that Germans were protesting for LGBT rights by 
highlighting that Europeans were protesting for democratic values. The idea of the EU 
does not carry the same type of historical baggage as bilateral relations between 
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In comparison to the French Republican (which is anti-Christian) and Anglo-Saxon Republican 
traditions (which is liberal), Polish Republican tradition is uniquely linked to the Catholic Church. This 
is, in part, because there was no reformation in Poland and no social revolution against the Church. 
Instead the Church, during the last two centuries, adopted most functions of political organization. In 
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Poland and its neighbors; instead Poland’s “return to Europe” is often associated with 
security and independence from communist oppression and a role as a modern partner 
within the society of EU states. European regulations are clear about how European 
societies “should” think about LGBT issue. While the topic is often domestically 
opposed on the grounds of rejecting the imposition of foreign states’ values, Poland’s 
membership in the EU makes the issue less foreign. The ability to persuade is 
increased when “the socializing agency or individual is an authoritative member of the 
in-group to which the target belongs or wants to belong” (Checkel 2006, 364).91  
When the Polish Right criticized Beck’s involvement—as a German—his 
response was that Germany is a member of one of the most democratic clubs in the 
world and thus has an obligation to promulgate those values in a fellow EU member 
state (interview no. 127). Similarly, Roth says that conservative “governments [were] 
naturally critical of [her] traveling into their country to demonstrate for the equal 
treatment of LGBT people, which has … [involved her] being denied a visa from 
Russia to attend a march in 2006” (interview no. 128). Within the EU, however, her 
engagement is about responsibilities associated with EU membership: “this has 
nothing to do with the German-Polish friendship, among friends one must say what 
does not work, especially among member states of the EU” (128).  
Framing LGBT activism in the language of “European” democratic values was 
employed because it resonated in Poland (interview no. 125). Examples of this frame 
include the t-shirts printed by the Warschauerpakt and worn at demonstrations, which 
                                                                                                                                            
particular, it “gave people faith and power to struggle against the Germans, the Russians, and the 
Austrians” (interview no. 141). 
91
 Similarly, psychologists have argued “common group memberships other than sexual orientation 
should be made salient (e.g., religious, social, ethnic, and political)” by LGBT actors to influence 
change among attitudes of the societal majority (Fiske and Taylor 1984; cited in Herek 1884, 14). 
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read “Europa = Tolerancja.” The Warsaw Marches’ themes also strategically used 
vertical Polish and European frames. For example, the 2007 and 2008 themes have 
biblical references: “Love your Neighbor” and “Culture of Love.” The 2006 and 2010 
themes were European: “Culture of Diversity” and “Wolność, 
Równość, Tolerancja”/”Liberty, Equality, Tolerance” (alluding to the French 
Revolution). While European framing is effective in the Polish context, it should be 
noted that the frame is contingent on historically repeated phases of Euro-
optimism/skepticism. Nonetheless, a vertical frame of LGBT issues as European, and 
thus indirectly also Polish, is evident.  
In consultation with their Polish counterparts, the same frame is used in the 
norm entrepreneur states. Within Germany, the call for engagement was also framed 
in a language of human rights responsibilities based on European citizenship. Leading 
up to former President Lech Kaczynski’s visit to Berlin in March 2006, Tolerancja po 
Polsku called on Chancellor Merkel, Foreign Minister Steinmeier, and all 
representatives of Germany’s political parties to address the human rights situation in 
Poland, with the premise that the “EU is not only a federation of states, but also a 
community of citizens with equal rights” (Maneo-Tolerancja 2006). While only 
German politicians and citizens were addressed, their duties were always labeled as 
European: “For this reason it is imperative that all European politicians must protect 
and defend human and citizen rights—even if for those outside their national borders” 
(1). Local and Berlin-based Polish activists, in consultation with their foreign 
counterparts, predominantly called for mobilization of support and recognition of 
LGBT peoples in a language of European values and responsibilities. Aware of Polish 
historical sensibilities and domestic norms, they acted as norm brokers between 
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different domestic contexts—contexts that were accustomed to incongruous types of 
LGBT expression—, successfully framing the issue to manufacture local resonance.  
EU Socialization: Learning and Deliberation   
Framing LGBT issues in a European discourse is used as part of a socialization 
mechanism in processes of Europeanization. European socialization refers to the 
process of inducting actors to the norms of the EU community. In large part, the effort 
of mobilization is undertaken to generate a discourse about LGBT issues, which 
functions by introducing members to EU norms and establishing their appropriateness. 
European institutions champion the norm of protecting sexual minorities, but these 
norms do not flow freely. They require actors—and the channels that connect them—
to mobilize and to validate the norms that need to be learned. According to Brake and 
Katzenstein (forthcoming), “We learn when we change our beliefs or alter the 
confidence we have in our beliefs because of new observations, interpretations, or 
repertoires of practice” (p. 36). The mobilization of actors in the EU framework—both 
horizontally and vertically—and their interaction with actors in the target state triggers 
the deliberation and learning mechanisms of socialization, which plays a key role in 
this process by introducing domestic actors to the LGBT issue. The remainder of the 
section explores the socialization engendered by the interaction between transnational 
actors and actors in the target state. In particular, I look at how the dialogue on LGBT 
issues engages Polish state authorities—politicians, police forces and foreign 
officers—and the media.   
Polish Political Elites and Political Parties  
Transnational mobilization aids the socialization of the Polish political elite 
through the presence of European colleagues and directly from the EU and the 
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representation of political parties in the European Parliament. The presence of 
European colleagues who promote the European norm on LGBT rights in Poland 
encouraged and supported the pioneering work of some Polish parliamentarians—such 
as early supporters, Kazimierz Kutz (non-partisan) and Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka (Unia 
Pracy)
92—because marching with other EU representatives legitimized their own 
involvement. A key example of socialization is the emerging support of the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)—about 20 members of the party marched in the 2010 
EuroPride. The SLD’s support is puzzling, because surveys show that supporters of 
the party—many of whom live in rural areas—are more homophobic than the 
constituents of the conservative Law and Justice party. Activists attribute the SLD 
position in part to EU socialization:  
Outside influence [from institutions like the European Parliament] is 
motivational. These politicians read the outside stances of their parties, and 
whether or not they are convinced, they know what it means to be a Social 
Democrat [in Europe], which includes being open to LGBTs … [Polish 
political parties now] have to know about the topic not to embarrass 
themselves at international congresses (interview no. 124).  
This marks a change from “the early 2000s, [when] it was obvious that Polish 
politicians did not know how to talk about it” (124; interview no. 8). Similarly, a new 
political party, Ruch Palikota—which garnered 10% of the vote in the October 2011 
elections on a platform of representing “modern Poland”—made LGBT issues a 
central theme of its campaign (group no. 206).  
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 While Jaruga- Nowacka was part of the Unia Pracy (not the SLD) she played an important role in 
Leszek Miller’s government and attended the illegal march in 2005 as a vice-prime minister. 
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Polish Police Forces 
The presence of international diplomats—from member states or directly from 
the EU parliament—also attracts police protection for the protesters and international 
and domestic media attention. This was the case when the German parliamentarians 
attended the illegal Warsaw march in 2005. The Polish government’s secret service 
was obliged to protect the foreign parliamentarians, despite the fact that the illegal 
parade was originally denied any police protection. It should be noted that LGBT 
mobilizations often face violent attacks by counter-mobilizations.
93
 The confirmed 
attendance of Beck, Roth, Künast, and others motivated the organizers because they 
knew “in advance that nothing terrible could happen” in terms of safety (interview 
nos. 124, 132), safety being a common reason for canceled attempts at LGBT 
mobilization. “The idea was having many parliamentarians there to protect [the 
March]…[and] because embassies were present, the Polish government had to react to 
prohibit attacks on foreign diplomats” (interview no. 125). Beck describes the same 
process when he marched in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia:  
It is not just about creating media attention, but also about concrete support 
from the authorities. When the ambassadors from Sweden or France, for 
example, decide to join the march too—as was the case in Vilnius last year—
the authorities at local level have to react differently. Then they authorize Pride 
marches and the police protect the participants instead of protecting counter-
demonstrations organized by the extreme right. Of course the presence of 
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 Recently, in Central and Eastern Europe, marchers have been violently attacked to cause bodily 
injury. Volker Beck was physically assaulted at an LGBT March in Moscow. Even in the heavily 
policed events I have participated in during my fieldwork, participants were pelted with eggs, diary 
products (to smell in high temperatures), and in rare cases, feces.  
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prominent international figures also help[s] to create media attention for the 
causes of the gay and lesbian movement (interview no. 127).  
As authorities of the state, police protection bestows a shield of state legitimacy on 
LGBT mobilization. Horizontal socialization among European police forces—for 
example, the presence of London police forces at training sessions on how to protect 
demonstrators’ human rights in Warsaw—is an important outcome of cooperation that 
furthers future LGBT mobilization and visibility (interview no. 129).  
Polish Foreign Ministry  
Tactics of European socialization guided many of the decisions expatriate 
activists made outside Poland as well. Even demonstrations that took place in 
Germany were organized to create a diplomatic dialogue. In 2005, for example, 
Tolerancja po Polsku organized a demonstration in front of the Polish Embassy in 
Berlin to protest a repressed equality march in Poznan and call on the German 
government to condemn the Polish Government’s reaction to the march (Maneo-
Tolerancja 2005).
94
 The idea behind the demonstration, however, was not to attract 
large crowds or employ confrontational tactics—only 20 to 30 peaceful protestors 
attended and the Polish Embassy was informed three weeks prior (interview no. 124). 
Instead, the strategy was to generate a dialogue about Poland among high-ranking 
German political authorities that would then provoke a response by the Polish Foreign 
Ministry; if pressure came from external diplomatic authorities, it would be more 
likely to provoke a Polish reaction (Bączkowski 2008, 36). Connections between 
LGBT organizations and LGBT-friendly politicians enabled a platform to make issues 
public when they arose. Berlin activists described the process, which began by 
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contacting their allies in the German government. “First the ones that you know 
personally... [who] formulate an official inquiry and send it to the party docket” 
(interview no. 124). Activists thought that the Polish administration would ignore 
grievances they themselves voiced, but if inquiries came from representatives of 
foreign governments, they would be obliged to react.  
Alongside generating statements from some German parliamentarians, the 
Polish Ambassador in Berlin addressed the demonstration and the issue it promoted 
with the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw (124). Without an official protocol on the stance 
of the Polish government on LGBT public assembly, the Foreign Ministry had to 
formulate a response, and articulate its general commitment to human rights and 
democratic values (interview no. 133). “So from the back door, [the activists] reached 
[their] goal, which was that everyone would know about the demonstration,” even if 
the demonstration itself was unspectacular and ended with a friendly coffee invitation 
at the Polish embassy (interview no. 124). The central motivation of such 
demonstrations “was not to demonstrate, not to riot, but simply to create the right 
environment through dialogue” (124). Creating the right environment meant obliging 
the Polish Foreign Ministry to formulate a response, and transnational activists 
achieved this by involving the Polish Ambassador and German political authorities 
(interview no. 133).  
Polish Domestic Media 
Finally, the presence of guest marchers also generated media attention, which 
is effectual by making the issue visible. Domestically this engendered a discourse 
within Polish society and internationally it drew outside attention to the social 
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 In response to the police repression of a 500-person equality march in Poznan in November of 2005 
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situation of LGBT Poles (interview no. 128). Polish LGBT organizations confirm that 
the LGBT issue has become increasingly visible in Poland since a series of campaigns 
began at the turn of the century, when the issue was virtually invisible (interview nos. 
8 and 9). According to the former President of KPH, even the left Polish media did not 
know how to write about homosexuality and the media response to early campaigns 
was largely negative (8). Across the political spectrum, newspapers responded with a 
naïve discourse that questioned the campaign’s break with traditional societal 
structures.  This was “because there were no norms of conduct on the issue, there was 
no popular discussion of homosexuality before then” (8). After a 2003 gay pride in 
Warsaw, with an unprecedented 3,000 marchers, “the media largely ignored the event” 
(Pasek 2003). In the years following 2005, press reports have changed their discourse 
and media have become more objective (8).  
Domestically, the equality marches started an internal dialogue that made 
LGBT issues visible. “In Poland, the parades are just a symbol. We know we won’t 
have a large [parade] in Poland. But we know that once a year we will have a 
discussion about tolerance, about homo-marriage” (interview no. 124). While this 
dialogue is often initially hostile—and some argue counter-productive as a result—
Polish LGBT activists say that the Polish media’s reporting on LGBT issues has 
dramatically improved in the last ten years, in large part because of the visibility of the 
issue and the attention it generated in other EU member states. Internationally, press 
on the situation of LGBT Poles generates interest and heightens political pressure 
from the EU and other international institutions. It also increases awareness and 
further fuels the involvement of foreign LGBT persons, like those discussed above. 
                                                                                                                                            
(resulting in over 100 arrests) (on police repression of protest in Europe cf. Ayoub 2010). 
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International press coverage rose from a few dozen articles after the 2005 march, to 
over 300 articles after the 2010 march—with coverage ranging from Gazeta Wyborcza 
to Al-Jazeera (Equality Foundation Archives). According to Beck, “In Poland…the 
debate on these issues has changed dramatically since 2005”  (interview no. 127). 
CONCLUSION 
The transnational mobilization by and on behalf of LGBT people has become 
truly European in scope. After the 2005 Equality March, Bączkowski and four other 
Polish-based activists brought a case against Poland (for prohibiting the protest) before 
the Council of Europe’s Court of Human Rights. With the volunteer help of a network 
of lawyers in Berlin and Warsaw, and legal resources provided by the Warsaw office 
of the Helsinki Human Rights Foundation, they filed the bilingual 500-page 
complaint. The court decided in their favor, making LGBT demonstrations in Poland 
legal and obliging the state to provide police protection. While the ruling applies to all 
demonstrations—including the extreme right—activists see it as a fundamentally 
important step for democratization in Poland. The ruling has further transnational 
implications, because Russian LGBT activists filed a similar compliant in Strasbourg. 
They worked closely with Bączkowski, who says the group used the successful 
complaint, “simply changing names and locations” (interview no. 124). Based on 
Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe and the Polish precedent, Russian 
activists won a similar case in 2011, though ILGA activists point out that 
implementation will be arduous in Russia, which is not subject to the norms of EU 
membership (interview no. 143). This legal avenue for change, along with the 
socialization process described above, provide concrete examples of outcomes 
associated with the Europeanization of LGBT mobilization.  
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 This chapter has described the transnational nature of European LGBT 
activism. It provides an empirical analysis of how Europeanization creates 
opportunities for mobilization by bringing together networks of distinct actors. The 
focus on the 2005 Warsaw Equality March and the use of extensive interview and 
archival data lend a more nuanced understanding to Europeanization and political 
opportunity structures. I argued that Europeanization offers both vertical and 
horizontal political opportunities for the political mobilization of transnational LGBT 
actors. Horizontal and vertical Europeanization provide differing types of mobilizing 
structures for LGBT mobilization, which come together to mobilize transnational 
actors to make claims for LGBT recognition in target states.  
Since the geography of LGBT acceptance is so varied among leading and new 
states, the chapter has emphasized the importance of horizontal transnational 
mobilizing structures—social spaces and organizational resources—that were scarce 
in Poland and readily available in Germany. Horizontal opportunities are particularly 
useful for non-institutionalized mobilization in a target state’s public sphere and bring 
together a wide range of transnational actors, including expatriate Poles, politicians 
and celebrities, and ordinary LGBT publics and their allies. Vertical opportunities 
provide the legitimacy and institutional clout to mobilize European political elites to 
the target state. Alongside obliging governments to introduce some LGBT protection, 
they also provide the frames and socialization mechanisms that activists use to make 
their message resonate among state (i.e., Polish politicians and parties, police forces, 
and the foreign ministry) and media authorities in the target country.  
 In discussing tactical European frames and socialization mechanisms, the 
chapter described the complexity of transnational LGBT mobilization. It emphasized 
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that cooperative transnationalism comes with cultural misunderstandings that trigger 
hostile reactions from some domestic groups, who see such activism as outside 
imposition from historically unwelcome neighbor states. Despite Europeanization, 
archaic views on LGBT issues are still expressed in the state and social spheres (as 
they are elsewhere), and political action to oppose the recognition of LGBT minorities 
reoccurs. Local activists, who work as norm brokers, compensate by framing the issue 
as an inevitable process associated with “European” standards of acceptability.  
While there is no rapid change associated with sexual minority rights in Poland 
as a result of transnational activism, the analysis here has highlighted the importance 
of European socialization on the tactical outcomes linked to transnational activism. 
These outcomes include gaining the support of some political elites, police protection 
for protestors, media visibility and international attention, and some domestic legal 
changes. However small these steps may be in repainting the broader picture, they are 
fundamentally important steps towards recognition nonetheless, and it is clear that the 
debate in Poland on sexual minorities is changing. It is worth noting that Poland 
recently elected Robert Biedroń and Anna Grodzka, its first openly LGBT 
parliamentarians—both activists and former presidents of Polish LGBT organizations 
(KPH and Trans-Fuzja). Anna Grodzka is only the third transgendered 
parliamentarian we know to have been elected in history, after former 
parliamentarians in New Zealand and Italy.  
While the objective of the analysis in this chapter is not to draw a causal arrow 
between mobilization and broader social and legal developments in Poland, the 
following chapters do explore the link between mobilization and change. They 
investigate the effects of transnational channels, alongside a series of other domestic 
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conditions, on social-legal change across European states. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
diffusion of LGBT legislation in both the new EU 12 and old EU 15 member states. It 
draws on the transnational activist networks and mechanisms of change that were 
emphasized in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
State Compliance: International Norms and the Diffusion of Pro-LGBT 
Legislation to New EU Member-States 
 
 
“[G]ay rights are human rights, and 
human rights are gay rights” 
 
— Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State  
 
 
In 1948, Axel and Eigil Axgil and their colleagues founded Denmark’s first 
gay rights organization, Kredsen af 1948 (“The Circle of 1948”).95 Inspired by the 
1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, homophile organizations like Kredsen af 1948 
began a process of lobbying states for gay rights. For affluent democracies, the birth of 
the gay liberation movement and the dawn of the 1970s heralded a marked, albeit 
gradual, expansion in the forms of legal protections that states provided gay and 
lesbian minorities. By October 1, 1989, the first same-sex couples—including the 
Axgils, who celebrated four decades as a couple and as human rights activists—had 
entered into registered partnerships in Denmark. Although progress has been slow and 
has often provoked counter-movements intended to both block progressive legislation 
and to promote anti-LGBT policies, the proliferation of LGBT-friendly legislation has 
amplified the voice of a once politically invisible group and has become a recurrent 
theme in modern European politics.  
The achievement of the legal recognition of LGBT minorities, however, varies 
greatly across European states. In this chapter, I explore LGBT norm diffusion by 
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 Born Axel Lundahl-Madsen and Eigil Eskildsen, they adopted the surname “Axgil” to express their 
commitment to each other.  
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examining legislative changes across states. Similar to the discrepancies in the social 
acceptance of LBGT minorities (Chapter 4), Europe is distinctive in that it houses 
states on both ends of the global LGBT egalitarianism spectrum.
96
 While some states 
(e.g., Denmark) quickly became the world’s leading advocates for LGBT rights, 
providing the most extensive legal measures to their citizenry, others (e.g., Romania in 
1996) have only recently decriminalized same-sex relations. Furthermore, some states 
in the region have introduced or proposed legislation that retrenches the rights of 
LGBT minorities, like bans on same-sex unions or “anti-gay propaganda bills.” 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the varied adoption of LGBT legislation over three decades 
in old and new member states, respectively—countries are listed in order of their 
standing in 2010. The 12-point LGBT legislation score reported in these figures is 
constructed as a count of various pieces of pro-LGBT legislation, described in detail in 
Table 3.2, Appendix C.
97
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 The overall legislation score is a count of the following provisions: antidiscrimination in 
employment, goods and services, and constitutional recognition; hate crimes based on sexual 
orientation recognized as an aggravating circumstance and/or incitement to hatred based on sexual 
orientation prohibited; same-sex partnership recognized for cohabitation, registered partnership and 
marriage; same-sex couples’ parenting rights for joint adoption, second parent adoption, and fertility 
treatment; and sexual offenses provisions for equal age of consent and same-sex activity legal (cf. Table 
3.2, Appendix C).  
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Transnational activists have long publicized this imbalance in legal recognition 
of LGBT minority rights as a central concern for those working to achieve social 
equality across Europe. The observed variation also raises important questions for 
scholars of international relations and social movements: What accounts for such 
different levels of legal recognition toward sexual minorities across European states? 
Is change due to heightened cooperation with individuals and groups in states that 
have previously adopted the legislation? Under what domestic preconditions (of the 
recipient state) do international norms regarding legal rights for sexual minorities 
proliferate? Finally, who are the agents by which these norms spread, and what are the 
channels of norm diffusion? The answers to these questions are theoretically and 
practically important for the study of politics and society. There are few norms that 
incite as much controversy in contemporary world politics as sexual minority rights, 
yet despite their contested nature, a growing number of states adopt these norms into 
their legal frameworks. Understanding the differential rates and timing of adoption 
illuminates the channels—both transnational and international98—and domestic 
conditions of diffusion. Furthermore, understanding how the state responds to 
contentious norms offers important insights on normative change in world politics.  
This chapter examines why LGBT rights legislation is introduced sooner and 
with more frequency in some cases and less so in others. I focus on pieces of LGBT 
legislation because they constitute an observable consequence of norm diffusion, and 
one that is easily identifiable, clearly reported in the data, and evident (to varying 
degrees) in all of the cases studied. Building on the efforts of international relations, 
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transnational and international channels. I do this to avoid writing out ‘transnational and international 
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social movements, and Europeanization scholars, I seek to explain the diffusion of 
LGBT rights policies by bridging theories of cognitive change among social actors 
and relational channels between states. I address calls for further research by 
systematically exploring the (non)diffusion of five categories of LGBT legislation 
(both protective and equality measures) in multiple domestic contexts and by 
specifying the transnational channels, domestic actors, and conditions responsible for 
change. Whereas previous research has focused largely on a small set of cases and on 
a particular type of policy provision, this chapter seeks to promote theoretical and 
empirical progress by integrating multiple theories and by testing the diffusion of a 
contentious norm in new contexts. To address the aforementioned questions, I employ 
a large-n, cross-national analysis of changed LGBT-rights legislation in Europe. I 
focus on the adoption of LGBT legislation in newly admitted European Union (EU) 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe, compared to the adoption patterns in 
long-standing EU member states. 
This chapter’s central proposition is that transnational channels of visibility, 
tying new and old EU states, can accelerate the diffusion of LGBT norms in contexts 
where LGBT issues have only recently become politicized (i.e., the EU-12 states). 
These channels have the capacity to enhance the salience of norms. When they have 
transnational ties, domestic LGBT organizations catalyze the adoption of legislation. 
Not only do they help states and societies, more broadly, to interpret international 
information, they also help to frame that information in ways that resonate with local 
contexts. In the absence of these organizations, societies are more likely to perceive 
the LGBT norm as an external imposition. By contrast, in EU-15 states where the 
                                                                                                                                            
channels.’ When I am referring specifically to international political channels, I use the term 
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norm was politicized earlier (through the Gay Liberation Movement of the 1970s and 
the HIV-AIDS Crisis of the 1980s), it seems likely that domestic factors have played a 
greater role in increasing the likelihood and speed of diffusion. I thus distinguish 
between domestic and transnational pathways to visibility, suggesting that their 
influence should vary across early and new adopters.  
My analysis of LGBT policy adoption over 40 years reveals that the 
transnational embeddedness of a state’s LGBT advocacy organizations is the most 
powerful statistical explanation for successful policy diffusion to new EU member 
states, alongside other transnational channels that lead to LGBT visibility among 
society and state authorities. In addition to lending cross-national, empirical 
reinforcement to some of the theoretical expectations regarding the transnational 
sources of diffusion, the results of this analysis suggest variability in the determinants 
of LGBT policy adoption between leading EU-15 and lagging EU-12 states. Domestic 
factors, such as economic modernization, are more relevant for policy adoption in EU-
15 states, whereas new EU member states display greater dependence on transnational 
actors and are more influenced by transnational channels. These findings also reveal 
variation in the domestic and transnational predictors for different pieces of LGBT 
legislation, which diffuse according to specific conditions.  
This chapter proceeds in five parts. First, I elaborate on my argument of norm 
visibility and how it shapes the diffusion of legislation. Second, I consider previous 
literature and how scholars’ expectations regarding the diffusion of law might vary 
across first-mover EU-15 states and new EU-12 states. Then, I discuss the data and 
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methods used in this chapter and the results of the analysis; and I conclude by 
discussing the significance of my findings for the study of norm diffusion. 
ARGUMENT 
Existing explanations for norm diffusion characterize rights legislation as 
diffusing to states when authorities fear the costs associated with international pressure 
(i.e., political conditionality and economic incentives), when they become convinced 
of the norm’s appropriateness (typically via socialization), when their preexisting 
domestic norms resonate with an international norm (e.g., high levels of democracy, 
modernization), and when their advocacy organizations are embedded in transnational 
networks. Taken individually, the theoretical approaches are simplistic in that they 
ignore the multiple dimensions of diffusion in a complex, multi-level interactive 
environment. Following Sil and Katzenstein’s (2010b) call to move beyond grand 
narratives (see also Lloyd, Simmons, and Stewart 2012), I combine several of the 
above mechanisms and add insights from the contentious politics literature to make 
the case that domestic explanations should be more powerful in first-mover states, 
while transnational explanations should be more compelling in states where issues 
have been more recently politicized.  
I argue that the achievement of norm visibility in new EU member states 
requires a specific set of actors and channels connecting the transnational and the 
domestic. The states most likely to adopt LGBT legislation are those that are the most 
porous in terms of political and social connectedness to other states. Furthermore, the 
adoption of such legislation is more likely when transnationally embedded LGBT 
organizations—norm brokers—exist to manufacture a narrative that can resonate with 
domestic norms. These actors help to interpret the norm, and send a clear signal to the 
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state that norm compliance is necessary to fulfilling its role in international society.
99
 
Thus, my theoretical expectations here link back to the argument outlined in Chapter 1 
and the mechanisms presented in Chapter 2, emphasizing the socialization processes 
created by visibility through the mechanisms of framing, brokerage, and social 
learning. We should also expect systematic differences between contexts in which the 
LGBT norm was politicized during the early phases of LGBT norm development in 
the 1970s  (e.g., many EU-15 states) and contexts in which the issue only recently 
become visible (e.g., the EU-12 states). Drawing on the work of sociologists like 
Tolbert and Zucker (1983), Strang (1990), Soule (1997), the diffusion and 
institutionalization of norms is then a two-stage process. In this sense, the process may 
be more “internal” in a set of leading states, where local community responds to 
domestic political problems and then crystalizes as a norm, which other states adopt as 
they seek external legitimacy. In new EU member states, I expect greater norm 
diffusion as (1) domestic LGBT organizations become embedded in transnational 
networks and (2) states become more permeable to transnational and international 
influences.   
Transnational LGBT Organizations as Norm Brokers 
I suspect that domestic LGBT activist organizations will experience greater 
success in the EU-12 states when they have the benefit of external resources. This may 
be particularly true for minority movements, since they can gain valuable resources for 
mobilization if they look outside the state. Deemed radical in most societies, ties to 
transnational advocacy networks enhance the effectiveness of domestic LGBT 
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 As elsewhere, many new member states have long and rich histories of LGBT life (Chetaille 2011; 
McCajor Hall 2009), but this identity was expressed less openly in public, compared to the earlier shift 
in many EU-15 states. 
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movements in channeling these grievances and in affecting policy. Transnational 
networks can multiply opportunities for the mobilization of marginalized people—
who may not have sufficient resources at home—and increase their political potential 
by connecting groups across borders (Montoya 2009). As was demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, these ties with transnational networks can yield expertise, financing, and 
access to political actors who can apply pressure to state authorities.
100
 In the 
European context, with its varying levels of LGBT resources among states, the results 
of my Transnational LGBT Organizations Survey (described, in detail, in the Data and 
Methods section) suggest that resource-poor LGBT organizations in the EU-12 are far 
more reliant on external grants to finance their projects than are those in EU-15 states. 
External funding sources are broadly conceived and can refer to international 
organizations, the governments of other countries or foreign civil society organizations 
(cf. Question 13 of Survey Details in Appendix C). 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics of the European LGBT Organizations’ Reliance on 
External Funding Sources (N=140) 
EU-12 EU-15  
83% 32% Part of budget comes from transnational and international sources 
56% 5% 
Majority of budget comes from transnational and international 
sources 
40% 42% Entirely volunteer based 
Source: Author’s Transnational LGBT Organizations Survey (for questions, see Appendix C) 
Alongside external resources, the local knowledge and life experiences of 
activists in local organizations provides actors with a valuable understanding of the 
domestic realm. This understanding allows them to act as brokers between the 
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(Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977). 
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international and domestic norm, framing the issue to resonate with the policymakers 
in their respective contexts (Tarrow 2005b). These actors actively select and adapt 
foreign ideas to local traditions and practices, and I suspect that this process explains 
success more than norm rejection based on the fit between international and domestic 
norms (Acharya 2004a; Seybert 2012). Thus, I look at domestic actors, who are also 
embedded in transnational networks of change, and how they target their own 
governments. 
Political and Social Channels of Visibility  
In addition to the presence of domestic organizations, I also expect social and 
political channels to influence norm diffusion, in that they prime the contexts within 
which activists function by making the LGBT rights issue visible. As Katzenstein 
(2005) has argued, the interaction of globalization and internationalization enhances 
the “porousness” of states. I adopt the terms internationalization—“as a process that 
refers to territorially based exchanges across borders” (22)101—and 
transnationalization, the latter emphasizing the involvement of non-state actors in 
these exchanges. Countries with the highest levels of social transnationalization and 
political internationalization, which connect them to larger communities of states, are 
more likely to have channels of access to the LGBT issue. This, in turn, yields 
visibility. Political and social channels prime the context by allowing the 
aforementioned transnational actors to send a clear and legitimate signal to both 
society and the state. These actors can harness those ideas and adapt them, 
manufacturing resonance in their domestic contexts, even when they do not exist 
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 Globalization refers to “a process that transcends space and compresses time” (Katzenstein 2005, 
13). The process I describe falls somewhere in between internationalization and globalization. Since I 
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locally. The more porous the context, the easier it is for actors to frame the norm as 
legitimate. 
These channels lead to elite and mass-level interactions between laggard and 
leading states that make the LGBT norm visible in domestic realms. Political 
internationalization creates channels of influence by embedding states in the 
international communities within which the LGBT issue receives more attention. 
Social transnationalization—particularly the flow of ideas and images—taps into the 
international awareness of the state’s society and its exposure to complex issues and 
norms that have preceded them in first-mover states. Social and political channels 
expose states to “the world out there,” and to the European norms on LGBT rights.102 
Mechanisms: Brokerage, Frames, and Learning 
The primary mechanisms at work in this process of state-level change are 
brokerage, framing and social learning.
103
 Transnational actors act as brokers between 
the international and the domestic norms, framing (or packaging and presenting) new 
ideas so that they resonate with a specific audience (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 
2002; Tarrow 2005b). Once beliefs change, political channels lead to social 
interactions between elites that fuel a process of social learning (E. B. Haas 1991). 
These pathways for learning operate by sending a visible signal that promotes state 
support of the issue. Information flows provide visibility and give actors a framework 
with which to make their case. The arguments advanced by LGBT organizations tend 
                                                                                                                                            
argue that processes of diffusion for LGBT norms are highly contingent on various regional-
institutional factors, I prefer to use the term “internationalization” to “globalization.” 
102
 I expect these channels to explain more than the direct impact of EU conditionality (associated with 
accession), which should only be effectual in the limited area within which it has competences. 
103
 While the mechanism of deliberation also plays a role here, I find it to be more centrally connected 
to processes of societal change. The analyses in the following chapters address deliberation more 
centrally, especially in the relationship between proponents and opponents of LGBT rights.  
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to have greater currency in states that are more familiar with the images that represent 
and the ideas that are associated with LGBT rights. Even if this visibility is negatively 
perceived, it is still effectual by virtue of creating a discourse.  
EXPLAINING THE DIFFUSION OF RIGHTS LEGISLATION: THE 
ARGUMENT AND HYPOTHESES IN RELATION TO THE LITERATURE  
The argument outlined above builds on a vast literature that analyzes how and 
when states alter their positions in response to international ideas and norms. Previous 
scholarship explaining the international diffusion of social policies has generally fallen 
into one—or a combination—of three camps, wherein successful diffusion is linked to 
the presence of: (1) advocacy networks connecting the international and domestic 
politics, (2) transnational and international channels of socialization and/or 
sanctioning pressure, (3) and bottom-up domestic resonance. These frameworks 
inform the core hypotheses used in this analysis.  
Transnational Advocacy Networks 
International relations and social movement scholars have noted the 
importance of advocacy groups in influencing the international diffusion of rights 
legislation (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Krizsan and Popa 2010; Montoya 2009; 
Roggeband 2010). Social movement organizations are commonly theorized as the 
most experienced type of organization in channeling a social group’s grievances to the 
relevant authorities (Ayoub 2010; Soule and Earl 2005; Tarrow 1998, 137).
104
 In 
particular, Soule’s work on minority rights legislation offers substantial evidence that 
social movement activity affects the introduction and diffusion of rights and anti-
discrimination legislation for various minorities, including LGBT groups, in the 
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United States (Soule and King 2006; Soule and Olzak 2004; Soule 2004b). Focusing 
particularly on LGBT rights, Paternotte and Kollman examine the diffusion of same-
sex marriage policies in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Spain (Paternotte and 
Kollman forthcoming).
105
 In addition to a series of domestic factors, they emphasize 
the centrality of advocacy networks, which organizations like the International 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) foster.
106
  
My analysis builds upon these theories, suggesting that such relational 
channels of diffusion have an effect on LGBT politics in new adopter states. I predict 
that the transnationalization of an EU-12 state’s LGBT organizations will provide the 
movement with resources that promote greater domestic visibility, in combination 
with the domestic movement’s knowledge that makes it possible to tailor the message 
to localities.  These messages send a clear and appropriate signal to policymakers 
while supporting successful diffusion of the norm.  
HYPOTHESIS 1a:  The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases 
when domestic LGBT organizations become embedded in the transnational 
activist networks Europe provides.  
 
Pressure and Socialization   
For many international relations scholars, rights legislation diffuses to states 
when they are convinced of the norm’s social appropriateness (socialization) or when 
they fear the costs of international pressures (political conditionality and economic 
                                                                                                                                            
104
 Social movement organizations are increasingly common in democracies; they link supporters, 
allies, and state authorities (Tarrow 1998, 137). 
105
 For non-European contexts see Barclay’s work (Barclay, Bernstein, and Marshall 2009; Barclay and 
Fisher 2003). 
106
 In particular, ILGA-Europe provides local groups with resources and examples of best practice, and 
it lobbies European institutions (Kollman 2009). The organization makes the issue visible by reporting 
movement activity and state-sponsored discrimination to the press. ILGA-Europe also contacts relevant 
European political authorities to address states when they deem their actions to be out of sync with EU 
standards. 
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incentives). These theories—one linked to socialization and the other to material 
incentives—posit logics of consequences and appropriateness, respectively.  
World polity and constructivist scholars focus on informal processes of 
influence, arguing that international norms exert influence on states by defining the 
contours of appropriate behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ingebritsen 2002; 
Klotz 1995; Legro 1997; J. W. Meyer et al. 1997; Price 1998). Interactions among 
states in an international community lead to different cognitive understandings of what 
is acceptable. Heretofore, scholars have focused on mechanisms like learning and 
deliberation (Risse 2000). As described in Chapter 2, these indirect channels can 
engender change through socialization based on interactions across borders.  
When states are members of international organizations their representatives 
are often required to confront the LGBT issue and take a stand. For example, when 
members of social democratic parties in laggard states interact with their party 
colleagues at the European Parliament, they must learn to speak about LGBT issues, 
because they are in the social democratic party platforms of many European states 
(interview no. 124). Consider the sharp media criticism that British Tories faced when 
they formed the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) with the Polish 
Law and Justice Party (PiS) in the European Parliament. While their cooperation was 
based on anti-federalist Euro-skepticism, the media criticized the Tories (at home and 
abroad) for cooperating with PiS because of the homophobic rhetoric espoused by 
many of its members (Day and Waterfield 2010; Helm 2010). The international 
media’s negative portrayal was so severe that some ECR members went to great 
lengths to prove that they were not homophobic, for example, by Tory politicians 
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attending gay pride parades in Warsaw.
107
 Other indirect channels of diffusion are 
social. For example, the import of television shows from cultural powers like the 
United States featuring gay characters has increased rapidly since the 1990s. Studies 
show that, in the United States, exposure to media with gay themes positively 
influences social attitudes and policymakers’ actions regarding LGBT issues (Cooley 
and Burkholder 2011; Garretson 2009). In Europe, social channels reconfigure the 
threat associated with minorities by making them familiar. Such channels of 
interaction lead to social learning, providing images and understandings of what it 
means to be a member of a European political and social community. 
HYPOTHESIS 2a: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases 
when the state’s level of political porousness is higher.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2b:  The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases 
when the state’s level of social porousness is higher.  
 
Rational institutionalists attribute domestic change to the incentives provided 
by international organizations and focus on the costs associated with norm adoption 
(Martin and Simmons 1998; Mastenbroek 2003). According to this perspective, 
political leaders weigh the costs and benefits of adopting a norm. In the EU, non-
adoption of the LGBT norm can mean lost material benefits linked to economic and 
security cooperation at the European level. Scholars have emphasized the unique and 
direct role of EU conditionality in the adoption of new laws in the EU member-states, 
with sanctioning and competition representing the central mechanisms by which this 
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 There are several examples of political socialization. For example, foreign embassies have actively 
supported LGBT visibility in recent years by backing the campaigns of local activists with rhetorical 
and financial support, and organizing floats for LGBT pride parades and marches (interview no. 132). 
The British Embassy was accused of meddling in Polish internal affairs when it raised the rainbow flag 
in Warsaw in 2008 (interview no. 8). 
  105 
type of process occurs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Toshkov 2008; 
Vachudova 2005).  
There are reasons to expect that states will adopt LGBT rights legislation, in 
part, through these mechanisms. First, in the late 1990s the EU required applicant 
states to decriminalize homosexuality and to adopt employment anti-discrimination 
measures in their legal frameworks. Second, economic competition—in terms of 
attracting foreign investment—is increasingly impacted by a state’s position on LGBT 
rights. For example, in its Legalize Love Campaign targeting Asia and parts of Europe, 
Google has formed alliances with partners (e.g., Citigroup and Ernst & Young) to 
pressure states wishing to retain their business to make advances in LGBT rights 
(Cowley 2012). Google sharply criticized the ban on same-sex partnerships in Poland, 
where it has three offices. Similarly, in response to the Russian Duma’s proposal to 
extend St. Petersburg’s 2012 ‘Anti-Gay-Propaganda’ Law to the national level, one of 
Europe's largest theater companies, the Friedrichstadt Palast GmbH, severed ties with 
its Russian affiliates (interview no. 145). The company cancelled meetings, shows, 
and its cultural collaboration with Russia, until the Duma rejects the law. Numerous 
transnational and international currents of sanctioning and competition surround the 
LGBT issue.  
HYPOTHESIS 2c: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases 
when the state’s level of economic porousness is higher. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2d:  The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases 
when a state accedes to join the EU. 
 
Finally, while this analysis assumes that the adoption of LGBT policies is 
connected to diffusion, I also include a variable to measure diffusion related to 
emulation in the analyses of individual types of legislation. The rationale for this 
  106 
inclusion is that policymakers will adopt laws if they feel compelled to do so and 
when they observe the trend in their society of states (Meyer et al. 1997). 
HYPOTHESIS 2e:  The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases 
when other EU member states pass similar laws. 
 
Domestic Resonance 
Others have taken a ‘bottom up’ approach, emphasizing the domestic political 
and cultural variables that condition the reception of contentious new international 
ideas (Checkel 1997; Cortell and Davis 1996; Seybert 2012; Zürn and Checkel 2005). 
This literature focuses on the congruence between international norms and elements of 
the domestic context. Furthermore, diffusion scholars have argued that some adopters 
are more “susceptible” to the norm than others (Soule and Earl 2001; Soule 1997). In 
other words, certain state characteristics make them more amenable to the norm.  
Previous research has outlined several domestic factors that may influence the 
receptivity of norms concerning social minorities. Post-materialists expect higher 
levels of democracy and affluence to correspond with a state’s readiness to legislate 
minority rights issues (Soule and Earl 2001; Soule 1997). Others have focused on 
domestic spaces for LGBT identities and culture, which may influence the reception of 
legal norms by making the context more hospitable. Various minority movements rely 
on  “free” or  “safe” spaces to form associational ties and to mobilize counter-
hegemonic identities (Polletta 1999; Scott 1990; Zepeda-Millan 2010). Adam, 
Duyvendak, and Krouwel (1998, 344) argue, “individuals must be able to find a social 
space where they can develop lesbian and gay identities.” While Chapter 2 made the 
case that LGBT norm entrepreneurs gain access to social spaces in foreign contexts, 
my analysis also suggests the value of access to such spaces domestically. Similarly, 
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policymakers may be less likely to adopt LGBT legislation in domestic contexts where 
counter groups actively mobilize. I suspect that such domestic factors are more critical 
for compliance in first mover states than they are for new adopters. 
HYPOTHESIS 3a: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases 
when social spaces for LGBT people exist.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 3b: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases 
when a state is not predominantly Catholic or Orthodox.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 3c: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases 
when a state’s level of democracy is higher. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3d: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases 
when a state is wealthier. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3e: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation decreases 
when conservative and or nationalistic groups mobilize. 
 
The following analysis tests these hypotheses to explore the statistical 
explanations for why the LGBT norm rapidly and abundantly diffuses to some states 
rather than others. 
DATA AND METHODS 
This chapter utilizes panel data that I have compiled to explore changes in the 
rate of LGBT legislation adoption across states over time. The dataset includes data on 
the passage of LGBT legislation in the 27 EU member states between 1970 and 
2010.
108
 It combines data collected on LGBT legislation (DV) with other country 
contextual data by year (IVs). The data used for the independent variables were 
collected from (1) an original LGBT organizations survey, (2) organizational 
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 With special thanks to Lena Renz for her research assistance in building the dataset, to Kees 
Waaldijk for his pioneering research and indicators on LGBT legislation in the EU, and to the various 
LGBT organizations that helped us clear up issues of discrepancy when the collected data were unclear. 
Among the sources used to compile the dataset: ILGA-Europe, ILGA State Homophobia,” ILGA-
Europe: “ILGA Rainbow European Country Index 2011,” Fundamental Rights Agency Reports, Kees 
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membership lists, and (3) five existing cross-national datasets containing information 
on levels of globalization (KOF Index of Globalization
109
), democracy (Polity IV
110
), 
GDP measures (Penn World Table
111
), and LGBT social spaces.
112
 Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
in Appendix C provides information on coding and the descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in this study.  
The survey data came from an author-conducted online expert survey of the 
291 transnational LGBT organizations in Europe (cf. Appendix A for Survey 
Questions). By transnational LGBT organizations, I refer to domestic groups that are 
members of transnational umbrella networks (i.e. ILGA-Europe and the International 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Youth and Student Organization). 
Data collection based on organizational surveys has a long history in both 
international relations and social movement scholarship (Hadden 2011). While the 
merits of this method are undisputed in the quantitative analysis of transnational 
activism, illuminating important patterns in movement dynamics, country contexts, 
and organizational characteristics, its limitations include low response rates and 
oversampling. In response to these concerns, I utilized features of the Qualtrics Survey 
Software to ensure that only invited respondents could take the survey and that each 
organization could respond only once (to prevent ballot box stuffing). Of the 291 
organizations I identified and surveyed, 180 responded, bringing the response-rate to 
                                                                                                                                            
Waaldijk: “A Compact Chronological Overview,” Amnesty International, The Palm Center, and 
GayLawNet. 
109
 See http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch// for data (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008; Dreher 2006). 
110
 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm for data (Gurr 2000; Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 
2010). 
111
 See http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php for data (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011). 
112
 With special thanks to David Frank (and his colleagues) for suggesting this measure for an early 
paper and for sharing their Spartacus Travel Guide data with me (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010). 
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62%. Compared to previous studies employing organizational surveys, 62% is 
substantially above the average yield (Baruch and Holtom 2008; Hager et al. 2003).
113
 
Consistent with the propositions of this research, I limit my analysis to: (1) the 
27 states that joined the EU by 2010, since all states are embedded in the EU’s 
institutional structures, and (2) the years 1970-2010. I begin the analysis in 1970 
because it roughly coincides with the time of the 1969 Stonewall Rebellion—the first 
broadly publicized instance of LGBT resistance—and the birth of the gay liberation 
movement, which began in the United States in 1965 and found its way to Europe by 
1971 (Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1998). As I will describe in greater detail 
below, I analyze new and old EU member states separately because they have 
differing political histories. As such, I expect that different conditions hold for these 
distinct subsets of states. The dataset includes 1,107 observations across 41 years in 27 
countries.
114
 The following sections supplement the descriptive statistics with the 
substantive meaning behind the dependent and independent variables.  
Dependent Variable 
Governments select from a set of equality and protective legislation measures 
that grant LGBT people state-sanctioned recognition in their respective states. This 
study focuses on five of these measures: anti-discrimination (employment, goods and 
services, constitution), criminal law (incitement to hatred prohibited), partnership 
(cohabitation, registered partnership, marriage equality), parenting rights (joint and 
second parent adoption, fertility), and equal sexual offense provisions (age of consent 
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 One study comparing 16 publications (that used organizational surveys) reported an average 
response rate of 42% (Hager et al. 2003). Another study, analyzing more than 490 publications using 
survey research, found that organizational surveys yield a smaller response rate—35.7 %, with a 
standard deviation of 18.8%—than do individual-level surveys (Baruch and Holtom 2008). 
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and legality of sex-same relations).
115
 First, the analysis uses a five-category LGBT 
legislation dependent variable, based on the key legislation components described 
above and in Table 3.2 (Appendix C). While other studies have focused on one 
category (Asal, Sommer, and Harwood 2013; Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010), there 
are important theoretical justifications for thinking of the adoption of LGBT 
legislation on an ordered scale. Exploring only the legalization of sexual relations—
which is linked to the global spread of individual rights (Frank et al. 2010)—tells us 
little about the extent of LGBT-friendly legislation achieved by states. Moreover, it 
fails to fully capture the impact of LGBT activism, which has a rich multi-issue 
agenda that extends beyond sodomy legislation. For example, Italy made same-sex 
activity legal in 1890 and Poland did so in 1932, yet this had little to do with concern 
for the well being of LGBT people.  While both states are coded as successes in anti-
sodomy datasets, they are laggards on other measures of LGBT legislation. Second, 
recognizing that unique pieces of LGBT legislation may diffuse differently, this study 
explores the various understudied categories of LGBT legislation separately. Doing so 
enables me to better examine the time to adoption, while observing the emulation of 
specific pieces of the understudied policy types across time provides a better measure 
of diffusion. 
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 Observations for countries that have not existed continuously for 40 years, such as the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, will be coded as having missing data for the years prior to their formation. 
115
 While transgendered people are affected by some of the pieces of legislation mentioned above, my 
coding reflects a concern regarding the absence of legislation pertaining specifically to transgendered 
people. Though I had hoped to include this component in the analysis, developing a reliable and valid 
measure for trans-legislation that could be used across cases was problematic for several reasons. For 
example, some states that afford legal recognition to transgender persons require them to undergo 
compulsory sterilization or divorce, which many LGBT organizations view as a violation of individual 
rights. Such cases inform my decision to refrain from coding a uniform transgender rights measure 
across states. Since legal progress for transgender people is limited to a few recent cases, this 
regrettable omission should not affect the results of the analysis. 
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The dual measurement of the dependent variable is based on two questions: (1) 
What explains the extent to which states adopt LGBT-rights legislation? and (2) What 
explains the differential diffusion and timing of certain types of LGBT legislation? To 
answer these questions, I use ordered logit and discrete time logit regression models, 
respectively. The dependent variable in the ordered logit model is a combined 
indicator of the five categories of LGBT legislation, ranging from 0-5 (cf. Table 3.2 in 
Appendix C). In this case, the dependent variable is ordinal and consists of six 
categories. A state might score “0” in 1990, but it will score “2” in 1991 if two pieces 
of legislation, falling under two separate categories (e.g., adoption in the parenting 
category and civil unions in the partnership category), are passed that year. Next, the 
absence or presence of a particular type of LGBT legislation in a given year (e.g., 
partnership) represents the dependent variable in the discrete time logit model. Prior to 
a state’s passage of legislation in a particular category, each year is scored as a “0.” 
The year that a state passes legislation in that particular category, it is coded as “1”, 
and the state drops out of the risk set. Let us now turn to the operationalization of the 
independent variables derived from the aforementioned theoretical approaches (see 
Appendix C for descriptive statistics). 
Independent Variables 
Transnational and International Channels  
A central variable in this analysis operationalizes the embeddedness of states’ 
LGBT organizations in transnational LGBT networks. The transnationalization of 
domestic LGBT organizations refers to the number of domestic organizations, which 
are members of transnational LGBT umbrella organizations in any given year. Using 
membership lists of ILGA-Europe and ILGA-International, I have collected data on all 
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of the 291 transnational LGBT organizations in Europe, including the year they joined 
the European LGBT umbrella organizations. The variable is coded in 4 categories, 
with countries having 0-3 transnational organizations.
116
  
Four additional variables operationalize the concepts of social, political, and 
economic channels, and the year of EU accession. The first three variables are based 
on the theory that porousness leads to LGBT norm visibility. Distinguishing between 
different forms of transnationalization and internationalization reflects Olzak’s (2011) 
call to differentiate between channels that differ in terms of who and what they bring 
into interaction across borders and the (in)direct nature of their effect. I also run the 
models using the overall globalization index, which serves as both a measure of 
robustness and a measure of the overall porousness of a state (Asal, Sommer, and 
Harwood 2013). 
The KOF Index of Globalization Dataset, compiled by Dreher and colleagues, 
provides measures for the concepts of “economic [transnationalization], characterized 
as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and 
perceptions that accompany market exchanges; political [internationalization], 
characterized by a diffusion of government policies” (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 
2008; “KOF Method 2012” 2012, 1).117 I also use a sub-index measure on information 
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 For 87% of the data points, it is true that countries have less than 4 organizations. Countries with 
more than 3 organizations were collapsed into the highest “3 organizations” category. There is no 
theoretical reason to expect that additional organizations will make a difference in the ability to signal 
to state authorities. While the current coding seems intuitively logical based on the distribution of the 
data, I have also—for good measure—coded this variable using different thresholds for categories (0,1; 
0-5, etc), and the results are robust.   
117
 See http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2012.pdf for the quoted description of 
measures (accessed May 1, 2012); see http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch// for data, (accessed May 1, 
2012); see (Olzak 2011) for an application.  
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flows, which is, for conceptual reasons, most appropriate for the present analysis.
118
 
The sub-index “is meant to measure the potential flow of ideas and images. It includes 
the number of internet hosts and users, cable television subscribers, number of radios 
(all per 1000 people), and international newspapers traded (in percent of GDP). All 
these variables to some extent proxy people’s potential for receiving news from other 
countries—they thus contribute to the global spread of ideas” (KOF Method 2012).119 
Political internationalization measures the extent to which a country is a member of 
international organizations, has signed bi- and multi-lateral treaties (since 1945), hosts 
embassies and high commissions, and is involved in UN peace missions (KOF 
Method 2012).
120
 These measures should indicate a state’s self-perception as a 
member of the international community (KOF Method 2012).
121
  Economic 
transnationalization is measured as an index of actual economic flows (i.e., trade, 
FDI, and portfolio investment) and the breakdown of restrictions to trade and capital 
(e.g., revenues on tariffs) (KOF Method).
122
 I also include a dummy variable that 
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 In addition to being a conceptual choice, the decision to use the information flows derives in part 
from my discomfort with the KOF’s measure of “cultural proximity” (another sub-index), which the 
researchers admit was “the dimension of globalization most difficult to grasp.” The way that it was 
coded does not correspond to the logic used here, as the lack of data on “English songs in national hit 
lists or movies shown in national cinemas that originated in Hollywood” forced researchers to instead 
use a series of measures reflecting “the domination of U.S. cultural products… [e.g.] the number of 
McDonald’s restaurants located in a country… In a similar vein, we also use the number of Ikea per 
country” (KOF Method 2012). While I do not consider the number of McDonalds restaurants to be a 
valid measure of cultural proximity, I did include the full “social globalization” index in my ordered 
logit models, and they do not alter the findings. 
119
 See http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2012.pdf (accessed May 1, 2012).  
120
 Dreher, A. et al. 2008. Measuring globalisation: Gauging its consequences. Springer Verlag. 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2012.pdf 
121
 Dreher, A. et al. 2008. Measuring globalisation: Gauging its consequences. Springer Verlag. 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2012.pdf 
122
 This measure captures the concept of transnational pressure through mechanisms of sanction and 
competition. That said, John D’Emilio’s powerful work on capitalism and gay identity has attributed the 
development of gay and lesbian identities to spaces created by capitalism—because capitalism’s labor-
system based on wages helps individualism to flourish, which subsequently allows for gay and lesbian 
identities to form.  He has also suggested that homophobia is at the root of capitalism (D’Emilio 1983). 
Though the embeddedness of states in international markets also contributes to the spread of ideas, I 
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distinguishes the years before and after a state joins the EU. Finally, in the duration 
models, I include a diffusion variable to tap into the concept of emulation. This 
measure is a yearly count of the number of other EU states that have adopted the given 
policy.  
While political and social channels should matter more for the spread of an 
idea, all variables are conceptually similar in that they measure a state’s connection to 
the international community. States with fewer channels are inherently less likely to 
have the LGBT norm become visible in their domestic contexts. As direct and indirect 
channels between transmitter and receiver increase, so should the diffusion of 
international norms (Soule 2004a).  
Domestic Conditions  
 
Next, a series of measures captures the concept of resonance in the domestic 
realm: the presence of domestic social spaces, the level of democracy, the level of 
state wealth, the type of religion, and the counter mobilization of anti-LGBT rights 
groups. 
To capture the presence of domestic social spaces, I use the data and coding 
schema developed by David Frank and his colleagues (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 
2010). Social spaces are scored on a six-point scale, ranging from zero (no activity) to 
five (widespread gay social life). These scores measure the presence of gay-friendly 
bars, clubs, organizations, restaurants, and cafes across cities in each country (cf. 
Table 3.2 in Appendix C). Research on the American context has used similar 
measures of LGBT spaces (using the Gayellow Pages) to identify pre-existing 
movement ties in the 50 states (Kane 2003, 320) or to study the inclusiveness of 
                                                                                                                                            
argue that it does so differently than the social mechanisms that accompany political 
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constituent ties in 218 counties (Negro, Perretti, and Carroll Forthcoming, 15). I 
include additional domestic variables to account for a state’s level of democracy and 
wealth in a given year. The Polity IV Database provides a measure for the degree to 
which a state is a consolidated democracy, using a 21-point scale “that spans from 
fully institutionalized autocracies… to fully institutionalized democracies” (Marshall, 
Jaggers, and Gurr 2010, 1). Next, I use the Penn World Table for the GDP measure, 
which I log to obtain a more normal distribution and to alleviate heteroskedasticity 
(Olzak 2011). Furthermore, I include a measure of the state religion, separating 
Catholic and Orthodox states from Protestant and mixed-religion states (Byrnes and 
Katzenstein 2006). 
A final domestic condition is the ability of opposition groups to counter-
mobilize. Here, counter-mobilization is defined as the presence of anti-LGBT groups. 
The responses are drawn from the survey question: In your opinion, to what degree 
are opposition groups (domestic and foreign) active and effective in mobilizing in your 
country? The scores of organizations in each new EU member state were averaged to 
form this macro-level variable.
123
 Controls for state population and years are included 
in the analysis but are not reported in the tables.  
Methods  
I test my hypotheses using two statistical techniques. First, I employ ordered 
logit regression models (using ologit in STATA 11) to explore the determinants of 
successful passage of legislation when the dependent variable is ordinal. The analysis 
                                                                                                                                            
internationalization and social transnationalization.  
123
 The scores were generally uniform across each country, meaning that experts agreed on the level of 
counter mobilization. While this is the only systematic data on counter mobilization available, some 
may argue that this is a weak measure. As such, I limit my use of the variable to one of models below, 
to demonstrate that its inclusion does not change the signs or significance of the other variables.  
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assigns an ordered value according to the extent to which a state introduces LGBT 
legislation, taking into account that some states go much farther (e.g., legalizing 
LGBT partnerships) than others (e.g., decriminalizing same-sex sexual relations). 
Depending on the subset of states being analyzed, the models include between 306 and 
560 yearly observations in 11 or 14 country clusters.
124
  
Second, I use a discrete time logit model, also known as a duration or event 
history model (using xtlogit in STATA 11), to explore change within states (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 1997; Lektzian and Souva 2001). Duration models are useful 
for analyzing a question of differential diffusion of policies across time and states and 
have been used, for example, to examine related questions concerning the 
decriminalization of sodomy laws and the introduction of hate crimes legislation in the 
United States (Kane 2003; Soule and Earl 2001). This type of estimation allows us to 
calculate a hazard rate, or the likelihood that an event occurs at a particular time. The 
analysis focuses on the duration of a particular condition, seeking to relate differences 
in duration “across units or over time to a vector of independent variables, which may 
or may not change during the period of observation” (Ulfelder 2005, 5). In my case, 
the units of analysis are states, time is measured in years, and the event that I observe 
is passage of LGBT legislation. When a state introduces a piece of LGBT 
legislation—for example, anti-discrimination—it drops out of the hazard set because it 
is no longer at risk for introducing anti-discrimination legislation.  
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 Data for Malta and Luxembourg are missing in the Polity IV Dataset, limiting the analysis to 11 of 
the new EU-12 states, and 14 of the old EU-15 states. Including Malta and Luxembourg by running the 
analysis without the PolityIV variable does not change the significance or sign of the other variables.  
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RESULTS 
Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the results for the ordered logit and duration 
models. In each table, the models test the three sets of independent variables in 
relation to the dependent variables—an ordinal variable in Table 3.3 and a set of 
dichotomous dummy variables in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Table 3.3 shows the results of 
the ordered logit models, which reflect the extent to which states adopt LGBT 
legislation. It divides results into two groups according to the subset of states: the 12 
new EU member states (Models 1-4) and the 15 old EU member states (Models 5-7). 
All Models reported in Table 3.3 are run with either the economic or the social 
channels variables (Models 1, 2, 5, and 6). Following Olzak (2011), I separate these 
variables because they have a relatively high correlation coefficient at .78.
125
 
Furthermore, Models 3 and 7 are re-run with the combined channels variable. Model 4 
also includes the variable measuring the level of counter mobilization. Due to data 
limitations, this variable is limited to the EU-12 (Model 4).  
Ordered Logit Regressions: Explaining the Extent to which States Adopt LGBT-
Friendly Legislation 
In analyzing the adoption of LGBT legislation in Europe, my models provide a 
measure of support for the hypothesis that social channels and combined channels 
influence the extent to which LGBT-Friendly policies diffuse into new adopter states 
(Table 3.3). Consistent with my expectations, the social channels and the combined 
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 To test for multicollinearity, I ran an OLS regression and calculated the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for my independent variables. Here the mean VIF is low (2.65), and none of the variance inflation 
factors are above 5.21. To be confident that no predictors indicate multicollinearity, I generated a 
correlation matrix (see Appendix C). Using a scale of -1 to 1, the matrix suggests the correlation 
between all of the independent variables. In this test, two variables (economic and social 
transnationalization) appear to be highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of .78. I ran the 
regressions again, dropping one of these predictors to ensure that the signs of the coefficients of my 
other predictors did not change. To deal with this, I report the reduced models in the analysis.  
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channels variables are significant (p ≤ .05126) across contexts, controlling for all other 
variables in the models.
127
 The results suggest that states are likely to pass LGBT 
legislation at higher rates if social channels and combined channels of visibility are 
more extensive.  
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 Following Ziliak and McCloskey (2008), I opt not to distinguish between the significance levels of 
.05, .01, and .001. I find little theoretical value in making a distinction between these levels of statistical 
significance, so I will report all of these significance levels as p ≤ .05. 
127
 Henceforth, I will not specify that I am “controlling of all other variables in the model” and will 
assume that the reader is aware that the result of one predictor is contingent on the others. 
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Table 3.3. Ordered Logit Coefficients Predicting Pro-LGBT Legislation in Europe, 1970-2010 † 
 EU-12 EU-15 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Transnational and International Channels   
Transnational LGBT 
Organizations 0.886 0.743 0.863 0.911 -0.212 -0.149 -0.149 
 (.21)* (.40)* (.30)* (.37)* (.28) (.29) (.29) 
Social Channels  
0.127    0.027 
  
 (.02)*    (.01)*   
Political Channels 0.052 0.045   0.016 0.017  
 (.02)* (.02)*   (.01) (.02)  
Economic Channels  0.129    0.019  
  (.05)*    (.02)  
Combined Channels   0.179 0.171   0.039 
   (.07)* (.08)*   (.01)* 
EU Accession 1.163 0.864 1.303 1.32 -0.12 -0.209 -0.195 
 (1.08) (1.38) (1.14) (1.13) (.67) (.68) (.67) 
Domestic Conditions        
LGBT Social Spaces 0.211 0.416 0.169 0.094 -0.074 -0.013 -0.036 
 (.56) (.43) (.59) (.63) (.50) (.49) (.53) 
Catholic/Orthodox -0.551 -1.21 -1.038 -0.959 -0.917 -0.818 -0.73 
 (1.10) (1.14) (.99) (1.04) (.90) (.87) (.87) 
Democracy Level -0.126 -0.11 -0.127 -0.13 -0.222 -0.227 -0.22 
 (.07) (.10) (.11) (.11) (.08)* (.08)* (.08)* 
GDP (log) -0.095 -0.192 -0.315 -0.182 5.271 5.186 5.117 
 (.57) (.49) (.43) (.52) (.90)* (.92)* (.86)* 
Counter Mobilization    -0.548    
    (.91)    
Observations 306 306 306 306 560 560 560 
Clustered by Nation 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 
 
†Malta and Luxembourg not included (data limitations in PolityIV Dataset), Robust z-statistics in 
parentheses, * significant at < 5% level 
 
Aside from these general findings, the results are more complex, supporting 
different theoretical approaches according to the subset of states analyzed. The EU-12 
states (Models 1-4) provide a high measure of support for the influences of 
transnational activism and all transnational and international channels in the extent of 
the diffusion of LGBT-friendly policies. The variables transnational LGBT 
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organizations, social channels, political channels, economic channels, and combined 
channels are all significant at the .05 level. An examination of Models 1-4 in Table 3.3 
indicates that, on average, as states have more transnationally embedded LGBT 
organizations, they are more likely to adopt LGBT-friendly policies and to do so at 
higher rates. The findings related to transnational channels are also in line with the 
hypothesis that diffusion depends on channels of visibility through mechanisms of 
socialization and political sanction. The EU accession variable fails to reach 
significance.  As I demonstrate below, this is related to the fact that the EU’s direct 
pressure mechanism only encourages states to pass anti-discrimination legislation. 
Contrary to common assumptions, the results do not show support for the influence of 
any of the domestic conditions variables—LGBT social spaces, Catholic/Orthodox 
religion, GDP wealth, democracy level, or counter mobilization—on higher levels of 
policy adoption in new EU member states.  
Figure 3.3 visually shows the strong influence of transnational LGBT 
organizations on the adoption of LGBT laws in new EU States. The y-axis indicates 
the expected change in the predicted probability (in percent) that a state will reach 
different levels of LGBT legislation when transnational LGBT organizations exist. In 
the new EU states, 3 categories is the highest level of law that a state has passed. 
When transnational LGBT organizations exist, the expected change in the predicted 
probability of passing no laws decreases by 31%.  When transnational organizations 
are present, the probability of reaching high categories of law—levels 2 and 3—
increases by 22% and 28%, respectively. Interestingly, the probability that a state will 
introduce one category of law is about the same across the two groups. This reflects 
the finding by Frank et al. (2010), that the decriminalization of sex has spread without 
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the presence of movements. That said, my findings make clear that transnational 
LGBT organizations greatly influence the probability of moving beyond that minimal 
threshold of legal recognition.  
Figure 3.3. Expected Change in the Predicted Probability of Legislation Outcomes when Norm Brokers 
Exist, in New EU Member States 
 
 
The image is somewhat reversed for the EU-15 states (Models 5-7), many of 
which were early movers (leaders) in the global expansion of LGBT rights. For this 
subset of states, two measures of domestic conditions are significant (p ≤ .05). The 
results indicate that economic wealth is positively associated with high levels of 
LGBT friendly policy. Substantively, the results suggest that the more affluent EU-15 
states were particularly likely to adopt extensive LGBT legislation. Interestingly, the 
level of democracy is negatively correlated with greater levels of LGBT policy 
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adoption. While we should note that this finding applies to one of the most democratic 
groups of states in the world—and the finding would likely be reversed if the analysis 
included states outside of Europe—it is interesting to show that among this group, the 
strongest democracies are not always the most successful LGBT rights adopters. This 
might be because states with strong democratic reputations need not worry about their 
international image to the extent that weaker democracies do (Towns 2010). For 
example, while the Danes were the first movers on registered partnership, they waited 
until 2012 to approve same sex marriage without international criticism.
128
 The 
weaker democracies of Spain and Portugal moved sooner and went further when it 
came to adopting various pieces of LGBT legislation, despite being followers on 
LGBT rights in early years (Denmark scores a perfect 10 in all 40 years of the 
analysis). France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the centers of European power, 
are among the early leaders that—confident in their democratic and human rights 
stature—no longer felt the same pressures to make advances. Of the transnational 
channels, only the aforementioned social and combined channels are significant and 
positively correlated with LGBT policy adoption, which suggests that social 
mechanisms are paramount to the diffusion of the LGBT norm. 
Aside from the consistent findings concerning the effect of social and 
combined channels of diffusion, several explanations could account for the notable 
differences between the EU-12 and EU-15 states in the extent to which LGBT friendly 
policies diffuse. That domestic resonance matters more for diffusion in the EU-15 may 
have to do with the fact that LGBT visibility came earlier in this subset of states. The 
null effect for domestic LGBT social spaces does not necessarily diminish the 
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 The Nordic States were the earliest first movers of issues of sexuality (Ingebritsen 2002; Paternotte 
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historical importance of these spaces in the development of the LGBT movement. 
Social spaces brought together an invisible group of people and helped to ferment a 
movement in first mover countries; but, for several reasons, these spaces matter less 
for the passage of LGBT legislation, which generally comes about much later. It may 
also reflect the fact that, as was suggested in Chapter 2, Europeanization gave actors 
greater access to established spaces in foreign contexts.  
Similarly, while GDP levels remain important for the extent of diffusion in 
EU-15 states, affluent modernity is not a significant predictor of diffusion in EU-12 
states. In line with modernization theory, wealth is associated with policy adoption, 
but only in the leading EU-15 states. It matters less for EU-12 adopters, where the 
diffusion of LGBT legislation is influenced by a host of transnational and international 
variables. The later timing of visibility—and the historically unprecedented magnitude 
of LGBT rights in contemporary politics—may also explain why EU-12 states are 
more susceptible to political and economic channels, while EU-15 states are not. The 
ideas and images that transnational channels carry today (and have carried since the 
1990s) are strikingly different, in terms of LGBT content, than they were when the 
issue became visible in leading EU-15 countries.   
The non-finding for the counter mobilization variable is also interesting, in 
light of studies predicting that greater counter mobilization can hurt movement 
effectiveness (Lipsky 1968). This coincides with the argument in Chapter 5, which 
suggests that counter movements are self-defeating, because they themselves make the 
issue visible. It also supports the organizational survey results presented in Chapter 5, 
which demonstrate that backlash can lead to tolerance. While I refrain from drawing 
                                                                                                                                            
and Kollman forthcoming). 
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any conclusions on the non-significant finding here, it is worth noting that many of my 
interviewees claimed that right wing activism is counter-productive because their 
arguments verge on the extreme and are poorly constructed, which can result in public 
sympathy for the LGBT cause (McAdam and Su 2002; Minkoff 1994).  
Discrete Time Logit Models: Explaining the Introduction of Various Types of 
Legislation 
I now turn to the question of what—aside from change in sexual offenses, 
which has been studied more extensively (Asal, Sommer, and Harwood 2013; Frank, 
Camp, and Boutcher 2010)—predicts the introduction of various types of legislation. 
In Tables 3.4 and 3.5, I report the results of full and trimmed models for each type of 
legislation (anti-discrimination, criminal law, partnership, parenting, and sexual 
offenses). The models in both tables present the results of the discrete time logit 
regressions, which assess the relationships between the key explanatory predictors (the 
significant predictors in Table 3.3) and the adoption-specific types of legislation.
129
 In 
addition to the transnational and domestic predictors, full models (Models 2, 4, 6, and 
8) in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 also include the regional diffusion variable. Table 3.4 is an 
analysis of the new EU-12 states.  Here I omit ‘parenting legislation’ from the analysis 
because no EU-12 state passed this type legislation in the time frame considered.
130
 
Table 3.5 focuses on the EU-15 states and includes all five legislation areas.  
The diffusion variables perform strongly in all models across both sets of 
states, which suggests that states do emulate other states in the region. Aside from the 
spread of partnership legislation in the EU-12 states, the results for the other types of 
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 In Table 3.4 I also include the EU Accession variable because there is strong reason to believe that 
this factor may play out differently on various pieces of LGBT legislation, since the EU has limited 
competency in this regard.  
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legislation and across all subsets of states indicate that the introduction of LGBT rights 
in European countries increases the probability that other countries will adopt similar 
legislation. In other words, positive action by states in the region does promote 
diffusion, as states look for cues on what types of policy to adopt.  
                                                                                                                                            
130
 Slovenia became the first EU-12 state to introduce second-parent in 2011. 
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Table 3.4: EU-12, Discrete-Time Logit Models Predicting Pro-LGBT Legislation in Europe, 1970-2010 † 
Determinants of Year Passing Anti-Discrimination, Criminal Law and Partnership Legislation 
 Anti-discrimination Criminal Law Partnership 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Transnational LGBT 
Organizations 
5.77 9.09 -.65 
-1.24 
7.64 8.56 
 (2.41)* (2.19)* (1.91) (1.96) (3.05)* (3.26)* 
Combined Channels .84 .99 .47 .19 3.20 3.18 
 (.49)* (.36)* (.54) (.36) (.79)* (1.44)* 
EU Accession 20.25 27.49 2.85 .23 -11.86 -10.38 
 (5.95)* (7.58)* (5.92) (4.34) (5.42)* (5.71) 
Democracy Level  -.953 10.62 -.196 -.635 -5.03 -4.88 
 (1.28) (4.12)* (.872) (.941) (1.67)* (2.33)* 
GDP (log) 26.07 11.43 19.05 -3.841 10.20 11.76 
 (9.49)* (9.22) (6.77)* (8.15) (8.91) (16.19) 
Diffusion Anti-Discrimination  2.82     
  (.435)*     
Diffusion Criminal Law    2.61   
    (1.16)*   
Diffusion Partnership Rights      -.692 
      (1.02) 
Diffusion Sexual Offenses       
       
Constant -309.52 -359.49 -230.01 -22.49 -328.22 -327.91 
 (78.32)* (77.39)* (41.48)* (53.60) (90.19)* (105.03)* 
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Number of Countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 
 
†Malta and Luxembourg not included (data limitations in PolityIV Dataset), Robust z-statistics in parentheses, * significant at < 5% level 
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The results presented in Table 3.4 show that the effects of the focal predictors 
vary across legislation type in EU-12 countries. The data suggest that the 
transnational LGBT organizations and combined channels variables are significant, 
positive predictors of policy adoption in four of the six models. These variables have a 
positive effect on the passage of anti-discrimination and partnership legislation, but no 
effect for the passage of criminal law legislation. The results for the other variables are 
less uniform. The EU accession variable is a significant and positive predictor of anti-
discrimination; but, in one of the partnership models, it runs in the opposite direction. 
The finding that only EU accession has a positive and significant relationship with the 
introduction of anti-discrimination legislation was expected, since the Article 13 of the 
Amsterdam treaty focused specifically on employment anti-discrimination as an 
accession requirement. The negative correlation between EU accession and 
partnership in one of the models (Model 5) may reflect the fact that some states 
responded to EU accession requirements by mounting strong opposition to same-sex 
marriage. For example, Poland opted out of the EU’s Charter on Fundamental Rights 
on the basis of a legally unwarranted fear that it might be compelled to accept same-
sex partnerships and to legalize abortion (Barnard 2008). The EU accession finding 
connects back to the discussion surrounding Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2, which 
emphasizes the limits to EU hard law. Furthermore, the results suggest that the initial 
introduction of partnership provisions is more likely to appear in countries that have 
lower democracy scores. The same surprising finding for democracy level that we saw 
in Table 3.3 (explained above) reappears in Models 5 and 6. In times where the 
American movement’s agenda has revolved around a marriage debate, states may see 
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partnership, in particular, as a way to signal to other states that they are modern, 
especially if they feel that their democratic reputation may be improved.
  129 
 
Table 3.5: EU-15, Discrete-Time Logit Models Predicting Pro-LGBT Legislation in Europe, 1970-2010 † 
Determinants of Year Passing Anti-Discrimination, Criminal Law, Partnership and Parenting Legislation 
 Anti-Discrimination Criminal Law Partnership Parenting 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Transnational 
LGBT 
Organizations -5.133* -1.752 -1.046 -1.173 2.073 0.883 -1.843 -6.851* 
 (2.264) (1.709) (0.915) (1.314) (1.933) (2.247) (1.754) (3.345) 
Combined Channels 1.598* 0.883* 0.541* 0.824* 0.469 0.341* 0.347* 1.116* 
 (0.419) (0.175) (0.150) (0.297) (0.424) (0.167) (0.175) (0.389) 
Democracy Level  -8.195 -0.463 -0.661 -2.098 -4.421* -2.926 -0.990 -0.470 
 (5.106) (4.248) (6.197) (4.625) (2.461) (2.107) (2.959) (2.757) 
GDP (log) 147.6* 29.48* 21.24* 11.87* 53.08* 28.56* 39.67* 16.80 
 (21.95) (10.50) (3.892) (5.621) (9.329) (11.95) (7.387) (10.65) 
Diffusion Anti-Discrimination  2.482*       
  (.53)       
Diffusion Criminal Law   1.573*     
    (.38)     
Diffusion Partnership Rights     2.015*   
Diffusion Parenting  
    (.71)   
       
Diffusion Sexual Offenses        3.247* 
        (.82) 
Constant -1,500* -392.0* -251.8* -185.4* -529.4* -302.7* -431.8* -278.6* 
 (222.2) (106.4) (75.37) (70.87) (92.67) (113.3) (85.50) (121.6) 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
# of Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
 
†Malta and Luxembourg not included (data limitations in PolityIV Dataset), Robust z-statistics in parentheses, * significant at < 5% level 
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Table 3.5 shows the regression results explaining the introduction of individual 
pieces of legislation in EU-15 countries. As was the case in the ordered analysis that 
appears in Table 3.3, GDP represents a significant predictor of the introduction of 
individual pieces of LGBT legislation. In seven of eight models, wealthier countries 
are more likely to pass LGBT legislation, regardless of legislation type. Likewise, the 
results indicate that combined channels represent a significant and positive predictor 
of policy adoption in seven of the eight models. Unlike the EU-12, transnational 
LGBT organizations are less influential for the initial introduction of legislation in the 
EU-15 states. Though indeterminate across models, Models 1 and 8 suggest that 
transnational mobilization may have slowed the initial introduction of anti-
discrimination and parenting legislation. This may echo Yamasaki’s (2009) findings 
on high-profile issues, that in EU-15 contexts “highly mobilized social movements 
may dampen the chance of major policy changes,” but only in first mover states. 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis sought to contribute to, and to test, the theoretical explanations 
for diffusion of contentious pieces of legislation. Three dominant theoretical 
expectations informed this investigation: rights legislation diffuses to states when they 
fear the costs of external pressure (political conditionality via sanction, and economic 
incentives via competition), when they become convinced of the norm’s 
appropriateness (socialization through learning), when their preexisting domestic 
norms resonate with the international ones (high levels of democracy, modernization, 
and gay culture), and when their advocacy organizations are embedded in 
transnational networks (transnational LGBT organizations). I hypothesized that the 
presence of transnationally embedded LGBT organizations and other channels of 
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transnationalization would lead to diffusion in new adopter states because they make 
the issue visible in the domestic realm.  
The results presented in this chapter suggest that transnational channels 
represent powerful explanations for the extent to which LGBT legislation diffuses to 
various domestic contexts. In particular, transnational channels of socialization (rather 
than political sanction) are the most powerful predictors of LGBT rights diffusion 
across cases. Surprisingly, countries with predominantly Catholic and Orthodox 
populations do not vary significantly from Protestant states in their likelihood of 
adopting LGBT legislation. Nor is the strength and rise of counter-movements in new 
EU member states statistically correlated with the passage of LGBT legislation.  
Other predictors produce more complex results. A comparison between the 
EU-12 and EU-15 suggests different processes and mechanisms of diffusion and that 
mediated transnational channels of activism matter more in the context of new EU-12 
member states. In particular, transnationally embedded activist organizations appear to 
be highly effective for diffusion in EU-12 states. All other channels—social, political 
and economic—also proved significant for diffusion in the EU-12 states. This finding 
coincides with my qualitative interviews, including those with opponents of the LGBT 
movement. When asked what could most erode values in Poland, one anti-LGBT 
activist responded, “Poland and the EU are in permanent moral confrontation 
concerning social issues. The only thing we fear could change that is the increasing 
outside imagery of this deviant [sexual] lifestyle as something common place, normal 
or even appealing for Poland” (interview no. 141).  
Since some of the EU-15 states were first-movers in passing extensive LGBT 
rights legislation, they do not rely as heavily on transnational ties for influencing state 
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authorities on LGBT legislation. This is not to say that transnational channels did not 
impact diffusion in EU-15 states, as is made evident by the significance of social and 
combined channels of transnationalization on the process of LGBT rights diffusion. 
What is unique about the EU-15 states is the prominent role that that domestic 
variables, such as affluence and democracy level, play in predicting high rates of 
LGBT rights.  
Another contribution of this analysis is that it tests dominant theoretical 
approaches across various pieces of LGBT legislation. While anti-discrimination in 
employment may be tied to EU conditionality, for example, it does not suggest that 
conditionality is the best predictor of diffusion for the introduction of various other 
pieces of LGBT legislation. By looking across four separate types of policies and 
comparing them to an overall scale of LGBT-friendly legislation, I can make 
inferences about when, where, and under what conditions rights legislation is most 
likely to diffuse. This analysis has revealed variation in the factors explaining the 
initial introduction of legislation (Tables 3.4 and 3.5) and the extent to which a state 
continues to pass LGBT legislation after the opportunity is created (Table 3.3).  
In sum, this chapter expands upon previous case study research that has looked 
at LGBT mobilization by providing a systematic, large-n analysis of various national 
contexts, detailing the complexity of legislative diffusion across two sets of states and 
across various pieces of legislation. Large-n studies that look across the globe often 
overemphasize certain variables, such as the importance of state wealth for the 
introduction of LGBT rights, taking for granted that the LGBT issue remains invisible 
in many of the contexts under study (Inglehart and Norris 2003). This chapter attempts 
to get at the nuances of diffusion using stringent methodologically driven scope 
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conditions, and by closely examining a region that actively purports an LGBT norm 
but exhibits variation across member states. I want to emphasize that in other regions 
porousness to transnational channels may operate in the other direction. Europe is 
unique in that the systems of knowledge at the regional level privilege the issue of 
LGBT rights, and this posture toward LGBT rights is not yet necessarily global in 
orientation.  
Finally, the results support the notion that state decision makers are drawn to 
internationally visible issues, even if the national debate concerning these issues is not 
resolved.
131
 States care about their image on the world stage and are willing to take 
risky policy decisions when they receive strong signals that their international 
community expects it of them. In the year since President Obama first expressed his 
support for same-sex marriage in May of 2012, five countries
132
 and six American 
states
133
 have passed such legislation. Even established democracies with the strong 
LGBT rights records felt compelled to address the issue further. It became a campaign 
issue in France—which passed same-sex marriage legislation in 2013—and in 
Germany. In Germany marriage had not traditionally been at the center of the LGBT 
agenda, but within days of President Obama’s announcement, transnational LGBT 
organizations like All Out staged protests in front of the Chancellery in Berlin 
referring to Germany—which has a better record than the United States—as a laggard 
on LGBT rights. Chancellor Merkel and her Union of Christian Democrats 
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 The shifts we observe are also about historic time. Early adopters were in a much less connected 
world, but the game has changed now such that decisions can no longer be made in a vacuum. In the 
American context, recent research has similar findings for other types of policy diffusion across states 
(Karch 2012, 50). 
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 The five countries are Denmark, Brazil, Uruguay, France and New Zealand. Nepal, Luxembourg, 
England, Whales, and Scotland have legislation in progress.  
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 Washington, Maine, Rhode Island, Maryland, Minnesota, and Delaware. 
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(CDU/CSU) had to address the issue at their party congress. Opting not to make it a 
party platform issue at the time, the party was banned from the 2013 Christopher 
Street Day parade in Berlin—an event that the CDU has supported and contributed a 
float to for decades.
134
  
The following chapter explores the hypothesis that societies, like their state 
decision makers, are also aware of such international trends. According to Agata 
Chaber, a co-organizer of the Warsaw EuroPride in 2010—an international event with 
extensive media coverage—, the numbers (15,000 participants) spoke for themselves:  
“But this is Poland! Normally we get 6,000 people, max. And it’s not just the 
foreigners. Because it’s EuroPride, more Poles are coming. They don’t want to 
be seen as homophobic” (Cragg 2010).  
Chapter 4 elaborates on this discussion as it pertains to changed attitudes toward 
homosexuality in Europe. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Societal Perceptions: 
International Norms and Perceiving LGBT Minorities in the “New EU” 
 
 
“Changing society required a revolution 
in thought.” 
 
— Angelo Pezzana, Fuori, 2011135 
 
As with the diffusion of legislation to states, the fall of the Berlin Wall also 
engendered an unprecedented exposure of Central and Eastern European societies to 
norms concerning LGBT people that were developing more rapidly in other parts of 
Europe.
136
 Pathways for exchange of ideas opened tremendously as the continent 
again reexamined its understanding and meaning of Europe, and as increased 
transnational channels would supplement the internal dynamics that lead to such 
sticking changes in Central and Eastern Europe. While political scientists generally 
analyze the diffusion of policies across states, the abruptness and rapidity of European 
integration and its social mandate in the early 1990s is also a natural treatment of sorts 
for value internalization among and across societies. Indeed, international norm 
diffusion theory suggests that accepted ideas spread from areas of high concentration 
(usually powerful states) to areas of low concentration, which is at its essence about a 
change in behavior by social entities (Florini 1996). Change in attitudes toward 
homosexuality is thus a measure of norm internalization that goes beyond state 
compliance. A “revolution in thought,” as the Italian transnational activist Angelo 
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Pezzana called it, is about fundamental shifts in behaviors, practices and 
understandings that change lived experiences for sexual minorities. Activists like 
Pezzana understood that for minorities—who are so often deemed radical in their own 
domestic contexts—such changes have both domestic and transnational sources.  
In this chapter, I focus on international norm diffusion pertaining to changing 
attitudes and perceptions of sexual minorities in an integrating Europe. I should note 
from the outset that attitudes towards homosexuality are still negative in the majority 
of countries around the world, including much of Europe. It is only recently that we 
have observed more rapid shifts in the internalization of norms toward accepting 
homosexuality. In their “return to Europe,” newly admitted member states were 
exposed to similar European Union (EU) norms and regulation, yet stark variations in 
value shifts are evident across their societies (see Figure 4.1). For example, between 
the time of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and accession to the EU, Slovaks 
positively shifted their opinion on homosexuality by nearly 60%, while Hungarians 
saw no positive change at all.  
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 In 1989, at the height of the HIV/AIDS crisis, some states in Western Europe were exposed to the 
mobilization and visibility of non-heterosexual minorities substantially more compared to states east of 
the Iron Curtain. 
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Figure 4.1, Variation in Attitudes towards Homosexuality Across EU Member States 
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This chapter returns to one of the core questions posed in the dissertation: Why 
have societal attitudes towards lesbian and gay
137
 people changed differently across 
states?  Are these changes due to heightened exposure to EU norms and institutions? 
Under what domestic and transnational preconditions do international norms on sexual 
minority rights successfully diffuse to new member states? I address these questions 
using data on the 27 EU member states from 1990 to 2009. As in Chapter 3, I also 
compare the trajectories of changed attitudes in the new EU-12 member states to those 
in the EU-15 states. The data are drawn from individual attitudes; individuals nested 
both in their domestic realm (societies) and in smaller sub-groups within their states 
(social groups).  
The analysis expands upon norm diffusion literature by looking at societal 
dimensions of international relations theory. Societies and social groups do not 
respond to the external environment in the same way. I follow Rousseau (2006, 212) 
to “open up the black box of the state” by exploring how differences in the domestic 
realm—and its ties to the international community—influence norm diffusion among 
individuals.
138
 As I have argued throughout, I expect states to differ in the degree to 
which LGBT norms become visible. The transnational and international
139
 channels 
that have contributed to the visibility of LGBT norms should influence individual 
perceptions of LGBT people. Attitudinal change among individuals—nested both in 
                                                 
137
 Since cross-national attitudinal data going back to the 1980s is limited to questions dealing with 
“homosexuality” and not to other sexual minorities, the chapter’s results unfortunately only speak to 
this narrow subgroup of sexual minorities. The question does tap into attitudes toward non-
heteronormative sexual orientation, however, which may serve as a rough proxy of attitudes toward 
sexual minorities more generally. 
138
 Observing changes in patterns lived out by individuals is one avenue for analyzing the effect of 
international norms. 
139
 As previously mentioned, for simplicity, I often use the terms ‘transnational channels’ or ‘channels’ 
to refer to both sets of transnational and international channels. I do this to avoid writing out 
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societies and social groupings within the state—depends on the degree to which their 
societies are connected to the international community via channels of visibility. 
Furthermore, such change depends also on the perceptions of perceived threat that 
individuals’ social groups associate with the norm. Within the domestic sphere, social 
groups that are more religious and more nationalist should perceive LGBT norms as 
more threatening, based on the assumption that LGBT rights challenge national 
identity and tradition. In this sense, threat perceptions moderate the effectiveness of 
transnational channels and the diffusion of international norms to individuals.  
This chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I survey the existing explanations for 
attitudinal change. From this baseline, I build my theoretical propositions for 
explaining the variation recognized across individuals. Second, I describe the model, 
data, and indicators with which I will test the postulated hypotheses. Third, I analyze 
the results of my findings in four subsections related to differing aspects of the 
analysis. In conclusion, I summarize the arguments and their implications for theory 
and future research. 
EXPLAINING CHANGE IN ATTITUDES 
Recent cross-national research has linked changing attitudes on homosexuality 
to various demographic variables, but less attention has been paid to transnational 
sources of such change (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Gerhards 2010; Lax and Phillips 
2009; T. W. Smith 2011; Takács and Szalma 2011). Theoretically, the studies by 
Takács and Szalma (2011) and Andersen and Fetner (2008) make the farthest 
theoretical advances by enhancing our understanding of the nuances behind positive 
                                                                                                                                            
‘transnational and international channels’ repeatedly. When I am referring specifically to international 
political channels, I make sure to use the term ‘international.’  
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and negative attitudes towards homosexuals.
140
 The former finds evidence that same-
sex marriage legislation leads to increasingly favorable attitudes toward 
homosexuality. The Anderson and Fetner (2008) article is theoretically rooted within 
the post-materialist thesis, demonstrating that the effect of modernization on pro-
LGBT attitudes is moderated by economic inequality. I draw on the above literature in 
discerning which variables, especially control variables, to include in the models. 
Alongside the commonly theorized demographic and modernization variables 
privileged in this literature, however, my theoretical foundation sets itself apart by 
examining the role of transnational channels—and the substantial variation across 
states in this regard—that shape how otherwise similar individuals might position 
themselves in relation to issues of homosexuality.  
The research puzzle presented here focuses both on the transnational and 
internal domestic dynamics that enable the success or failure of international 
pressures. By viewing states as differentiated entities that require disaggregation, my 
argument takes into account that transnational channels vary in breadth and scope 
across states and their societies. First, I argue that differences in transnational channels 
of visibility linked to LGBT norms are powerful determinants of normative change 
across societies. Second, for questions of internalization we must also consider the 
differing potential that the social groups in which individuals are nested have for 
associating threat with LGBT norms. Threat perception can augment the thesis that 
norms diffuse through transnational channels and it plays an important role in the 
success or failure of norm internalization. By this, I suggest that individuals are 
socialized by norms constructed by groups within the domestic sphere that adhere to 
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 Gerhards (2011) finds evidence for both modernization and secular arguments associated with more 
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different threat perceptions of homosexuality, and that these norms can resist or 
facilitate the internalization of “imported” ones.141  
Linking threat construction to the norm diffusion literature provides a useful 
starting point to gain leverage on the variation. The construction of threat differs 
across social groups, with domestic players competing to define “self” and “the other” 
according to their distinct perceptions of what is acceptable and what is threatening. 
My interviews with proponents of LGBT rights have emphasized that resistance 
movements found success when they recast LGBT identities as external and 
antithetical to domestic values and traditions. If LGBT rights norms are portrayed as 
inherently external, then the degrees to which individuals are socialized in their 
national identities and traditional values will influence reactions to the norm. Thus, not 
all individuals will find the imported norm equally threatening. Individuals embedded 
in groups where they will be socialized to perceive the LGBT norm as threatening—
based on the logic that it challenges traditional values and national identity—will be 
more likely to reject it. The reverse is also true: individuals in groups less wedded to 
nation and tradition, will be more likely to incorporate a “framed” or “grafted” 
international norm. Within the domestic realm, the social underpinnings of individual 
attitudes are effectual in light of international norms.
142
  
                                                                                                                                            
positive LGBT attitudes. 
141
 This dimension is neglected in the dominant IR literature. The results reinforce the theory that 
domestic identities are essential to understanding the variation in diffusion across states. 
142
 Especially after Gourevitch’s (1978) article, “The Second Image Reversed: The International 
Sources of Domestic Politics,” IR scholars responded to the rapid rise of international organizations by 
exploring their effect on domestic politics and society. Much of this literature explains how domestic 
politics bend in response to international pressure. Yet scholars of the European polity are equally 
attuned to the power of the domestic level, since Europeanists have learned that member states and their 
citizens often resist pressure from Brussels. My study benefits from this multi-level understanding of 
international pressures, while departing from the literature’s dominant focus on market compliance. 
Instead, I look at the social compliance dimension. This means that I disaggregate the “EU pressure” 
variable and focus only on EU norms that deal with accepting LGBT persons. This contrasts with the 
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In sum, my expectations in this chapter are twofold. First, I expect that 
transnational channels of visibility will shape outcomes in attitudes across societies. 
Second, I expect the effect of these channels will vary across the social groups in 
which individuals are nested depending on their level of threat perception. The causal 
argument is simple: (1) individuals nested in the societies of more porous states will 
be more likely to internalize the norm; (2) individuals embedded in social groups that 
are more nationalistic and religious will perceive norms associated with foreign 
contexts as external, and by definition “threatening.” Individuals in these “high-threat-
perception” groups should be systematically less likely to internalize the international 
norms that their societies are adopting.  
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Model 
I test theories of norm diffusion on both the transnational and domestic level.  
At the transnational level, EU stipulations on governments and contact between 
societies should change conceptualizations of the “self” and “the other” (Rousseau 
2006, 211). Since the Acquis Communautaire and other EU conditions do not vary 
across my cases, I measure both the individual’s geographic proximity to, and the 
European identification with, first mover states. I also explore the extent of a state’s 
political, social and economic channels to the international community, as a test of 
                                                                                                                                            
compliance literature’s tendency to explain domestic responses to a package of European directives 
(Toshkov 2007, 2008), as if the domestic realm responds the same way to a vast variety of issues. 
Finally, I intend to move beyond the compliance literature’s focus on states complying with the 
minimum stipulations of the EU directives to a deeper analysis of societal transformation—as is 
stipulated in the diffusion literature. These steps will (1) add a disaggregated social dimension to the 
compliance literature and (2) add an empirical and a domestic focus to the IR literature on norm 
diffusion. 
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international norm diffusion. Furthermore, I look at characteristics of the individual 
that denote the levels of perceived threat they may associate with the norm.  
Data 
This chapter utilizes data collected by the European Values Survey (EVS) 
between 1990 and 2008 (EVS 2011).  The EVS researchers surveyed over 43,000 
respondents in my selected countries of interest during the designated time period, in 
three waves (1990-1991, 1999-2000, and 2008-2009). Research based on survey data 
has a long history in social science research. While the merits of this method are 
unrivaled in quantitative analysis of individual attitudes, the limitations of survey 
research include sampling bias and measurement error. The EVS researchers 
controlled for these limitations by using random selection
143
 and uniform measures.
144
 
I am careful that the survey responses I use validly capture the concepts I put forth 
(this is demonstrated below). I also expand the EVS dataset using a series of state-
level variables and by coding for the geographic proximity of individuals to Western 
Europe. For state-level variables, I use data from the KOF Globalization Index 
(Dreher 2006, 2008) and my original legislation dataset.
145
 To measure geography, I 
corresponded the EVS regional codes in the EVS data with Nomenclature of Units for 
Territorial Statistics (NUTS) data, to add two proximity variables to the EVS dataset. 
These variables measure the distance from each individual’s residence in the new EU-
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 “… the process of assigning values to the explanatory variables is independent of the dependent 
variables, that selection bias… is absent, and that omitted variable bias is also absent” (King, Keohane, 
and Verba 1994, 94). 
144
 The researchers asked the same questions to all respondents, in the same way, and using the same 
response scale. 
145
 Both of these datasets are explained in depth in Chapter 3, under the “Data and Analysis” section. 
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12 states to Western Europe.
146
 These additional measures supplement the EVS data 
that I employ to demarcate change in attitudes. 
The study explores the determinants of attitudes towards homosexuals in all 27 
EU member states. In several models, I limit the analysis to the 12 member states that 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.
147
 Consistent with my theoretical proposition, I select 
these states on the basis of two criteria: all states (1) experienced greater exposure to 
more developed norms surrounding homosexuality after 1989, and (2) were successful 
in gaining membership to the EU. I also compare these EU-12 models to others 
limited to the EU-15 states.
148
 Tables 4.1 and 4.6 in Appendix D describe all variables 
and in detail.  
Dependent Variable: International Norm Diffusion and Attitudes toward Homosexuals  
The indicators for the dependent variable (DV) tap into the one dimension of 
norm internalization: change in the attitudes of individuals within society. The variable 
is constructed from responses to this EVS survey prompt: “Please tell me for each of 
the following whether you think [homosexuality] can always be justified, never be 
justified, or something in between.” Responses were coded on a scale of one (never 
justifiable) to ten (always justifiable). Since the distribution of the data points on this 
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 This coding process was a large endeavor that involved able research assistance by Jakob Tesch and 
helpful communication with Dr. Inge Sieben, a researcher with the EVS study. We took the regional 
variable (x048) in the EVS dataset and corresponded the regions with Nomenclature of Units for 
Territorial Statistics (NUTS) data. Because of coding discrepancies across different EVS waves, we 
needed to combine two different codes in the EVS. The codes underlying the x048 variable were not the 
same as the codes underlying the coding for the NUTS variables in the subsequent EVS waves, and the 
codes underlying the NUTS variables in the European Value Survey do not correspond to 
the NUTS codes used by the European Union. In the end, we managed to use NUTS3 data to code for 
most individuals in EVS Waves 3 and 4, but only for seven of twelve countries in Wave 2. 
147
 This includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Cyprus, Malta, Romania, and Bulgaria.   
148
 The differences in the variability of the independent variables between EU-12 and EU-15 are 
marginal; they have a similar spread in terms of range and mean.  
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variable is slightly skewed to the left, I transformed the variable using the natural 
logarithms.
149
  
The dependent variable indicator above has been used in the recent research on 
attitudes towards homosexuality (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Takács and Szalma 
2011), but general concerns about the use of single-item measures remain, in that such 
variables are more prone to measurement error.
150
 To address this concern, I also 
created a composite measure that integrates the DV data above with a question on 
unwanted neighbors. EVS respondents were also asked: “On this list are various 
groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as 
neighbors? Among the 15 identified groups, respondents could select “homosexuals” 
as one of their unwanted neighbor groups. While the previous DV question on 
attitudes illuminates whether or not respondents feel homosexuality is acceptable, this 
second measure also might uncover respondents’ willingness to practice intolerance 
by placing themselves in a scenario in which they single out gay and lesbian people. In 
                                                 
149
 I also run each model with the original variable, and the sign and significance levels of the predictors 
do not change. 
150
 Beyond the issues with single-measure survey items, there remain limits to using attitudinal survey 
data to capture norm internalization. A critical concern is that respondents might consciously moderate 
their actual positions on homosexuality when they respond to survey questions. This case has been 
made by research on symbolic racism in political psychology. McConahay and Hough (1976) and Sears 
(1988) have argued that opponents to black rights developed a language superficially distinct from 
racism to describe African Americans and their behavior. If this is true, we should expect respondents—
aware of norms of conduct—to disguise and suppress overt racist positions, opting to express their 
racism covertly by supporting traditional and national values, for example. According to this idea, 
survey data may have serious limits as a measure of internalization for social issues like racism and 
homophobia, as negative feelings toward these groups remain unacknowledged. The bimodal nature of 
the survey responses used here—showing that respondents generally take extreme positions on either 
end of the spectrum, and with a majority still feeling comfortable in expressing negative feelings toward 
homosexuals—alleviates this concern somewhat, but I wish to instill a note of caution nonetheless. 
While this is the best data we have at our disposal to address the topic of this chapter, I have taken steps 
(described above) to improve on previous studies that use this data. I also wish to thank Anna 
Grzymala-Busse, who alerted me to the issues of single-measure survey items on social issues (email 
communication 2010).  
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any respect, the composite index serves as a robustness check of the findings using the 
original variable on homosexuality as justifiable.
151
  
Independent Variables: Domestic Variation in Transnational Channels 
I use four variables to access my concept of transnational channels of 
diffusion. Returning to the indicators presented in Chapter 3, I again employ the 
measures of social, political, economic and combined transnational and international 
channels. These indicators are measured at the state level. Each respondent is thus 
linked to her state’s group-level score at the time of the survey. As presented in 
Chapter 3, these direct, indirect, and mediated channels of diffusion are theoretically 
important because they produce the transnational interactions that expose individuals 
to new norms, making them visible and open to deliberation in the domestic sphere.  
If norms spread through channels of transnational interaction, then we might 
also expect that geographic proximity to the states west of the Iron Curtain—a context 
where homosexuality was politicized earlier—can predict successful diffusion. Social 
movement scholars of diffusion have highlighted geography as an indicator of a direct 
channel between transmitter and receiver of a norm (Givan, Roberts, and Soule 2010). 
Empirical applications by political scientists and sociologists find that distance is a 
politically and socially salient variable, for example, in explaining (1) the 
democratization and market-Europeanization of post-communist states (Kopstein and 
Reilly 2000) and (2) the positive attitudes of citizens toward the EU (Berezin and 
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 In previous work, I have also tried to capture change between T1 and T2 by calculating the national 
means of the responses in T1 and subtracting them from each of the individual responses in T2. For 
example, I subtracted 1.85 (Polish mean score in T1) from a Polish respondent’s score of 5 in 2008, 
giving that individual a change score of 3.15. While this measure produced results largely in line with 
my argument here, I do not employ it here because it does not reflect change in the same individuals 
over time—picking up country fixed effects instead. Ideally we will have panel data to study these types 
of questions in the future, but they do not exist cross-nationally over the time periods I analyze. 
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Diez-Medrano 2008). Following these scholars, I create two indicators of proximity to 
Western Europe. The first variable measures the distance to Vienna or Berlin, 
whichever lies closer: “These cities are chosen as important economic and cultural 
referents for the countries of the former communist world” because of the location 
along the Iron Curtain (Kopstein and Reilly 2000, 10). The second indicator measures 
the distance to Brussels, the political center of the EU and NATO (Berezin and Diez-
Medrano 2008). However, I expand on both previously used distance measures, which 
either simply measured the distance from Central and Eastern European capital cities 
(Kopstein and Reilly 2000) or the distance in 10 intervals (Berezin and Diez-Medrano 
2008). Instead, I measure the exact distance (in kilometers) between the residence of 
14,910 individuals, in over 400 cities across Central and Eastern Europe, and their 
western counterparts (Berlin/Vienna or Brussels). If individual information flows and 
the spread of ideas constitute the goal, then we can assume that the citizens of Słubcie 
(historically connected to Frankfurt an der Oder) are more familiar with Germany than 
those in Warsaw. In this regard, my measure is more accurate and careful in capturing 
the propositions put forth in previous scholarship. The same logic should make the 
“Iron Curtain” variable more valid than the “Brussels” variable (which may be one of 
the EU capitals but is not necessarily tied to the embodiment of EU norms). I test both 
measures as a robustness check, but I only report the “Iron Curtain” measure in my 
tables. The unreported “distance to Brussels” variable produces nearly identical results 
in terms of sign and direction, though with a slightly larger coefficient size. 
Finally, I include an individual measure of shared identification with the EU 
that constitutes an indirect channel of diffusion. My qualitative research has shown 
that proponents of LGBT rights in the EU consciously frame the LGBT norm as one 
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of European democratic values and responsibilities.
152
 The rights of sexual minorities 
are also clearly articulated in EU treaties (cf. Chapter 1). Thus, I expect that an 
individual’s shared identification with European institutions to establish an indirect 
channel of diffusion, in that these individuals have a shared identification with an 
institution that purports the norm (Givan, Roberts, and Soule 2010). I use an EVS 
(2011) survey question that asks how much confidence individuals have in the EU (a 
great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all). Whether individuals are originally 
convinced of the content of the norm, if they have strong confidence in the values of 
the EU, then they may be more likely to embrace the norm as part of their European 
identity.  
HYPOTHESIS 1a: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the state 
is more porous to the international community (in/direct and mediated 
channels) (state level variable) 
 
 Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the state is more 
socially porous to the international community 
 Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the state is more 
politically porous to the international community 
 Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the state is more 
economically porous to the international community 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1b: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the 
individual is geographically closer to Western Europe (direct channel) 
(individual level variable) 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1c: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the 
individual identifies with the EU (indirect channel) (individual level variable) 
 
Independent Variable: Perceived Threat 
The main variables of interest in this category of independent variables are 
related to religion and nationalism. Nationalism should matter for perceiving 
homosexuality as threatening because the anti-LGBT opposition almost always frames 
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 See also (Ayoub and Paternotte 2012; Beger 2009; Kuhar 2011; Stychin 1998). 
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LGBT norms as “external” and imposed by the periphery (cf. Chapter 5). Individuals 
who are deeply rooted in the imaginary of the nation will feel more vulnerable towards 
“external” LGBT norms, which they see as challenging their national identity. 
Churches also recognize international norms on homosexuality as threatening to 
important moral values. Byrnes and Katzenstein (2006) find the variation in type and 
strength of religion across Europe is an obstacle to EU integration (see also, Prochazka 
1994). In post-socialist societies, Catholic and Orthodox Churches have been 
especially opposed to the import of EU standards on sexuality (Ramet 2006, 126).
153
 
Finally, individuals who practice their religions are more exposed to the messages 
espoused by religious institutions and should be more likely to perceive imported EU 
norms as threatening to their values (Herek 1987). 
I use four indicators—nationalism, religiosity, church authority, and religious 
affiliation—to distinguish individuals who have characteristics that I expect will lead 
them to perceive norms governing LGBT rights as threatening. People with these 
characteristics hold more traditional or national values that should be more likely to 
associate the LGBT norm as externally imposed. National pride is measured in four 
intervals, very proud (4) to not at all proud (1). Church authority is a dichotomous 
measure in response to the EVS question: “Generally speaking, do you think that 
[your church is giving/the churches are giving], in your country, adequate answers to 
the social problems facing our country today?” To measure religiosity and religious 
doctrine, I use the EVS data on religious affiliation and religious service attendance. I 
predict that more church attendance is negatively correlated with malleable attitudes to 
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 Unlike the Catholic Church hierarchy, the Orthodox Church is decentralized across national contexts 
(Philpott 2007). That said, it takes a strongly uniform position when it comes to issues of homosexuality 
(Gerhards 2010, 16). 
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international norms. I remain ambivalent about whether religious doctrine should 
matter, since textual references to sexuality do not vary greatly. That said the structure 
and organization of religious organizations vary considerably, and Catholic and 
Orthodox hierarchies in Europe have been more vocally threatened by LGBT norms as 
a part of Europeanization (Ramet 2006), which is why I choose to include this 
measure. Religiosity is measured on an 8 point scale (1 = “never, practically never,” 8 
= “more than once a week”)—and as religious denomination in four categories: (1) 
Protestant, (2) Catholic, (3) Orthodox, and (4) Other. These indicators tap into the 
likelihood that individuals will be embedded in groups where they will be socialized to 
perceive the LGBT norm as threatening: based on the logic that it challenges 
traditional values and national identity. 
HYPOTHESIS 2a: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will be lower 
among individuals who have higher levels of national pride (individual level 
variable) 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2b: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will be lower 
among individuals who believe churches have legitimate authority over 
answers to their state’s social problems (individual level variable) 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2c: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will be lower 
among individuals who attend religious services more frequently (individual 
level variable) 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2d: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will be lower 
among individuals who are Catholic or Orthodox (individual level variable) 
  
Interactions 
 Furthermore, I expect that the effect of transnational channels will vary across 
individuals who are more or less likely to perceive the LGBT norm as threatening. In 
this sense, the state’s level of norm visibility and individual-level threat perception 
interact in their effects on norm internalization. Specifically, the differences between 
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individuals of low threat perception and high threat perception—in terms of religion 
and nationalism—should become more pronounced as the level of visibility increases.  
HYPOTHESIS 3a: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will increase as 
channels of visibility increase, but more sharply among individuals who are 
less religious. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3b: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will increase as 
channels of visibility increase, but more sharply among individuals who are 
less nationalist. 
 
Control Variables 
The models also control for a series of additional variables that previous 
research has found to explain changed attitudes toward homosexuals. In particular, 
scholars who have worked with societal values find that modernity is an important 
predictor of value change. For example, Inglehart’s (1997) postmaterialist theory 
stipulates that societies invest in social issues when they have the luxury to do so—
after industrialization, education, and wealth. To control for these factors, I use 
Inglehart and Norris’s (2003) 12-point “postmaterialist index” variable. I also include 
separate variables that control for gender, age and education. These controls derive 
from consistent and robust findings across previous studies, which show that younger 
generations, educated people, and women are generally more accepting of 
homosexuality (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Lamar and Kite 1998; Lax and Phillips 
2009). Age is measured in years (beginning at 15) and education is measured years of 
schooling attended. Next, I include a variable that measures the more contested 
finding that residents of urban areas are more tolerant toward homosexuals (Andersen 
and Fetner 2008; Takács and Szalma 2011). Urbanity is measured by a variable that 
accounts for the size of the municipality in which the respondent lives. It is coded 
according to Andersen and Fetner’s (2008) four categories: (1) less than 5,000, (2) 
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5,000 to 49,999, (3) 50,000 to 499,999, (4) greater than 500,000. This control variable 
also serves as a measure of social isolationism, the theory being that people in isolated 
rural communities are less likely to have interpersonal relationships with LGBT 
people. Finally, I include year dummy variables to control for time differences across 
survey waves.  
Methods  
I test my hypotheses using multilevel random intercept regression. The 
multilevel structure of the research design drives the selection of the method, which 
combines data at the level of respondents (individual-level) and states (group-level). 
This means that my data consist of observations at two analytical levels where one 
unit of analysis (43,296 individuals) is nested in another (27 states) (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003, 98).  Multilevel models are useful when the researcher believes that 
the individuals in his or her dataset are nested in unique groups that influence the 
outcome (Snijders and Bosker 1999, 43). The merits of this method include making 
inferences about the state’s contextual influence over individual attitudes (Anderson 
2007). Indeed, people “form attitudes and make choices in variable [social and 
political] environments… that shape people’s interpretations and actions” (590). It also 
addresses some of the concerns associated with hierarchical data resulting from 
random variance, clustering, and underestimating standard errors (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003, 98).
154
 To avoid these errors, I use statistical techniques developed for 
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 The statistical method captures the strength of the relationships among variables. The multilevel 
regression method assumes (similarly to ordinary regression) that data are derived from a representative 
sample (since the results are used to make inference about a broader population), variables are 
independent of one another and are linearly related, and error terms are homoscedastic, normally 
distributed and uncorrelated (Maas and Hox 2004, 428). 
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modeling data with a multilevel structure.
155
 The baseline model I develop in the 
following tables can be econometrically expressed as: 
Attitudes towards Homosexuality = β0 + β1 Transnational and International Channels 
(State-Level) + β2 Geographic Proximity + β3EU Identification + β4 National Pride + 
β5 Church Authority + β6 Religiosity + β7 Denomination + β8 Controls + ε || 
Country/Wave 
 
 My expectation is that transnational channels are predictors of more positive 
attitudes towards homosexuality. By contrast, I expect a significant and negative 
relationship between threat perception predictors and attitudes toward homosexuality. 
In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, I test how these expectations bear out across different contexts 
(EU-12 and EU-15 states). A subsequent analysis then adds interaction terms to the 
above models, to explore the role of individual threat perception in internalizing norms 
among citizens of new adopter states. In this analysis, my expectation is that 
transnational channels are moderated by the perceived threat variables in the model. If 
this is true we should see two trends in the margins plotted below (Figures 4.3 and 
4.4). First, individuals in highly porous contexts should, on average, have more 
positive attitudes than people in low porous contexts. Second, we should also see that 
the effect of transnational channels plays out differently across groups, with 
individuals in low-threat perception groups exhibiting a more positive and profound 
response to increased transnational channels. Individuals in high-threat perception 
groups, by contrast, should exhibit both lower scores and more modest slopes of 
change in response to transnational channels. Finally, the analysis in Table 4.5, adds a 
state-level pro-LGBT legislation variable to the analysis. This serves the purpose of 
exploring the effect of legislation on attitudes—a finding in recent research. 
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 In STATA 12.0, the statistician can constrain the degrees of freedom on the group-level variable 
using the xtmixed command. In STATA this is done using the xtmixed regression command and 
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RESULTS 
 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the regression models for the state-level and 
individual predictors of tolerant attitudes toward homosexuals. For each of the three 
sets of states (EU-27, EU-12, and EU-15) in Table 4.2, I estimate two separate models. 
The first model for each subset of states uses the logged measure of attitudes toward 
homosexuality, which the second model then re-estimates using the index measure of 
the dependent variable. All of these models include a state-level variable measuring 
the combined transnational and international channels (social, political, and economic) 
that tie a state to the international community. The EU-12 analysis subset also includes 
a measure of geographic proximity to Western Europe; this variable does not apply to 
the other subsets of states and is thus missing from those models.
156
 Finally, the 
models throughout all of the Tables in this chapter include unreported year dummy 
variables—they are almost always insignificant across models.   
In the sample of all individuals in the EU, my models provide a measure of 
support for both the transnational channels and domestic threat approaches. The signs 
of the coefficients take the expected directions: they are positive when channels of 
visibility are high and negative when individuals have characteristics that may 
associate homosexuality with threat. For the channels variables, all three measures are 
significant (p ≤ .05), controlling for all other variables in the model.157 At the state 
level, increases in channels of visibility are positively correlated with more tolerant 
attitudes on homosexuality. This is in line with the hypothesis that the political, social 
                                                                                                                                            
designating the country-level variable with the ||variable: symbols (xtmixed DV IV1 IV2 || IVgroup:). 
156
 Including this geographic proximity variable in the EU-12 models does not change the sign and 
direction of the other predictors. 
157
 I only report significance levels at the p ≤ .05. Henceforth, I will no longer write out “controlling for 
all other variables in the model” when reporting the effects of specific predictors. 
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and economic embeddedness of the state in the international community facilitates 
successful norm internalization. The same is true for individuals who reside closer to 
the former Iron Curtain border and identify with the EU.  
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Table 4.2. Estimates for Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Tolerance toward Homosexuality in Europe 
 
 
EU-27 EU-12 EU-15 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES DV(log) DV (Index) DV(log) DV (Index) DV(log) DV (Index) 
 Transnational and International Channels            
Combined Channels (State) 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* 0.04* 0.01* 0.01* 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Geographic Proximity 
  
0.0001* 0.0001* 
  
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
  EU Identification 0.03* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 0.03* 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Threat Perception       
National Pride -0.09* -0.08* -0.06* -0.05* -0.10* -0.10* 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Church Authority -0.15* -0.12* -0.13* -0.12* -0.15* -0.12* 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) 
Religiosity -0.04* -0.04* -0.02* -0.02* -0.04* -0.04* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Catholic 0.02 -0.01 -0.06+ -0.12* 0.04* 0.02 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.029) (0.033) (0.020) (0.021) 
Orthodox -0.12* -0.18* -0.07* -0.19* -0.35* -0.30* 
 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.040) (0.073) (0.072) 
Other -0.29* -0.24* -0.23* -0.24* -0.30* -0.24* 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.046) (0.050) (0.028) (0.028) 
Controls       
Post-Materialism 0.14* 0.14* 0.10* 0.10* 0.15* 0.16* 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
Education 0.02* 0.02* 0.01* 0.01* 0.02* 0.02* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Town size (5,000-49,999) 0.08* 0.09* 0.07* 0.07* 0.10* 0.11* 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) 
Town size (50,000-499,999) 0.15* 0.16* 0.13* 0.14* 0.18* 0.18* 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) 
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Town size (500,000+) 0.22* 0.21* 0.22* 0.20* 0.24* 0.23* 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender (Women = 1) 0.21* 0.23* 0.11* 0.14* 0.26* 0.27* 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant -1.03* -2.31* -0.58 -2.48* -0.30 -1.38* 
 
(0.294) (0.284) (0.448) (0.389) (0.265) (0.253) 
       Observations 43,296 42,348 14,598 14,060 28,386 27,976 
Number of groups 69 68 28 27 40 40 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Though they are difficult to calculate in a multi-level model with transformed 
dependent variables, the coefficient sizes are considerably large when taking into 
account that DV1 is on a scale of 0 to 2.3, and DV2 is on a scale of -1.2 to 1.5. When 
compared to individuals in countries with the lowest level of transnational channels, 
individuals in the countries with the highest level of transnational channels are, on 
average, expected to have more positive attitudes by 0.6 to 0.9 units (depending on the 
model). Similarly, the results support the hypothesis that individuals who identify with 
the EU generally hold more positive attitudes. Each unit increase in EU identification 
is associated with an increase in tolerant attitudes by roughly 0.03 units. Finally, 
geographic proximity is positively correlated with internalization, suggesting that the 
closer individuals live to the former Iron Curtain, the more likely they are to embrace 
the international norm. On average, every kilometer east decreases the rate of 
attitudinal change between 0.0001 and 0.0002 units, depending on the model and 
indicator used. In Model 3, a resident of Bucharest is expected to hold a position 
toward homosexuality 0.11 units lower than a resident of Bratislava. All of these 
findings lend support to the expectations of the diffusion hypothesis.   
The regression results suggest that transnational channels influence the extent 
to which individuals internalize norms concerning homosexuality. To also demonstrate 
this visually, I present a scatter plot of the simple correlation with the fitted line of the 
slope. Correlations between aggregate-level variables are useful in visualizing this key 
relationship. Figure 4.2 plots the correlation between the primary predictor of state 
porousness (combined channels) and the dependent variable. The correlation indicates 
that, on average, EU-12 states—each state is shown at the three different time points—
with more developed transnational channels correlate with successful norm 
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internalization (for the plot of all EU-27 states, see Figure 4.6 Appendix D). As is 
suggested in the qualitative chapters, these channels provided the foundation for a 
growing visibility of the homosexual community, fostering more comfortable self-
expression on the part of homosexuals as well as some erosion of misperceptions on 
part of the society at large. 
Figure 4.2. Correlation between Aggregate Attitudes and Combined Channels in EU-12 States 
 
Across models, all of the perceived threat variables are also significant at the 
.05 level. Higher levels of national pride, church authority and religiosity are all 
negatively correlated with positive attitudes. The results indicate that, on average, 
individuals who have higher levels of national pride, who see the church as an 
authority on social problems and who attend religious services frequently are less 
likely to accept the norm.  For example, the coefficient size of roughly 0.1 for each 
unit change on a 4-point scale of national pride in Models 5 and 6 is substantial. 
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Similarly, the findings suggest an average decrease of 0.04 with each unit increase in 
religious service attendance. This means that the relative rate of tolerance score for an 
individual who goes to church more than once a week will be 0.32 units lower than an 
individual who never goes to church. Finally, I should note that differences among 
denominations are more pronounced in EU-12 states, in which people of Catholic and 
Orthodox faith are on average (in increasing order) less tolerant of homosexuality than 
their Protestant peers. In EU-15 states I do not observe a statistically significant 
difference between Catholics and Protestants.  
Although I do not discuss in depth the various control variables for the 
purposes of this analysis, they are consistent with previous findings on attitudes 
toward homosexuality: Attitudes are more tolerant among women and among those 
who are younger, more educated, and more likely to possess post-material values. 
Finally, attitudes become more positive as the size of the municipality increases. 
Urbanity is indeed a source of visibility, not only because LGBT people (who have the 
means to do so) often seek these places out, but also because these localities often 
offer a more diverse multitude of ideas.  
The findings are consistent across models, regardless of the dependent variable 
I analyze. Reporting both indicators of the dependent variable in Table 4.2 was 
intended to give the reader additional confidence in the measures. In terms of 
significance level and sign, both dependent-variable measures produced nearly 
identical results, which holds true for the subsequent analyses presented here. Thus, I 
opt to report only the composite dependent variable hereafter. Moreover, in this 
section I report the calculated R-squared at two levels, using both the equations put 
forth by Snijders and Bosker (1999) and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). Across models 
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the variance levels are quite substantial, and comparable to those reported in studies 
using a similar dependent variable (Gerhards 2010). For both dependent variables, the 
majority of the variance appears across states (about 70%). A smaller part of the 
variance occurs across individuals (about 30%).
158
 
Differences Between EU-12 and EU-15 States 
The models in Table 4.3 replace the combined-channels variable to examine 
the differences between social, political and economic channels among new adopter 
(EU-12) and first mover (EU-15) states. Social and economic channels are not run in 
the same model to avoid issues associated with multicollinearity.
159
 Since the 
substantive significance of the coefficient regressions are difficult to interpret, and are 
also addressed carefully in the previous analysis, I will limit this section to a brief non-
substantive description of the findings. The findings that I highlight are the ones that 
differ between EU-12 and EU-15 states. As expected, the consistency of transnational 
channels as significant predictors of normative change is stronger among new EU-12 
states. This corresponds to the notion that, on average, new adopters are more 
influenced by transnational variables than first mover states (Tolbert and Zucker 
1983). Moreover, different types of transnational channels play distinct roles across 
contexts.  
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 I calculate the R-squared in STATA 12 using the “mltrsq” command. The results for the Raudenbush 
and Bryk test are slightly lower than the Snijders and Bosker test, but comparable enough to report here. 
159
 I control for multicollinearity by evaluating the correlations among my predictors. To be confident 
that no predictors are multicollinear, I generate a correlation matrix (cf. Table 4.6, Appendix D). Using 
a scale of -1 to 1, the matrix suggests the correlation between all the independent variables. None of the 
predictors are multicollinear. I also ran an OLS regression and calculated the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for my independent variables. When excluding the interaction terms, the mean VIF is low (1.1), 
and none of the variance inflation factors are above 1.18. In the VIF test that included interaction terms, 
two variables (economic and social channels) appear to be highly correlated, with a correlation 
coefficient of .66. This result is quite common when including interaction terms in the model. To deal 
with this, I report the reduced models in the analysis. 
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Table 4.3. Estimates for Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Tolerance toward 
Homosexuality in Europe in New Adopter versus First Mover States 
 
 
EU-12 EU-15 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES DV (Index) DV (Index) DV (Index) DV (Index) 
 Transnational and International Channels        
Social Channels (State) 0.04* 
 
0.00 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.004) 
 Political Channels (State) 0.01+ 0.01* 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Economic Channels (State) 
 
0.02* 
 
0.01* 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.003) 
Geographic Proximity 0.0001* 0.0001* 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
  EU Identification 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 0.03* 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Perceived Threat Perception     
National Pride -0.05* -0.05* -0.10* -0.10* 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Church Authority -0.13* -0.13* -0.12* -0.12* 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) 
Religiosity -0.02* -0.02* -0.04* -0.04* 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Catholic -0.12* -0.11* 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.021) (0.021) 
Orthodox -0.18* -0.18* -0.31* -0.30* 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.074) (0.073) 
Other -0.23* -0.24* -0.24* -0.24* 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.028) (0.028) 
Controls     
Post-Materialism 0.10* 0.10* 0.16* 0.16* 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
Education 0.01* 0.01* 0.02* 0.02* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Town size (5,000-49,999) 0.08* 0.08* 0.11* 0.11* 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) 
Town size (50,000-499,999) 0.14* 0.14* 0.18* 0.19* 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) 
Town size (500,000+) 0.20* 0.20* 0.23* 0.23* 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender (Women = 1) 0.14* 0.14* 0.27* 0.27* 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant -3.09* -2.47* -1.07* -1.30* 
 
(0.568) (0.481) (0.320) (0.282) 
     Observations 14,060 14,060 27,976 27,976 
Number of groups 27 27 40 40 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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In new adopters, all three transnational and international channels are 
statistically significant. The results suggest that individuals in EU-12 states who are 
more socially, politically and economically connected through such channels are on 
average more likely to adopt more tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality. Of the 
three channels, the softer social channels are the most robust across EU-12 models and 
have a larger coefficient size (.04) than the political (.01) or economic channels (.02). 
On average, individuals in more porous EU-12 countries evaluate homosexuality less 
negatively.  
The picture is different among EU-15 countries, in which economic channels 
are the only significant sub-competent of state porousness. This finding not only 
reflects differences among diffusion to new adopters and first mover states (Soule 
1997; Strang 1990; Tolbert and Zucker 1983), it also limits the economic narrative of 
homosexuality as linked to capitalism (D’Emilio 1983)—suggesting that this narrative 
may have currency for the development of homosexual identity in first movers, but is 
only one of several factors for its spread. Other notable differences in the predictors of 
attitudes between respondents in EU-12 and EU-15 states are the aforementioned null 
finding for Catholicism in EU-15 states. The data suggest that Catholics are distinct 
from Protestants in their attitudes toward homosexuality in EU-12 states but not in 
EU-15 states. Indeed, some Catholic countries are leaders in LGBT rights—as I show 
in Chapter 5, distant national experiences of church-society relations play a more 
fundamental role than denomination in predicting resistance to LGBT norms. Finally, 
while women are more likely than men to approve of homosexuality in both contexts, 
the difference in coefficient size between men and women is greater in EU-15 states 
  164 
(.27) than in EU-12 states (.14). As is the case with the previous section, the signs of 
the coefficients of the other variables take their expected directions.  
Perceived Social Group Threat Moderating Transnational Channels  
I now explore differences across differently situated individuals within and 
across countries. In particular, I expect the positive effect of visibility to be less 
pronounced among individuals who are prone to perceive LGBT individuals as 
threatening. In the models in Table 4.4 (Appendix D), I add interaction terms to test 
the hypothesis that individuals who are more inclined to perceive the norms as “an 
external threat” are likely to exhibit more gradual shifts in their attitudes, as channels 
increase. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below illustrate that individuals in groups with “low 
threat” characteristics make more substantial changes in their attitudes as international 
visibility heightens. I report the untransformed dependent variables scores (on a scale 
of 1 to 10) for ease of interpretation. As expected, in low visibility contexts—contexts 
with few transnational channels—I do not observe substantial differences among 
groups of individuals. As channels heighten, the fitted lines representing the attitudes 
of individuals in low-threat groups show a strong upward trend. While this trend also 
exists among high-threat groups of individuals—reported here as individuals who are 
more religious, and who are more nationalistic—it is much less pronounced. For 
example, in Figure 4.3, individuals who attend religious services most avidly (lower 
third of the sample) changed their position marginally (from 2.6 to 4.1), while the 
individuals least likely to attend services changed their positions by over one point 
(from 2.4 to 5.2). In fact, the attitudes of the high-threat-perception group are initially 
more negative as channels increased from low to medium levels (from 2.6 to 2.4). By 
contrast, individuals who rarely attend religious services internalized norms of 
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tolerance toward homosexuals more rapidly. They are arguably also more likely to see 
added value in adopting norms of legitimate behavior according to international 
scripts, compared to their peers who perceive of international pressures as threatening. 
A second threat perception variable, national pride, shows similar trends. Individuals 
that are less nationalistic improved their attitudes toward homosexuals more rapidly 
and more substantially than their peers in the highest-perceived threat group.  
Figure 4.3. Religiosity and Perceived Threat 
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Figure 4.4. National Pride and Perceived Threat 
 
 
LEGISLATION AS VISIBILITY 
 
Finally, Table 4.5 adds another state-level variable to explore the effect of 
introducing pro-LGBT legislation on attitudes. This final step of the analysis thus ties 
back to Chapter 3 and contributes to previous studies by exploring the links between 
legislation—a commonly studied indicator of diffusion—and internalization at a 
societal level. Takács and Szalma’s (2011) work modeled this effect, finding that the 
introduction of partnership legislation correlated with positive change in attitudes. In 
Table 4.5, I use the five-category legislation index as a predictor to show that Takács 
and Szalma’s (2011) finding holds in first mover EU-15 states (Model 13). If I break 
down the analysis to explore its effect in new adopter states, however, I lose the 
positive effect of legislation on attitudes (Model 12).  
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Table 4.5. Estimates for Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting the Effect of 
Pro-LGBT Legislation on Tolerance toward Homosexuality in Europe 
 
 EU-27 EU-12 EU-15 
  (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES DV (Index) DV (Index) DV (Index) 
Legislation     
Legislation Score 0.18* -0.11 0.11* 
 
(0.037) (0.105) (0.028) 
 Transnational and International Channels      
Combined Channels (State) 0.01* 0.04* 0.01* 
 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) 
Geographic Proximity 
 
0.0001* 
 
  
(0.000) 
 EU Identification 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Perceived Threat Perception    
National Pride -0.08* -0.05* -0.10* 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
Church Authority -0.12* -0.13* -0.12* 
 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.010) 
Religiosity -0.04* -0.02* -0.04* 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Catholic -0.01 -0.12* 0.02 
 
(0.017) (0.033) (0.020) 
Orthodox -0.18* -0.18* -0.25* 
 
(0.031) (0.040) (0.071) 
Other -0.23* -0.23* -0.23* 
 
(0.025) (0.050) (0.028) 
Controls    
Post-Materialism 0.14* 0.10* 0.16* 
 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008) 
Education 0.02* 0.01* 0.02* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Town size (5,000-49,999) 0.09* 0.08* 0.11* 
 
(0.010) (0.017) (0.013) 
Town size (50,000-499,999) 0.16* 0.14* 0.19* 
 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.014) 
Town size (500,000+) 0.21* 0.20* 0.23* 
 
(0.014) (0.027) (0.017) 
Age -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender (Women = 1) 0.23* 0.14* 0.27* 
 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.009) 
Constant -1.91* -2.50* -1.18* 
 
(0.256) (0.382) (0.218) 
    Observations 42,348 14,060 27,976 
Number of groups 68 27 40 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Based on survey results and my interviews, the effect of legislation on attitudes 
was always more pronounced in first mover states. While organizations in new adopter 
states all felt that legislation would ultimately help their cause, they qualified its effect, 
noting that it could be responsible for temporary “backlashes” in attitudes toward 
LGBT peoples—especially if it was “forcibly imposed” (interview no. 141). 
Hungarian activists all noted backlashes after their successful movement introduced 
legislation (interview nos. 109 and 123). A Latvian LGBT activist noted:  
We want to pass legislation because it is good and creates a discussion, but 
[with discussions] suddenly the issue begins being talked about shamelessly; 
even in Parliament! Here shameless arguments are still [legitimate] that are [no 
longer acceptable] in other countries (interview no. 138; interview no. 106).  
The answer to the same question with Spanish and Portuguese activists yielded far less 
cautious responses. For example, according to representatives from both countries, 
same-sex marriage (introduced in 2005 in Spain, and in 2010 in Portugal) came with 
rapid and dramatic increases in societal attitudes (interview nos. 100, 104, 135-137). 
According to the president of ILGA-Portugal:  
In 2010 we had a turning point, because same-sex marriage is the large, key 
issue that opens all types of doors or closes all types of doors. So in a sense we 
had an issue that the whole society is able to discuss or willing to discuss. It let 
in a lot of visibility and removed the silence that usually impedes LGBT-
issues. In our case, Spain’s successful move on the issue in 2005 paved the 
way for a smooth transition delegitimizing opposition. Legislation had an 
important social impact. Since the start of the marriage campaign in 2005 
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[Portuguese] support for marriage has risen from 20% to 50%. (interview no. 
100) 
The null finding for the LGBT variable in EU-12 contexts, as opposed to the strong 
statistical significance present in the EU-15 states, supports the qualitative and 
organizational survey data presented in Figure 4.5.  
In response to the question, “In your opinion, what has been the effect of your 
country introducing legislation that strengthens the rights and protection of LGBT 
people?,” the representatives of 46% of transnational LGBT organizations across EU-
15 states felt that introducing LGBT legislation had a substantial positive influence on 
people’s attitudes in their country. Another 46% said it has some effect. Only 1% said 
it had a null or negative effect, respectively. The reaction of organizations in EU-12 
states was far more tempered. While 71% said legislation had some effect on attitudes, 
no organizational representative ventured to say it had a substantial effect. Another 
14% said it had no effect, and 5% felt it had a negative effect. 
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Figure 4.5. Effect of Pro-LGBT Legislation on Societal Attitudes, N = 133 
 
These findings qualify those of Takács and Szalma (2011), suggesting that 
legislation is an important source of deliberation, but its positive effect on 
internalization is often on a non-linear and extended time-horizon. In contexts with no 
prior widespread discourse surrounding LGBT people, the introduction of legislation 
can be perceived as imposition by large segments of society, and fuel a societal 
backlash—even if such backlash is temporary. Most importantly, it is the mechanism 
of deliberation behind the legislation that has the most effect. Juris Lavrikovs of the 
ILGA makes this clear when says: “As we see in many countries, only with openness 
… we can win the situation because the laws, however important they are, [are] only 
one particular element in changing public opinion. But it’s about being open[,] about 
speaking…” (“Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania Anti-gay Criticism” 2012). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has described the responses of European societies to norms 
governing LGBT rights. The chapter supports theoretical and empirical progress by 
employing a rare approach of combining state-, group- and individual-level analyses 
and comparing their relative effects. Alongside the traditionally theorized variables at 
the individual level, such as gender and age, I have shown that relational and non-
relational channels that connect the state to the international community also explain 
much of the variation in changed attitudes among people that live within those states. 
States with greater transnational channels differ from less porous ones in how their 
societies internalize norms.  
These channels have differing effects on distinct subgroups of individuals, 
however. Individuals who perceive LGBT norms as threatening have more negative 
attitudes toward lesbian, gay and bisexual people, and they also alter their positions 
more gradually than their peers—and in some cases, the attitudes of individuals in 
high threat groups worsened in a phase of backlash—as the channels of visibility 
increase. Indeed, individuals who hold more nationalistic or traditional values are 
systematically less likely to internalize LGBT norms. Based on the qualitative 
research, which I elaborate on in the following chapter, the mechanism through which 
this functions is threat perception. Individuals who are nationally and traditionally 
oriented are more likely to think of LGBT norms as external and imposed.  
Finally, the results do not suggest that internalization proceeds in a steady 
linear fashion. Instead, the basic descriptive statistics in Figure 4.1 show a common 
occurrence of small dips in attitudes that come with heightened resistance in response 
to outside norms—this is especially true in new adopter states. Levels of perceived 
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threat vary across context and across individuals and these variables can fuel 
resistances and slow internalization among societies. That said, in the twenty years 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, all societies in the EU have taken a more favorable 
position towards homosexuality as compared to 1990. Chapter 5 develops our 
understanding of perceived threat by exploring how it is fomented and how resistance 
is mobilized differently in two cases: Poland and Slovenia.  
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CHAPTER 5 
With Arms Wide Shut: Threat Perceptions, Norm Reception and Mobilized 
Resistance in Two Catholic Countries  
 
 
Braving sweltering summer temperatures, 15,000 people gathered in Warsaw 
to celebrate LGBT visibility on a July weekend in 2010. Everything about Warsaw—
from the 90-degree temperatures to the parade of rainbow colors—seemed atypical 
about that weekend as marchers from Poland and beyond assembled for the annual 
EuroPride parade. Hosting the regional event was a first for Poland, and also for 
Central and Eastern Europe. The European Pride Organizers Association (EPOA), a 
group that included Tomasz Bączkowski, wanted the event to come to Warsaw after a 
favorable 2007 legal decision at the European Court of Human Rights that made it 
illegal to ban public assembly in Poland. This was a moment to reflect on the progress 
that domestic and transnational activism had made in Poland and for activists from 
across Europe to gather and discuss the achievements and obstacles ahead.  
That same month, roughly 300 participants
160
 attended the tenth annual 
Ljubljana Pride, whose theme that year was “Enough Waiting on Equal Rights.” The 
Ljubljana Pride proceeded as usual. It received political endorsements from the 
President of the National Assembly, Pavel Ganta, and Ljubljana’s Mayor, Zoran 
Jankovič—who has attended in years since. The Minister of Interior, Katarina Kresal 
of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) party, again marched alongside 
participants. Novel to the 2010 event was the attendance of several Slovenian 
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 300 is a common figure at the Ljubljana Pride, though it was exceeded more recently in 2012 when 
the parade was attended by around 500 to 600 participants (interview no. 154).  
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celebrities who expressed their support of expanding additional rights to the LGBT 
community. As had been the case every year since 2001, the Ljubljana Pride looked 
and felt like a celebration.
161
  
The Warsaw and Ljubljana pride parades employed similar tactics and made 
related claims. Yet the striking difference between the events lies in the forms and 
extent of local resistance they provoked. While “there have never been large masses of 
counter-demonstrations at the Ljubljana Pride” (interview no. 154), an estimated eight 
counter-demonstrations took place alongside the EuroPride in Warsaw. Even the 
academic panels at the Warsaw “Pride House” in the week leading up to the event 
drew demonstrators. In Slovenia, political leaders were responsible for the public 
statements in reaction to the parade, but in Poland the stage was left open to religious 
leaders to respond. Although the EuroPride program included encouraging messages 
of support from mayors of other cities, like London and Berlin, Warsaw’s mayor, 
Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz of the center-right Civic Platform (PO) party, remained 
silent. Instead the archbishop of Warsaw, Kazimierz Nycz, gave a statement echoing 
the sentiments of a vocal Polish opposition: “No one can force us to support, promote 
or sponsor this parade” (Cragg 2010).  
Of the counter-demonstrations organized that week in Warsaw, the central 
theme commemorated the battle at Grunewald where Poles and Lithuanians defeated 
the Teutonic knights in the year 1410, exactly 600 years earlier. This nationalist frame 
harped on unwanted external influences—German Teutonic knights returning as 
European crusaders for “sexual deviance”—entering into the domestic sphere to 
destroy something sacred—Polish values as defined by the Roman Catholic Church. 
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 Many thanks to Jasna Magic for several first hand accounts of the 2010 Pride.  
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According to Robert Winnicki, organizer of the Marszu Grunwaldzkiego (Grunewald 
March), “We feel that the situation today is similar [to the year 1410]… EuroPride is 
some kind of ideological aggression: the knights from the West want to force us to 
think that gayness is normal” (Cragg 2010). In defense of the Catholic nation, counter 
protesters waved flags, rallied, chanted, fired rockets and disseminated leaflets citing 
the wrongs of non-heterosexuality. Tomasz Andryszczyk, from the Warsaw City Hall, 
contextualized the reaction—so different to the one in Ljubljana—saying “You can 
point to the background in attitudes … the role of the church here is different; history 
is different ...” (Cragg 2010).  
This chapter explores the varied nature of domestic responses—such as those 
typified by Poland and Slovenia—to new norms, and how these responses influence 
visibility. While previous chapters have highlighted the powerful effect of the 
transnational channels that make such norms visible, domestic understandings shape 
how these norms are received and interpreted by the public. The findings in the 
previous chapters raise three important questions for domestic and transnational 
mechanisms with regard to the relationship between politics and social change. First, 
how do the processes of Europeanization—so fundamental to the diffusion of LGBT 
rights in Europe—interact with domestic institutions and norms? Second, why does 
the same norm mobilize an active resistance in some cases and not others? Finally, 
how does resistance influence norm internalization? Using a paired comparison 
design, I answer these questions by tracing the different trajectories of norm reception 
in the two target state cases presented above, Poland and Slovenia.
162
 These cases 
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 Like Chapter Two, this chapter relies on data from 82 semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation at LGBT and anti-LGBT events in Europe, and an expert survey of 291 transnational 
LGBT organizations. 
  176 
show different rates of change on both indicators of the two dependent variables of 
interest: social attitudes and laws toward sexual minorities. 
Specifically, different domestic perceptions of threat moderate the effect of 
transnational channels on norm internalization. The chapter’s core compares the link 
between national identity and religion in Poland and Slovenia, finding that the varied 
constitutive effects of secularism and tradition in different national contexts influence 
responses to norms concerning sexual minorities. I find that the historical antecedents 
of the essence of popular nation opened the path for religion in fueling the process of 
counter-mobilization. This is particularly relevant if we consider the varied roles 
played by the Catholic Churches and the related impact on the strength and longevity 
of the anti-LGBT response. In Slovenia, norm brokers could foster significant change 
in favor of LGBT people without a strong and domestically resonant resistance. In 
Poland, mobilized resistance to LGBT rights is routine. To explain this difference, I 
argue that religion matters for counter-mobilization in cases when its moral authority 
is historically embedded in the essence of the popular nation. In Poland, the Catholic 
Church created a role for itself as a moral entrepreneur. Here, domestic opposition 
actors succeeded in framing a narrative that linked LGBT rights to external forces that 
threaten national values. By contrast, the Catholic Church in Slovenia could neither 
maintain nor (re-) establish similarly strong ties to the popular nation after the Second 
World War (WWII). LGBT rights diffusion provokes a lesser resistance in states 
where the Church
163
 has lost its moral authority as a constitutive part of national 
identity.  
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 By “Church,” I simply refer to the dominant religious institution, all of which happen to be Christian 
in the EU.  
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The argument—that norms governing LGBT rights diffuse according to 
transnational channels, but are moderated by conditions of domestic threat 
perception—is presented in four sections. Section 1 conceptualizes the differing 
perceptions of threat that derive from the ties between religion and nationalism in 
Europe. Section 2 traces these differences—both in LGBT visibility and in threat 
perception—in the cases of Poland and Slovenia. Section 3 explores the different 
trajectories of mobilized resistance that such threat produces in Poland and Slovenia. 
Section 4 then examines the effect of resistance on LGBT visibility to show that the 
mobilization and rhetoric of anti-LGBT resistance can backfire, actually heightening 
norm visibility. Indeed, the data show that strong resistance, produced in high threat 
contexts, can lead to greater visibility and international attention for LGBT-rights 
when domestic LGBT movements are transnationally linked.  
I. DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT IN EUROPE 
Threat Perceptions  
A central premise of the proposed theoretical framework is that successful 
norm diffusion is moderated by differing perceptions of threat across national 
contexts.
164
 Sociologists of sexuality and queer theorists have long argued that new 
forms of sexuality are threatening to national identity because they destabilize the 
narrative of nation. This argument builds on the work of Stychin (1998), Binnie (2004) 
and others (A. M. Smith 1994), who trace a long history of national policies intended 
to categorize and repress non-reproductive forms of sexual intimacy; homosexuality 
being historically “linked to conspiracy, recruitment, opposition to the nation, and 
ultimately a threat to civilization” (Stychin 1998, 9). Sexuality, like gender, is 
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threatening to national narratives because it is not confined to national borders.
165
 This 
is not to say, as Binnie (2004) also notes, that the relationship between national 
identity and sexuality is determined and unchangeable. National narratives of sexuality 
do change, for better or for worse, across time and place.  
In the international relations literature, one understanding of national security 
is the “absence of threat to acquired values” (Bajpai 2000, 8).  Indeed, some state 
actors do interpret the imposition of the EU’s norms on sexual minorities as a threat 
that requires “self-defense” (Cârstocea 2006, 216). This is especially true if our 
understanding of societal security “concerns the sustainability…of traditional patterns 
of language, culture, and religious and national identity and custom” (Buzan 1990, 
2).
166
  Paradoxically, the security of LGBT individuals—who seek protection from the 
state and the social collective—is often framed as threatening to the security of 
nations.   
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 In the language of diffusion scholars, high threat contexts should be initially less susceptible to norm 
diffusion (Soule 1997).  
165
 According to Conrad (2001, 125), “homosexuality in particular threatens the stability of the narrative 
of Nation: the very instability and specific historical contingency of the definition of homosexuality 
makes the category more fluid than most, and thus brings into question the fixity and coherence of all 
identity categories.” National narratives are related not only to sexual minorities but also to traditional 
gender roles and the status of women—often simultaneously. 
166
 “We can best understand [social security] by studying the processes whereby a group comes to 
perceive its identify as threatened, when it starts to act in a security mode on this basis, and what 
behavior this triggers.  Societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity” 
(Weaver et al. 1993, 23). 
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Religion and the Popular Nation 
Religion connects to nationalism, because national narratives often invoke a 
return to the purity of an imagined past, one that is rooted in religious tradition (Hayes 
2000). In Europe, religion is still a defining feature of nation and it has a dominant 
authoritative voice on issues of sexuality and societal security. As previous chapters 
have shown, however, religion and modernization on their own do not explain the 
diffusion of norms concerning social issues. More secular states are not necessarily the 
first to adopt LGBT norms. Echoing those scholars that champion a complex 
understanding of religion’s effect on politics (Berger 1993; Casanova 1994), I show 
that religion plays a role in moderating the effect of international LGBT norms, but 
only in contexts where it has become linked to the popular nation.
167
 The role of 
religion not only varies across nation contexts, but it also varies across time, as the 
relationship between religion and nation changes, and as the LGBT issue becomes 
deliberated and co-opted by various social actors. These factors have shaped the 
discourse and the extent of the opposition to norms concerning LGBT rights.  
In post-socialist European states, the link between religion and nation has been 
established in part by democratic transition, where “the Church” played vastly 
different roles across states. By looking at Poland and Slovenia, two Roman Catholic 
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 Among the sociologists of religion that have challenged the secularization argument that modernity 
hampers the role of religion, Berger (1993) and Casanova (1994) offer a nuanced argument that 
explores the varied root factors of religious demise and revival across contexts. In international 
relations, realist and liberal perspectives, which are both rooted in rationalist thought, have too quickly 
accepted secularization theory to dismiss the role of religion as a variable in shaping and moderating 
outcomes in contemporary world politics (Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006). Yet, as Graff’s (2010, 601) 
eloquent article has demonstrated, the instrumentalization and politicization of homophobia in Poland is 
not just about religious morality, instead is about “a discourse of wounded pride characteristic of the 
postaccession period … At stake are not the actual attitudes of Poland’s citizens toward sexual freedom 
but the position of Poland as a state and a nation in Europe’s economic, geopolitical, and racial 
hierarchy.” In comparative perspective, O’Dwyer and Schwartz (2010) have also emphasized that 
illiberal LGBT politics are a product of nationalism in the Latvian and Polish contexts. 
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countries, I hold constant the separate effect that denomination could play—
notwithstanding the fact that religious scriptures on acts of sexually deviant behavior 
do not vary greatly across doctrine—and because Catholicism is deeply transnational 
in its institutional structure.
168
 Yet Philpott (2007, 506) has warned that despite this 
transnational scope, “religions do not usually act singly or comprehensively in their 
politics,” which is true of the role religion plays in LGBT politics across states. As I 
will demonstrate with the case of Roman Catholicism—a religion that is both 
transnational and hierarchical—its influence on politics varies greatly across contexts, 
depending on the intricacies of Church-society relations and its role in processes of 
meaning-making concerning national identity. Poland and Slovenia demonstrate the 
divergent trajectories of the Church’s political legitimacy and ties to national identity.  
The historical ties between religious nationalism and LGBT rights in Poland 
and Slovenia—which are presented as ideal types169—reflect the general trends and 
illuminate the diffusion processes of other states in the region:  
We [new member states] are not so different, we all have the Post-Soviet 
syndrome, lack of trust in social partners, are skeptic of NGOs, and often 
homophobic and socially conservative. The difference [in processes of change] 
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 Religions are transnational in their reach, often spanning much further than the state in terms of 
membership and claims making (Philpott 2007, 506). The textual references to and same-sex relations 
do not vary greatly between the core religions and denominations in Europe. What scripture had to say 
about sexual relations is not central to this debate, in fact, research has shown that religious knowledge 
in Poland (in terms of understanding what is written in scripture) is staggeringly low (Borownik 2000a, 
88). 
169
 I call these cases ideal types, because they have unique features that embody several elements of the 
argument both in terms of transnational visibility and domestic threat perception. The legacy of 
Yugoslavia’s (and particularly Slovenia’s) openness to the West is a testament for the effect of 
transnational channels on the situation there. Travel, experimentation and innovation were more 
developed in Slovenia compared to other states in the region during the communist period. Poland is a 
case in which religion has resonated fundamentally in people’s lives, arguably more so than any other 
case in Europe.  
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is the ties between the Church and the nation. At any political event [in 
Poland], there are always 10 bishops in the first row. (interview no. 140).  
 
We cannot blame it all on the communist past, which explains part of it, but 
clearly not all of it, if we compare [Poland] to other post-communist countries. 
It’s the role of Church nationalism mostly (interview no. 129). 
The weak role of the Catholic Church in Slovenia is comparable to that of the 
Church in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, two states that have internalized the 
international norms governing LGBT rights at similar rates to Slovenia (cf. Figure 1.2, 
Chapter 1). In these cases, “[t]he unpopularity and weakness of the Cold War 
Czechoslovakian Catholic Church vis-à-vis the state date back to the Habsburg 
suppression of nationalist Protestant uprising during the Reformation era” (Philpott 
2007, 508), which resulted in relatively few Church ties to democratic opposition 
groups in the 1980s (Ramet 1998). Similar dynamics also play out in earlier 
democratizers like Spain and Portugal, within which the Catholic Church had long and 
sustained ties to authoritarian rule, and their late role in democratization processes did 
little to restore the church’s authority (Manuel 2002; Philpott 2007, 509, 512). Czechs 
and Slovaks linked the Church to state socialism in Czechoslovakia, Spaniards
170
 
linked it to Franco’s regime, and Portuguese to the Estado Novo (Second Republic) 
(interview nos. 100, 104, 135, 136, 137). 
The main difference between Spain and Poland is Solidarity and the role the 
[Polish] Catholic Church played [during transition]. The Church collapsed with 
                                                 
170
 Spain has among the most far-reaching legal protections and rights for sexual minorities in all of 
Europe (including full marriage rights), and social attitudes have become more favorable since 1990 
(over 60% positive change).   
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Franco in Spain. Here [in Poland] the Catholic Church gave people energy, 
strength (interview no. 140).  
The authority the Catholic Church wields in Poland is most similar to that in 
Lithuania, where it also played an active civil-society role of resistance (Linz and 
Stepan 2011). In both cases, the Church maintained deep ties to the nation and 
remained autonomous from the socialist state (Philpott 2007, 511). In domestic 
responses to LGBT norms, Lithuania followed a similar trajectory to Poland. 
Likewise, the Protestant Church played the central role fueling civil-society opposition 
to the socialist state in Estonia, Latvia (mixed Christian) and East Germany (Philpott 
2007, 514; Stepan 2000). Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were among the 
laggards on furthering the rights of LGBT people. The East Germany (GDR) is a 
unique case because of the dynamic that a divided Germany produced between church 
and GDR-state—the result was a “church from below” that unexpectedly sheltered and 
supported the lesbian and gay movement (Hillhouse 1990; Kellogg 2001).
171
 Among 
the EU-15 states, cases like Greece, Italy, and Ireland have religious institutions with 
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 Most uniquely, the gay and lesbian movement in the GDR grew out of the Church, whose more than 
20 lesbian and gay groups orchestrated most of the activism under the Church’s umbrella in the 1980s 
(focus group no. 205, interview nos. 19 and 20). There are two key reasons (one internal and the other 
external) for this development: the competition between the Church and the state in the GDR and the 
competition between the GDR and the FRG. The Church provided a general safe space to new social 
movements (e.g., pacifist, environmental, handicapped and LG groups) and used these ties to maintain 
their legitimacy and relevance with GDR society (Hillhouse 1990, 593). “The church, despite its long 
history of antipathy towards homosexuality, offered social services to gays and lesbians to increase 
church support” (Hillhouse 1990, 592). In response, the GDR state was troubled by the Church’s close 
ties to its protestant counterpart in the FRG and the outflow of gays and lesbians to the Federal 
Republic: “competition with West Germany also contributed to [some minimal] liberal government 
policies on homosexuality…These possibilities for freer expression of lifestyles led a disproportionate 
number of homosexuals to apply to leave the GDR. By ignoring the needs of some 700,000 to 800,000 
citizens, the SED realized it was exasperating the emigration problem and it began addressing the needs 
of homosexuals” (Hillhouse 1990, 592). The unique role of divided Germany was the most fundamental 
to the special relationship between the lesbian and gay movement and the Church, which is evident 
when taking into consideration that only 10% of the GDR’s lesbian and gay groups under Church 
patronage identified as Christian, and that most of these groups severed their ties to the Church after 
reunification (Hillhouse 1990).  
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close ties to national identity.
172
 According to the co-president of the European Forum 
of LGBT Christian Groups,
173
 the historical ties between religion and nation that I 
trace in cases below also offer the predominant explanation in explaining resistance to 
the transnational movement for LGBT rights across Europe (interview no. 104).  
II. POLAND AND SLOVENIA: LGBT VISIBILITY AND THREAT 
PERCEPTION 
LGBT Visibility in Poland and Slovenia  
Poland and Slovenia exemplify the importance of the differences in LGBT 
visibility described in the previous chapters, with Slovenia—despite its small size—
developing deeper and more abundant transnational ties to first-mover states at an 
earlier time. As part of the emerging civil rights movement that helped topple 
communism in Yugoslavia, the Slovenian gay and lesbian organizations Magnus and 
Lesbian Group (ŠKUC-LL) were founded in 1984 and 1987, respectively. They were 
the first gay and lesbian groups in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe (Greif 2005, 150). 
In Slovenia, the LGBT movement was transnationally oriented very early on, with 
three groups applying for membership in the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) by 1991,
174
 a relatively high number of 
transnationally linked LGBT organizations for a small country of two million people. 
The organizations maintained a healthy relationship with international bodies, 
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 Wald emphasizes the powerful role of the Greek Orthodox Church in the both Greek state and 
nation, tracing its influence back to four centuries of Ottoman occupation (Wald 2013). LGBT activists 
referred to Italy as the “last bastion” of the Vatican (interview no. 104). Finally, the conflict sustains 
religion as a beacon of national identity in Ireland and N. Ireland, the result being initially sluggish 
protections toward sexual minorities (N. Ireland decriminalized homosexuality 15 years after Great 
Britain, and only after legal intervention based on ECtHR principles). 
173
 In 2010, the forum included 39 LGBT groups from 20 European countries. It has the double mission 
to represent a voice of Christians in the LGBT-world, and to represent an LGBT-voice among 
ecumenical communities. 
174
 Lesbian Group  (ŠKUC-LL) joined in 1987, followed by Magnus and Roza Klub in 1991.  
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obtaining a large part of their annual budgets from transnational and international 
sources, along with support from the state and the city of Ljubljana. In 2010, external 
funding made up 60% and 80% of the annual budget for Magnus and Lesbian Group 
(ŠKUC-LL), respectively (Survey Data).175  
Poland has also established the channels that enhance the visibility of LGBT 
rights, but these changes came later. Poland’s movement started more slowly with 
fewer formal transnational ties. The presence of LGBT groups has grown rapidly since 
around the time of European Union (EU) accession, with six groups developing 
extensive transnational ties to EU-15 states and beyond by 2009.
176
 The “Let Them 
See Us” campaign and the Cracow March of Tolerance, in 2003 and 2004, were the 
earliest key moments for gay and lesbian visibility in Poland (Gruszczyńska 2007, 
99).
177
 These events were primarily organized by the Kampania Przeciw Homofobi 
(KPH) (Campaign Against Homophobia), the largest and most transnationally 
connected group in Poland, which emerged in 2001 as a politically-oriented LGBT 
organization focused on attaining LGBT rights from the state. KPH joined ILGA-
Europe in 2002, and 80% of its funding came from external sources in 2010 (Survey 
Data).  
The data in Table 5.1 offer descriptive statistics on the differences in 
transnational channels of socialization and the presence of norm brokers 
(transnationally linked LGBT organizations). These channels contributed to the earlier 
politicization of LGBT rights in Slovenia. This correlation is supported by the results 
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 According to an activist from the youth LGBT group, Legebitra, they are seen as lower priority for 
external funds now, because of their relative successes in past years (interview no. 107). 
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 For example, the organizations ILGA-Europe, IGLYO, Soros Open Society Foundation, COC 
Netherlands, Maneo in Germany, RFSL Sweden, Homotopia in Britain, and the embassies of Denmark, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and the United States (post-2008).  
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of my organizational survey, which asked experts to answer questions about LGBT 
visibility by selecting a year using a sliding bar from 1950 to 2011 (or select an option 
of “not applicable”) in response to the question: Do you recall approximately when 
newspapers and other mass media started to cover stories related to the question of 
sexual minority rights? The mean year selected by Slovenian and Polish experts was 
1993 and 2004, respectively.   
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics on Transnational Social Channels, and Norm Brokers 
  
 
Poland  
 
Slovenia   
  1991 2000 2009 1991 2000 2009 
Channels of Information  
(0-100)
a
 
66.1 79.8 89.7 80.1 85 95 
Channels of Social Contact  
(0-100)
a
 
57.6 56.9 57.3 70.1 74.2 77.1 
Transnationally Linked LGBT 
Organizations
b
 
0 1 6 3 4 5 
Source: 
a
KOF Index, 
b
Transnational LGBT Organizations Dataset 
The Polish experience with state-sponsored homophobia (Chapter 2) stands in 
contrast to that of Slovenia, where social attitudes and legislation have changed at an 
accelerated pace. In 2000, about 60% of Poles felt that homosexuality was never 
justifiable, while only about 20% of Slovenes agreed (EVS 2011). Slovenia also 
enacted some of the most far-reaching LGBT rights laws in Central and Eastern 
Europe, including protections that surpass those of many older EU member-states. 
Table 5.2 illustrates this difference in comparison to Poland. 
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 Confer Chapter 2 for an expanded discussion on Poland. 
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Table 5.2. Legal Framework for LGBT people in Poland and Slovenia
178
 
 
 
Sources: ILGA-Europe, ILGA State Homophobia”, ILGA-Europe: “ILGA Rainbow European Country 
Index 2011”, Fundamental Rights Agency Reports, Kees Waaldijk: “A Compact Chronological 
Overview”, Amnesty International, The Palm Center, and GayLawNet. 
 
These differences persist despite the fact that Poland and Slovenia are both 
Catholic societies, with 94.2%
182
 of Slovenes (Conway 2009) and 92% of Poles 
(Mizielińska 2010) self-identifying as Catholic in 1990. In both countries, the Catholic 
Church adheres to the Vatican’s moral opposition to non-heterosexual relations. Both 
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 There are no states in this analysis where sexual minorities enjoy the same human and civil rights 
and privileges as citizens whose sexual orientations align better with hetero-normative social structures. 
There are differences, however, in the degree to which LGBT minorities have come to be incorporated 
into the frameworks of the state, which the cases of Poland and Slovenia demonstrate. 
179
 Homosexuality remained legal during the communist period, but police kept files on gays and 
lesbians and there were not registered LGBT organizations or press (Mizielińska 2010). Same-sex 
relations were first criminalized in Poland in the 19th century, under German, Russian and Austro-
Hungarian laws. 
180
 Slovenia bans all forms of anti-gay discrimination, the most comprehensive legislation in new EU 
member states.  
181
 Article 297 of the Slovenian constitution refers explicitly to sexual orientation, criminal law 
provisions existed more generally since 1994 in Article 300 but were not always upheld for sexual 
minority cases. Thanks to Roman Kuhar for point this out to me.  
182
 It should be noted that beyond self-identification, Poles are far more likely to attend religious 
services. In 1990, 71% of Slovenes considered themselves adherent to the Catholic faith. Before the 
Second World War 97% of Slovenes identified as Catholic.  
 Poland Slovenia 
Same-sex sexual activity legal / Equal age 
of consent 
Yes (1932)
179
 Yes (1977) 
Sexual Orientation can be a grounds for 
granting asylum  
Yes (2007) Yes (2007) 
Partnership Rights No  Yes (Registered Partnership 
2006) 
Freedom of Assembly (no bans in last ten 
years) 
No  Yes 
Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination  No (Only 
employment 
passed in 2004) 
Yes (beginning in 1994)
180
 
The incitement of hatred, violence or 
discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation is a criminal offence 
No Yes (2008)
181
 
Homophobic intent is an aggravating 
factor in common crimes 
No Yes (2008) 
Equality body to address discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation 
No Yes 
Parenting Rights No No (Second Parent Adoption 
2011, but reversed by slight 
majority in 2012 referendum) 
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countries are also ethnically and linguistically homogenous relative to their European 
counterparts. Finally, the two post-communist countries attained independence at 
roughly the same time, joined the EU in May of 2004, and are among the countries 
ranked by Freedom House as having the most successful democratic transitions 
(Bunce 2003, 172). By virtue of their differences in outcomes, these two historically 
Catholic countries merit in-depth consideration. In what follows, I trace these 
differences back to different perceptions of threat in both contexts. 
Threat Perception in Poland 
In Poland, national identity is linked to a long history of being deprived of 
nationhood and the collective memory of foreign intrusion and oppression (Borowik 
2002, 240).
183
 The accounts of the members of the anti-LGBT opposition I 
interviewed—conservative politicians, far-right nationalists, and religious figures—
emphasized the overlap between national identity and Catholicism in Poland. The 
Polish Catholic Church “was a church that, through a century and a half of fending off 
invaders from Prussia, Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had established a 
strong autonomy from the state, fortified by a deep identification with the popular 
nation” (Philpott 2007, 511). Not dismissing the prominent role that Catholicism 
played across European nations, opponents of LGBT rights insisted the role of 
Catholicism in Poland is special. In their view, Polish Republican tradition is uniquely 
linked to the Roman Catholic Church, unlike French Republican tradition (which is 
“anti-Christian”) and Anglo-Saxon Republican tradition (which is liberal) (interview 
no. 141). This is, in part, because Poland did not experience a reformation or social 
revolution against the Church and the monarchy to which it was tied, since the country 
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lost independence before the monarchy could be overthrown. Instead, the Church in 
the last two centuries adopted most functions of political organization. It “gave people 
faith and power to struggle against invaders: the Germans, the Russians, and the 
Austrians,” becoming a defining feature of the Polish nation and their identity 
(interview no. 141). In due course, the Church in Poland has wielded a tremendous 
influence in shaping the national narrative: “to root legitimation in the past ([the 
Church] always served the nation); to respond to any objections … [in the name of 
‘the nation’]; [and] to affirm that nobody can teach the Church how to understand the 
nation, including the nation itself” (Borowik 2002, 248–249).  
The German-Soviet occupation of Poland during the Second World War and 
the subsequent re-drawing of geographic borders and population transfer only 
strengthened the role of the Church in popular memory as a resister against external 
forces. During the post-war period, the WWII narrative of “bad” Germans was 
expanded in a “dualistic societal structure: ‘bad’ communists, associated with the 
Communist Party and its apparatus; and ‘good’ Poles, patriots, associated with the 
Roman Catholic Church” (Borowik 2002, 239–241). For Philpott (2007), Poland is the 
ideal type of a “high-differentiated” context, in which the Church was severed from 
the nondemocratic state for decades. Soured relations between Church and state date 
back to the internment of priests, including that of Primate of Poland Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszyński, in response to Church resistance in the 1950s and 1960s (Philpott 2007, 
511). In 1981, after the state imposed martial law and imprisoned Solidarity activists, 
the Church again assumed its role as “a shelter for truth against political 
censorship…[as] a symbol of freedom” (Borowik 2002, 241). It is important to note 
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 The Polish Catholic hierarchy fueled this narrative in part by linking unwanted external interventions 
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here that the Church not only became an increasingly important political actor in terms 
of its actions, but that it became a symbolic force equated with autonomy and 
democracy.  
The Polish Pope. Before and after democratic transition, Karol Józef Wojtyła, 
later Pope John Paul II, also played an exceptional role in the Church’s relationship to 
Poland, to Europe, and to LGBT people. Born in Wadowice, he maintained close ties 
to the Polish nation through papal pilgrimages, commanding unparalleled respect from 
Polish society, and exercising great symbolic influence over Poland’s political role in 
Europe:  
[The Pope] sought to use that seat of authority to advance his own distinctively 
Catholic reasons for wanting his native Poland and the other formerly 
communist states to be a part of the European Union. Eastern enlargement, in 
fact, was a crucial element of the Pope’s vision for the future of Europe, 
because he saw the institutional reunification of the continent as the historic 
occasion for a new evangelization flowing from East to West (Byrnes 2007, 3; 
P. J. Katzenstein and Byrnes 2006, 684).  
As part of Poland’s special role in Europe he articulated strong views on non-
heterosexuality. In 1986, Pope John Paul II issued his first official statement on the 
issue, written by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI):  
[The homosexual inclination] is a more or less strong tendency ordered toward 
an intrinsic moral evil; thus the inclination itself must be seen as an objective 
disorder. Therefore special concern … should be directed to those who have 
this condition, lest they be led to believe that the living out of this orientation 
                                                                                                                                            
to other churches, for example, German Protestantism and Russian Orthodoxy. 
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in homosexual activity is a morally acceptable option. It is not. (Ratzinger 
1986).
184
 
Polish LGBT activists regularly made reference to the influence that the 
“Polish Pope effect” exercised on society, even posthumously.185 A KPH activist 
lamented, “while Ireland and Spain, for instance, also had Catholics, the Poles had the 
Pope” (interview no. 9). She echoed the scholarship that has cited the Pope’s political 
vision for a “new East to West evangelism,” and the responsibility bestowed upon 
Polish society to maintain and spread Catholic values via their return to Europe. In her 
view, the obstacle behind this philosophy for the LGBT movement is that “‘saving the 
world’ is already a difficult enough task, and doing it with ‘fucks’ [LGBT people] is 
impossible, so you had to kick ‘fucks’ out of the country [to realize the Pope’s 
political role for Poland]” (interview no. 9). The ramifications of this philosophy 
played out politically when the socially conservative coalition of the Law and Justice 
Party (PiS), the League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Self-Defense of the Polish 
Republic (SRP) came to power in 2005. In 2007, then President of KPH, Robert 
Biedroń said to a reporter, “the brothers Kaczyński want to export their moral 
revolution to Europe, trapping us in the culture of death endorsed by Pope Wojtyła 
instead of a civilization.”186 
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 The Church hierarchy’s has remained relatively stagnant. In 2003, Cardinal Ratzinger articulated the 
Vatican’s position on same-sex unions and adoption: “There are absolutely no grounds for considering 
homosexual unions to be in any way similar to or even remotely analogous to God’s plan for marriage 
and the family… Allowing children to be adopted by persons living in such unions would actually mean 
doing violence to these children” (Colbert 2013). Before resigning as head of the Church in 2013, he 
again deplored the global diffusion of same-sex unions calling them a threat to “human dignity and the 
future of humanity itself” (Colbert 2013). 
185
 This effect was not limited to devout Catholics, “Even Polish atheists cried at the Pope’s funeral” 
(interview no. 8). 
186
 Translated from Polish.  
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The Polish Catholic Church and the EU. As Burns (2009) has noted, the 
Polish Church hierarchy found itself in a precarious position leading up to European 
accession. It worried that any identity shift among Poles toward Europe could threaten 
its own power, which rested on Polish national identity. Furthermore, while most of 
Polish society backed accession, the Church’s staunchly supportive agrarian 
constituency opposed the EU’s Common Agriculture Policy. But this national view 
stood in sharp contrast to pro-EU aspects of the Church, like the Church hierarchy’s 
traditional state-skepticism, the European Christian-democratic parties’ historically 
strong support of European integration, and the Pope’s own strategic plan187 for 
Poland in Europe (P. J. Katzenstein and Byrnes 2006, 682).
188
 By way of compromise, 
the Polish Church officially supported EU accession, but “church leaders at the highest 
levels peppered their public statements with caveats about Poland’s membership. 
From the pulpit, priest’s statements were even more skeptical—presenting scenarios of 
lost cultural identity…” (Burns 2009, 169). In this process, LGBT politics and 
abortion became an especially easy—even if materially insignificant—target with 
which to distinguish “Europe” from Poland. In sum, church leaders saw a role for 
Poland in Europe but greatly questioned the role of Europe in Poland.
189
 The Polish 
anti-LGBT opposition, which is almost always anti-EU, echoed these sentiments, 
claiming that EU institutions adhere to a liberal, left consensus that is inherently 
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 According to Pope John Paul II, “The church in Poland can offer Europe as it grows in unity, her 
attachment to the faith, her tradition … and certainly many other values on the basis of which Europe 
can become a reality endowed not only with higher economic standards but also with a profound 
spiritual life” (Katzenstein and Byrnes 2006, 684). 
188
 Others took a more pragmatic stance: According to Archbishop Józef Życiński, “even if Poland 
remained outside EU structures the younger generations will seek patterns of living foreign to 
Christianity, following a life-style taken from the media or learned abroad” (KAI, 24 August 2000). 
189
 The frame of the LGBT actors was exactly the reverse. Take for example the fliers for a pride parade 
in Poznan in 2011, which read: “Equality in Europe, Equality in Poland.” In this sense, Europe is 
clearly present in Poland. This is very much in contrast to the opposition to LGBT rights, which has 
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incompatible with national values. In their view, “Europe” thus became synonymous 
with LGBT rights, framed as inseparable sides of the same coin. On social issues, 
Poland and Europe are in “permanent confrontation” (interview nos. 141).  
Threat Perception in Slovenia  
In stark contrast to Poland, the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia failed to 
become a consolidating social force either before or after democratic transition. The 
opportunity presented by a “return to Europe” did nothing to restore the political 
legitimacy of the Church; and Slovenes placed minimal emphasis on it as a vehicle for 
evangelizing the “West”: 
Contrary to common sense expectations, … issues related to Slovenia’s 
national consciousness have not been dominant in the wake of the country’s 
international recognition in 1991. Thus, in all its intensive efforts to restore the 
power and prestige that has been taken from it over five decades of socialist 
rule, the Roman Catholic Church has not been able to draw on a widely 
accepted concept of nationalism (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 361). 
Coming out of the Second World War, the state successfully attributed the 
early post-war tensions between itself and the Church—which involved the 
expropriation of church properties, prosecution of priests, and removal of religious 
curricula from schools—to the wider punishment for the Church’s collaboration with 
Nazi occupiers and failure to support the Resistance (Radeljić 2011, 179; Ramet 1982, 
257). Societal skepticism of the Church thus dates back to this time, and contrasts 
itself with Polish collective memory, where the Church was heralded as the great 
                                                                                                                                            
focused on keeping Europe out of Poland.  
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resister to outside forces (Pollack 2003).
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In the Yugoslav context, the essence of 
nation did not depend on the Church as it entered the post-war period. Instead the state 
was successful, at least in part, in linking the Church—not LGBT norms—to external 
political powers. As one activist explained, “When it comes to the Church, it was 
really strong until WWII but then began a history of missteps and misfortune that 
came with the change of the system” (interview no. 108).  
While the Church was generally suppressed under communism in Central and 
Eastern Europe, it is incorrect to paint the interactions between church and state, or the 
level of suppression as uniform across the Eastern Bloc. State suppression of the 
Catholic Church was substantially weaker in Yugoslavia than in other communist 
countries (Ramet 1998). Črnič and Lesjak (2003), for example, provide a series of 
incidents exemplifying what they call a tolerant relationship between the Church and 
the Yugoslav state—it was the only socialist country to sign a Protocol with the 
Vatican in 1966 and it reestablished relations with the Holy See in 1970—that did not 
win the Church popular sympathies after the regime changed. Because of this history, 
the Church does not have a social pull comparable to that in Poland. As one LGBT 
activist recalled, “We had a long communism, but it was not such a hard communism 
as in Poland. Today when people go to Church, they don’t listen” (interview no. 111).  
During the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Slovenia was spared the process of 
political identification that homogenized all Serbs as Orthodox, Croatians as Catholic, 
and Kosovars as Muslim: “Despite the fact that most Slovenes were Catholic, this did 
not need to be a defining aspect to their identity qua Slovenes” (Črnič and Lesjak 
2003, 350). Slovenia’s brief direct (ten day) involvement in the war did not cement 
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 “Unlike the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, which was a pillar of resistance, the Roman Catholic 
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religion—which was used as an argument to differentiate the other republics and 
justify militarism against each other—with national philosophy.191 A Croatian LGBT 
activist confirmed the importance of this distinction for LGBT people, “Slovenia had 
an experience with war unlike the other republics. This was important [for the 
Slovenian movement] because then the nationalism and the religious fundamentalism 
did not become so developed there” (interview no. 102). The Church tried but failed to 
seize the opportunity to restore its role in politics in the 1990s,
192
 which LGBT 
activists say made it less of factor for their work:  
After Slovenia separated from Yugoslavia, the Church tried to become more 
visible in the 1990s, but they did not succeed in entering mainstream politics. 
The Church existed—and it was not necessarily a bad thing—but certainly not 
as a political institution. The government made sure to emphasize the 
separation between church and state, and the [societal] attitude is that the 
Church should not be involved in politics. If you asked the population, 90% 
would agree with that (interview no. 108). 
Historical experiences had political consequences for Slovenians’ collective 
memory of church-state relations. Contrary to the widely accepted suppression 
narrative in Poland, Slovenes do not remember the Church as a victim of the socialist 
state. The results of the “Aufbruch” survey showed that 25% of respondents “believed 
that the Church was not persecuted at all during this [40-year socialist] period” and 
                                                                                                                                            
Church in Slovenia leaned more towards collaboration” (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 356). 
191
 This process was not mainly a phenomenon of the republics but of the nationality politics within 
Croatia, Serbia, and especially Bosnia. It was the war in Bosnia that forced religious identity to the fore, 
even when majorities were non-believers or from multiethnic families. 
192
 “There were [also] no radical changes in the area of new religiosity after Slovene independence in 
the year 1991 … [which questions findings showing the] success of new religions after the democratic 
social changes of the early 1990s” (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 358). 
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another 45% said the Church was only occasionally persecuted during that time (Črnič 
and Lesjak 2003, 357). Similarly, 84% of Slovenes believe that individual Catholics 
were not at all (43%) or only occasionally (41%) discriminated against (Črnič and 
Lesjak 2003, 357). Historical legacy has diminished the role of the Church in its 
ability to influence societal thinking on LGBT politics: “People have a critical attitude 
towards the Church and they believe strongly in the separation of church and state. 
People do not take church messages seriously anymore” (interview no. 107).  
By way of comparison, the descriptive statistics in Table 5.3 demonstrate the 
gap between Polish and Slovenian aggregate responses to the European Values Survey 
question on church legitimacy over social problems in each country. Church 
legitimacy dropped in both cases after transition, but more rapidly in Slovenia. While 
it is also decreasing in Poland—in large part through a process where it has entrenched 
itself (Berger 1993) by moving to a role as a “political institutional actor and 
simultaneously put[ing] itself outside of the discourse of civil society” (Borowik 2002, 
251)—the difference remains clear. In 2008, the Polish score of .60 (compared to 
Slovenia’s .39 that year) is approximately what it was 17 years earlier in Slovenia at 
.64. The data also show differences in Polish and Slovenian perceptions of their 
national identity’s vulnerability.  
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Table 5.3. Descriptive statistics on church authority, answering the EVS question:  
Year Poland (N=3,587) Slovenia (N=3,407) 
Generally speaking, do you think that the churches are giving, in your country, adequate 
answers to the social problems facing our country today? Country means on a scale of 0 to 1 
(Yes) 
1990/91 .80 .64 
1999 .66 .45 
2008 .60 .39 
Perception of the EU as threatening to national identity, on a scale of 0 to 1 (very 
threatening) 
2008 .64 .43 
Source: EVS 2011 
 
When asked why Slovenia’s trajectory in accepting LGBT rights developed 
relatively more smoothly than in other new EU member states, one activist said:  
Slovenia is somehow a strange country. I think it has to do with the fact that 
it’s a small country and that the nationalist movement and the nationalist 
mentality is not as influential or strong as in other countries. The intolerance 
and non-acceptance of differences is not so transparent. We were the first 
republic in former Yugoslavia to decriminalize homosexuality in ’77. We often 
have these types of extreme situations, like this year [2010] we elected the first 
Black mayor in Eastern Europe. I didn’t expect this, but this is Slovenia. 
Sometimes we are the first in good things, and as I see it, that is because we are 
a small country and we want to prove ourselves (interview no. 101).  
A Polish activist responded similarly when I asked him if he could compare the two 
countries:  
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It is different than Slovenia. They are Catholic too but, unlike Poland, they are 
small and have experience living with diversity. They are far less ideological. I 
have never heard about a nationalist problem in Slovenia (interview no. 140) 
Religious institutions gain the most political traction when their messages are 
used to define national identity in the popular discourse. Subsequently, norms 
governing LGBT rights meet the most resistance in countries where national identity 
hinges on religious scripts. The next section examines how these different degrees of 
threat perception influence the makeup and mobilization of the anti-LGBT resistance 
in both contexts, resulting in the varied discourses and frames of mobilization used by 
the opposition. In Poland, more than in Slovenia, heightened threat perception initially 
stifled the reception of LGBT norms, to which state and society responded with 
vigorous resistance. 
III. THE MANIFESTATION OF THREAT: MOBILIZATION, FRAMES AND 
ARENAS OF OPPOSITION IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA 
Dissimilar threat perceptions manifest themselves in the rhetoric and forms of 
resistance.
193
 Resistance to LGBT rights in Poland and Slovenia frames its grievances 
differently across contexts, and mobilizes in different public arenas. Like LGBT 
groups, opposition groups also package information for their respective audiences but 
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 Social movement scholars have paid ample attention to threat generated by social movements as 
perceived by state authorities, and when threat leads them to repress movements (Ayoub 2010; 
Davenport 1995; Earl and Soule 2006; Tilly 1978). Threat can also be conceived of as the flip side of 
opportunities for movement mobilization, as the “risks and costs of action or inaction” for movement 
actors (Tarrow 2011, 160). Almeida (2003) makes a distinction between political opportunities and 
threat, showing that both can take place to fuel more institutionalized or radical forms of mobilization, 
respectively. Still others have looked at how collective threat can create opportunities for group 
identity, and subsequently mobilization (Zepeda-Millan 2010), and how counter-movements interact 
with and play off of each other (Fetner 2008). Opening opportunities for one group (in this case LGBT 
actors) that offend influential actors may lead to counter protest. Here I look at domestic responses to 
the salience of LGBT norms, and demonstrate how domestic perceived threat to “external” norms 
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these messages vary greatly in theme and intensity. In both cases, their frames are 
initially grounded in morality and “the laws of nature,” which are then portrayed as a 
threat to the family, and thus also to the nation.  
In Poland, the threat that non-heterosexuality poses to the nation begins with 
the family, but then makes a large leap to become associated with invasion, 
occupation, and repression of the nation by outside forces. I call it the “defend the 
nation” frame, because it is rooted in a philosophy of defensive moral nationalism. 
The frame is so potent because it harps on the idea that the nation is under attack. 
Thus, the threat is framed as external and presented in a way that suggests norms on 
sexuality can dismantle the many attributes of Polish identity. The Polish frame of 
resistance creates an artificial binary between Polish values and the imagined 
European queer periphery. 
In Slovenia, non-heterosexuality is a framed as a threat to children and 
reproduction (“Institute for Family Life and Culture” 2013). Adopting Kuhar’s (2009) 
term, I use the wellbeing of children to define the Slovenian counter-movement’s 
frame. The frame links LGBT rights to societal frustrations with change in social 
structures, such as lower birthrates. While the wellbeing of children frame is also 
inherently about the nation, the argumentation is not extrapolated to threat via invasive 
external forces—the dominant frame used by the Polish opposition.194  
In what follows, I explore how these frames were employed and the types of 
anti-LGBT actors who were mobilized in response to LGBT visibility in four arenas: 
conventional political debates, on the streets, in the media, and in the education 
                                                                                                                                            
mobilizes opposition. It is not a threat to the material benefits of the state or the movement, but a 
perceived threat to values and identity of a nation.  
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system. In Slovenia, the opposition has less public visibility and nationalist and 
religious groups do not use the same narrative. In Poland, the threat attributed to 
LGBT norms has sparked a vocal opposition and presence by groups that define 
themselves as both national and religious.  
Conventional Politics: The Roman Catholic Church(es) 
The European Fundamental Rights Agency’s reports on sexuality exemplify 
the different political roles that the Catholic Church plays across contexts: 
Slovenia: The Church adheres to the Vatican’s moral condemnation of 
homosexuality. It stresses, however, its human standpoint toward 
homosexuals, and says that the Church is not going to turn its back on them, 
but they must purify themselves. Bishop Kramberger of Maribor stated in an 
interview with Radio Slovenia: ‘The Church cannot accept homosexuals, but it 
may never sentence them…’ (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009b, 8; 
Kuhar 2006).  
 
Poland: The Catholic Church has considerable cultural and political influence 
and actively takes part in the public debate regarding LGBT issues. Their 
stance is very much against granting LGBT persons equal rights…There are 
numerous incidents where Church officials have expressed homophobic hate 
speech ... For example, homosexuality has been called a disease, and/or a 
disorder, which needs to be cured and that homosexual persons need to be 
isolated from society. Similarly, it has been argued that homosexuality is in 
opposition to the ‘European civilization’ (European Fundamental Rights 
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 Instead, Slovenian anti-LGBT activists often use the birth rate quotas of other EU states—even more 
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Agency 2009a, 10; Krzeminski 2008). 
Slovenia. According to Slovenian LGBT activists, the Church did not play a 
politically pivotal role in movement opposition, and only entered the public debate on 
LGBT issues concerning registered partnership and adoption. The message broadcast 
by the Church revolved around the family. Even then, “some representatives of the 
Roman Catholic Church did not condemn the legal regulation of homosexual 
partnership… [but said it] should not be made equal to marriage” (Kuhar 2008). In 
opposition to the partnership legislation, “[the Church] held press conferences on this 
issue, saying that we are going to corrupt family values … But on the other side 
[LGBT organizations] formed a strong campaign which connected all existing LGBT-
groups, called the ‘Campaign for All Families’” (interview no. 101).195 Activists are 
ambivalent about the Church’s effectiveness in public debates on sexuality: 
Whenever it comes to something that conflicts with their values, they’ll issue a 
statement, but I am not sure how effective those statements are. They are not 
taken very seriously, and the media does not reflect on every statement. 
(interview no. 107).  
Slovenian LGBT organizations began demanding partnership rights in 1997, 
achieving success in 2005.
196
 The eventual 2005 bill, which allows for registered 
partnerships, was drafted and passed following the 2004 election that brought the 
conservative Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) to power. While activists were 
                                                                                                                                            
gay-friendly ones—as examples that Slovenia should aspire to. 
195
 LGBT activists recognized and reacted to the wellbeing of children frame. The 2012 Ljubljana Pride 
theme was called “Day of Families” and the logo showed the silhouettes of six children walking 
together. 
196
 Initially, three Slovenian LGBT organizations (SKUC, Magnus, and SKUC-LL) and other experts 
(academic, legal and psychiatric) brought the initiative to the government and established a working 
group for the draft law on registered partnership (interview no. 101). 
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disappointed with the inferiority of these partnerships to marriage (as in most cases 
where partnerships have been granted), it is worth noting that the governing SDS that 
passed the bill is the only party with ties to the Church.
197
  
The Church contributed to the public debate more actively later on, as activists 
demanded that the benefits of registered partnership be expanded. According to the 
president of one Slovenian LGBT organization, when asked if his organization faced 
an organized opposition, he said: “No not really. Until the Family Law there were no 
organized opposition groups” (interview no. 108). The “Family Law” refers to the 
Družinski zakonik (Family Code), which sought to expand the registered partnership 
legislation and give same-sex registered partnerships the same legal rights as those of 
heterosexual partnerships, including the right to second-parent adoption. In this case, 
the Catholic and the minority Islamic hierarchies in Slovenia spoke out against the 
Family Code together, exemplifying the Church’s willingness to use a frame that 
invoked a heterogeneous national identity. One LGBT activist noted the irony of the 
new union between Catholicism and Islam, “It was the first joint statement of the 
Christian Church and Muslims in Slovenia. After 2000 years of wars among 
themselves they finally united against gays ... I guess we brought them together”  
(interview no. 107).
198
  
Among the Slovenian opposition, the Institute for Family Life and Culture 
(KUL), founded in 2009, was the most vocal and organized. KUL’s campaign 
embodied the wellbeing of children frame, which activists linked to emulating the 
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 According to one of the activists who proposed the Bill originally, “We had waited and waited, but it 
was the conservative party in the government who made it happen. We had many negotiations with 
them, because we were not satisfied with how they drafted the bill. But they did what they wanted” 
(interview no. 101). 
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initially successful 2008 campaign by the Mormon Church against Proposition 8 in 
California (interview nos. 107 and 108).
199
 The organization cited social issues related 
to marriage, childbirth, abortion, suicide, alcoholism, and poverty as their rationales 
for opposing the Family Code. In an article by Tadej Strehovec (2012), KUL’s 
founder and secretary of the Commission for Justice and Peace at the Slovenian 
Bishops’ Conference, he ironically highlights birthrate successes in other EU countries 
(one’s that have same-sex unions) as grounds for preserving the traditional family in 
Slovenia. Despite Strehovec’s role as the most vocal opponent of the Family Code, his 
article revolves only around the societal structure of family and child, making no 
reference to unwanted outside forces or inherently Slovenian values.  
The relationship between the Slovenian Church hierarchy and KUL also 
provides an interesting reflection into the backseat role of the Church. Despite 
ideological ties, the Church consistently denied its involvement with the institute, and 
the KUL claims it is privately funded. LGBT activists created some controversy, 
however, when they exposed a direct connection, linking KUL’s website directly to 
the server of the Church (interview nos. 107, 111, 151):
200
   
The Catholic Church was the most active party against the Family Law, but 
they did it quietly, setting up an independent lobbying group that says it’s 
separate from the Catholic Church. Yet, their website server can be traced back 
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 In contrast, such collaboration did not occur in Poland as most members of the Polish opposition 
feared it would challenge their monopoly of the issue as a threat to the homogenous nation.   
199
 Proposition 8 was the California referendum that reversed the legalization of same-sex unions in 
2008. It remains unclear whether there were any formal ties between the Mormon Church and the KUL, 
though the interviewees that mentioned the connection assume it was informal emulation.  
200
 To access photographic evidence of the link, see 
http://img148.imageshack.us/img148/5145/24kul.jpg (accessed February 1, 2013).  
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to the Church, and funds were funneled from the Church to [KUL] (interview 
no. 111). 
Poland. Unlike Slovenia, the Church in Poland has not shied away from 
vocally trying to influence Polish politics throughout the debates on social issues. The 
Church maintains close ties with Polish political parties and parliamentarians, and the 
Episcopate has approached voters directly, sending them letters to support candidates 
who defend “the inviolable rights of man, and these in a natural life from conception 
to natural death” (Borownik 2002, 244). The 2005 campaign of former President Lech 
Kaczyński produced a document called “Catholic Poland in Christian Europe,” listing 
the 2004 and 2005 bans on the Warsaw Equality Marches as successes (Gruszczyńska 
2007, 100). And Church leadership has been vocal in implementing political 
roadblock to public assembly by LGBT groups. The Cracow Old Town’s roughly 30 
churches always posed an obstacle to the organizers of LGBT marches, since the city 
originally requested that march routes not pass in front of any church.
201
  
The same year Slovenian activists established a working group on same-sex 
unions with their government. In 1997, Article 18 of the Polish constitution defined 
marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Pope John Paul II’s visit to Poland 
in 1995 emphasized the type of role the Catholic Church should play in the new Polish 
politics, highlighting the key issues fundamental to nourishing the Christian nature of 
the state: opposition to abortion and same-sex partnerships (Burns 2009, 166). The 
visit was a direct attempt to “influence the new legal foundations being formulated by 
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 Outside of the formal political sphere, members of the clergy have occasionally protested LGBT 
demonstrations on the streets. Kubica (2009, 133) notes the presence of a Benedictine Monk at the 2004 
Cracow Festival, who would appear from a Church on the march route to sign the cross. Apparently he 
was preforming an exorcism, but this was only made clear after Kubica’s student asked him to describe 
his performance—from the outside it appeared as though he were blessing the march (133). 
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the country, including the Polish Constitution” (Burns 2009, 166).202 Several LGBT 
activists ascribed the obstacles they face surrounding partnership and other movement 
goals to the role of the Church in politics: 
Belgium is very Catholic, and the Church didn’t agree with [same-sex] 
marriages, and a year later they got it. In Poland it’s different, the Church is 
involved in different aspects of life, especially politics. They talk too much 
about politics. They have religion in schools and feel legitimate in telling 
politicians how to lead. Here the Church has a super position (interview no. 
140).  
With the support of 36 senators and various LGBT representatives, Senator Maria 
Szyszkowska submitted a motion to allow same-sex partnership to the Parliament in 
November 2003, but no legislative procedure was started and the draft bill was never 
sent to a parliamentary committee to take a final form (Mizielińska 2010, 331). It was 
in 2012, a year after electoral wins by former presidents of LGBT organizations, that a 
partnership bill had a real chance in Parliament, but then lost by 17 votes (228 to 
211).
203
 Despite unleashing a typically harsh homophobic rhetoric in Parliament, the 
bill’s near passage exemplifies the remarkable shift LGBT politics have taken since 
domestic and transnational activism made the issue visible at the turn of the century. 
Compared to Slovenia, the ability of the Church to influence political responses to 
LGBT norms is far greater in Poland. 
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 “Article 25 of the constitution deals solely with church-state relations; in it, the constitution specifies 
that ‘relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by 
[the] international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute’” (Burns 2009, 167). 
203
 The Bill was inferior to marriage and in a language that also presented it as an alternative for 
heterosexual couples. The strongest backing came from the PO (146 of 206 votes) and two opposition 
parties, the anti-clerical RP and the left SLD, with 42 and 23 votes respectively. The other three parties, 
including 137 Law and Justice votes, were unanimously opposed.  
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Resistance on the Streets 
The well-being of children frame in Slovenia has also not spurred public 
mobilization the way the defend the nation frame has in Poland. The Slovenian state 
has not banned freedom of assembly since independence in 1991, which is protected 
by Article 42 of the constitution (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009b, 5). 
LGBT activists only note one incidence where the proprietor at the Ljubljana Castle 
terminated a rental contract to use the venue—to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the 
LGBT movement—when the nature of the event was exposed (European Fundamental 
Rights Agency 2009b, 6). Furthermore, as Table 5.4 shows “there is no record of 
demonstrations against tolerance of LGBT people” (European Fundamental Rights 
Agency 2009b, 6). 
Table 5.4. Data on Slovenian Mobilization in the Public Sphere:  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
# LGBT 
demonstrations 
and parades 
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
# demonstrations 
against tolerance 
for LGBT 
people 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Table Recreated from 2009 FRA Report (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009b) 
 
These data are in sharp contrast to the situation in Poland, where “various 
groups and politicians organize marches of normalcy, especially around the time of 
gay prides” (interview no. 129).204 Among the most active groups in mobilizing 
demonstrations is the Stowarzyszenie Kultury Chrześcijańskiej im. Ks. Piotra Skargi 
(Father Piotr Skarga Association for Christian Culture), founded in Cracow in 1999 
(Mizielińska 2010, 333). They organized the Marsz dla Życia i Rodziny (March for 
Life and Family) from 2006 to 2008 and participants donned the typical Polish 
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national symbols, crosses and banners, calling to “Stop Perversion” and that “Marriage 
is One Man, One Woman.” As is typical in Poland, these chants are often 
complemented with nationalist ones: “Lesbians and faggots are ideal citizens of the 
EU” and “Healthy Poles are not like that” (Gruszczyńska 2007, 100). The Skarga 
Association has published anti-homosexual propaganda leaflets and letters to citizens 
in Cracow, Poznan and Warsaw that encourage recipients to contact local authorities. 
It also disseminated a 50-page brochure called the “Hidden Problems of 
Homosexuality” to schools in 2006, which, among other things, linked homosexuality 
to pedophilia (Mizielińska 2010, 333; interview nos. 8 and 129). The group has ties to 
the American Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (TFP), a 
transnational Catholic organization, which activists suspect funds the “wealthy” 
organization’s fliers (interview nos. 129 and 139).205 The secretary at TFP confirmed 
the “sister-organization” status of the Skarga Association, but denies the transfer of 
funds to Poland (interview no. 147).
206
 Another Catholic organization, the Fundacja 
Mamy i Taty (Foundation for Mothers and Fathers) is vocal in the public sphere and 
politically lobbies conservative politicians (interview nos. 129 and 141). Before the 
EuroPride in 2010, it paid for a full-page newspaper advertisement outlining 
homosexual threat, and together with the Catholic magazine Fronda, organized an 
online petition and counter protest (“Homoparady w Europie” 2010). All three groups 
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 “[These demonstrations] are never very big, but they do happen and they have politicians marching 
with them, so it is not that niche” (interview no. 129). 
205
 According to the American TFP’s website, “The TFP is financed by a network of donors nationwide 
that give large, medium and small contributions. Many of these donate on a monthly basis while others 
give only periodically. Contributions are tax deductible. The TFP receives no government grants or 
support” (“American Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property” 2011). 
206
 He says that there are ample opportunities for networking and knowledge transfer (e.g., on 
organizing pro-life marches) at conferences but that cross-border financial transfer was strictly through 
private donations and would be minimal at best (interview no. 147). 
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have a Catholic mandate, but deploy a clearly nationalist discourse around the defense 
of uniquely Polish values.   
Several activists identified their early opposition as Młodzież Wszechpolska 
(the All Polish Youth), a far-right nationalist and Catholic youth organization founded 
in 1922 and revived after independence in 1989.
207
 In response to Cracow’s Festival of 
Culture for Tolerance in 2004, the group formulated their “Declaration of Ideas” as 
follows: “The Nation is the most important worldly value. First, after God, service is 
deserved by our own nation…. [The Roman Catholic Church] creates and strengthens 
Polish national identity” (Kubica 2009, 130). A former president of the All Polish 
Youth justified the strong Polish opposition more broadly, based on three core Polish 
values that he felt were contrary to the goals of the LGBT movement: (1) power of 
country (sovereignty in law from international influences); (2) Christian values (a 
Christian concept of mankind and human dignity), and (3) the common good of the 
Polish Community (against modern individualism and liberalism) (interview no. 141). 
The organization, which had strong ties to the Law and Justice Party (PiS), was most 
active against LGBT mobilization from 2004 to 2007 but lost influence after the 
vocally anti-LGBT governing coalition of PiS, the League of Polish Families (LPR) 
and the Self-Defense of the Polish Republic (SRP) dissolved in 2007. 
Other Polish nationalist groups also mobilized against LGBT rights, making 
LGBT politics the focus of their “defense of nation” rhetoric (see Figure 5.2, 
Appendix E). The Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (NOP) (National Rebirth of Poland) 
describes their mission as “spiritually motivated” nationalism, with the first two points 
of their ten-point declaration specifically referencing the Christian faith: “We, the 
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Polish nationalists concentrated in the ranks of the NOP, contribute to the 
development of the Polish national community. Our actions will be based on the 
teachings of the Catholic Church” (“Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski” 2011).208 The 
organization’s logos include a series of religious, anti-EU, anti-American, and anti-gay 
symbols representative of the defend the nation frame (see Figure 5.3, Appendix E). 
The opposition at Polish LGBT marches commonly displays an anti-gay symbol, 
which depicts two stick figure men in a sexual position encircled by the phrase “Zakaz 
Pedałowania” (Ban Faggots). Similarly, the group Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny (ONR) 
(National Radical Camp) also lists “the development and revival of national and 
Catholic values” as their central objective, and takes an identical position vis-a-vis the 
LGBT movement.
209
 Finally, LGBT activists listed the informal fringe group that runs 
a website called Redwatch Polska among those that organize violent counter-
protesters at LGBT events.
210
 The website also created an online list targeting 
individuals from leftist groups and LGBT and other minority groups.
211
  
In practice, these groups mobilize extremists from around the country to gather 
and block LGBT marches. Often these forms of recruitment are informal, for example, 
through soccer fan forums that bring together hooligans opposed to LGBT rights. In 
2011, before the first LGBT pride march in the city of Lodz, organizers at KPH-Lodz 
created their own accounts on soccer fan forums to gain information on how the 
extremist opposition was organizing (interview nos. 130 and 131). Since nationalist 
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 Kubica’s (2009, 131) research on the organization concluded that “nationalist ideology together with 
Catholicism is the main reference point” for the organization. 
208
 Translated from Polish 
209
 Translated from Polish 
210
 Redwatch Polska has links to other Redwatch websites in United Kingdom, Germany and New 
Zealand. The first Redwatch website was started by supporters of the British People’s Party.  
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groups often use violent tactics, organizers planned accordingly, informing themselves 
and the police about numbers and locations and potentially making alterations to the 
route (interview nos. 130 and 131). Describing the Lodz march, an LGBT activist that 
traveled in for the event from Warsaw, recalled:   
We saw it clearly. We were on the road lined with police, and [the counter-
protestors] were in the park. We had 150 people and they had plenty, around 
400. They threw plastic bottles [filled] with water, potatoes, eggs, and 
tomatoes. Eggs and tomatoes are popular. They are very aggressive and shout 
‘Go to the gas chambers.’ And alongside the nationalists we also see Church 
people, with crosses, with bibles, they throw holy water and say things like, 
‘Oh, holy father bless them.’ They don’t come with the nationalists but they 
are there next to each other (interview no. 139).
212
   
The recollection paints a vivid picture of the ties between religion and nationalism in 
the Polish counter-movement.  
In contrast, Slovenian far-right groups remain unorganized. The two opposition 
groups that activists sometimes, though rarely, mentioned in interviews and surveys 
are Tukaj je Slovenija (Here is Slovenia) and the Slovenian branch of Blood and 
Honor. The former makes a reference to the Church on their website, but religion is 
not mentioned among their three fundamental goals, which include patriotism, bonds 
of friendship among Slovenians, and activism to draw attention to the Slovenian 
nation’s right to exist. The latter, Blood and Honor, is a group that promotes national 
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 The three men responsible for coordinating the website were arrested and their website was blocked 
by the Polish government due to the illegal xenophobic content, to which the group responded by using 
an international server to make it accessible (interview no. 139). 
212
 One of the organizers of the event listed the attendance figures as 200 for the LGBT activists, and 
350-400 for the opposition (interview no. 131) 
  210 
socialist ideals through rock music concerts since 2001 (Mudde 2005, 231). Neither 
group has organized counter protests, but they are responsible for sporadic violence 
directed at individuals or vandalizing organizational facades. In 2010, for example, 
affiliates of Here is Slovenia attacked three men after the pride parade for which they 
were sentenced to a year and a half in prison.
213
 According to an activist from the 
LGBT-group, Legebitra:  
The attacks after pride were not organized, they see someone on the street and 
say he’s a faggot, let’s kick him. They only organized after the arrests were 
made [to protest the sentence]. There was a protest of maybe 100 [people], 
dressed in black with masks, in front of the court. The [hate-crime] sentence 
was high, which they [found to be exaggerated] because a ‘kick is a kick, just a 
bit of fun.’214 Now they say they are not against the gays, but against the 
system. They graffitied the house of the judge that ruled in the case
215
 
(interview no. 107).  
The difference in public sphere opposition to the LGBT rights between Slovenia and 
Poland is that Slovenian “nationalist groups are anti-religious, and quite strongly anti-
religious” (interview no. 108). In Poland, religious and nationalist groups both use the 
defend the nation frame.   
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 These attacks were also related to vandalizing Café Open, a popular gay-friendly Ljubljana café 
several times since 2009. Three perpetrators were found “guilty of a crime of incitement to hatred, 
violence and intolerance” (http://www.red-network.eu/?i=red-network.en.items&id=241). Such acts of 
“physical violence or interference by third parties with the rights of LGBT people has won severe and 
unanimous condemnation from the highest Slovenian officials” (European Fundamental Rights Agency 
2009b, 23). 
214
 Other sources referred to the reference as ‘a bump is a bump, fag!’ (http://www.red-
network.eu/?i=red-network.en.items&id=241). 
215
 Coincidently, the judge is the spouse of the minister of justice. 
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Other Spheres of Opposition (Education and Media)  
Education. The ramifications of threat perception are also apparent in other 
spheres of LGBT life, such as education and the media. In Poland, schools are among 
the most conservative elements of society. Either a religion or ethics course is 
mandatory and the overwhelming majority (around 90%) opt for religion because the 
priests, who are employed by the schools, encourage students to enroll and, in general, 
“being the ‘other’ is not popular for young people” (interview no. 130). The 
curriculum is also conservative. Sex education is limited and, in many cases, archaic 
biology textbooks are used that reference the need to cure homosexuality (Bączkowski 
2010).
216
 The previous PiS/LPR/SRP government banned curricula addressing 
sexuality altogether and the “family life” curriculum only refers to traditional 
heterosexual families (Krzeminski 2008). In 2006, Roman Giertych, the Polish 
Minister of Education dismissed the director of the Service Teacher Training Centre 
(NTTC), Mirosław Sielatycki, for promoting homosexuality (Biedroń and 
Abramowicz 2007; European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009a). Sielatycki had 
simply published the European Council’s recommended guidelines for teachers, 
Compass – Education on Human Rights (Biedroń and Abramowicz 2007; European 
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 The Church is also involved in curing homosexuality in the private sphere. Father Francis Blachnicki 
and Ruchu Światło-Życie (Light and Life Movement) founded the treatment center Odwaga (Courage) 
in Lublin. Supported by several Polish bishops and priests, the center uses controversial psychotherapy 
techniques with the objective “to help people with homosexual tendencies to achieve purity and 
rejection of the homosexual lifestyle” (“ODWAGA” 2012, translated from Polish). LGBT actors say 
financial ties to the Ex-Gay Watch and the American National Association for Research & Therapy of 
Homosexuality (NARTH) brought at least two American speakers to Poland in the last ten years 
(interview nos. 8 and 129). In 2011, however, NARTH’s Joseph Nicolosi—“the chief engineer of 
modern reparative therapy”—was obliged to move the venue of his talk from a medical school in 
Poznan, after the Gazeta Wyborcza published a damning front-page critique of gay to straight therapy 
preceding the event (Rattigan 2012). 
  212 
Fundamental Rights Agency 2009a).
217
 “Teachers are very reluctant to talk about 
homosexuality for fear of losing their jobs” (European Fundamental Rights Agency 
2009a). In 2010, the Polish Equality Minister, Elżbieta Radziszewska, argued that EU 
law allows for Catholic schools to discriminate against LGBT teachers and then asked 
that contrary opinions be censored, provoking startled and reproachful responses from 
members of the European Parliament (European Parliament 2010). 
By contrast, the nine-year curriculum of the Slovenian education system 
requires 5
th
 graders to learn about sexual diversity, and in some cases textbooks do 
mention sexual orientation and same-sex families (Kuhar 2008). While LGBT 
advocates argue that the issue deserves more prominence in the education system, 
there have been no state bans on discussing homosexuality, and LGBT activists have 
sent representatives to lecture at some public schools (Kuhar 2005, interview no. 111). 
In the Slovenian context, the state-sponsored homophobia in the education system 
found in Poland, is absent.  
Media. As is the case with education, the domestic media uses two different 
narratives in the two states. Polish members of the LGBT movement highlight ultra-
conservative Catholic media sources as a well-organized source of resistance. 
Prominent Catholic media sources, including Radio Maryja and the magazine Fronda, 
made homosexuality a household issue among clerical communities by tying issues of 
sexuality to the vast array of social topics they cover (see fronda.pl and 
radiomaryja.pl).
218
 Similarly, scholars have described Radio Maryja as its own social 
movement with an action frame that postulates: “Any attack on Polishness is 
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 A Warsaw district court later ruled that Sielatycki was discriminated against, and he was paid 5,700 
euros in damages (Abramowicz 2007). 
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perceived as an attack on the Church and vice versa. In this perspective … the nation 
is not history’s but God’s creation” (Bylok and Pędziwiatr 2010). Both networks 
publicize LGBT demonstrations and call for people to oppose them. The Polish 
Catholic Church hierarchy has distanced itself from the extreme perspectives 
articulated by Radio Maryja, but their parallel deployment of the defend the nation 
frame has given them a strong influence in the national discourse against LGBT 
rights.
219
  
Other researchers also noted the “dubious quality” of Polish mainstream 
journalism on LGBT issues at the turn of the century (Kubica 2009, 134). Kubica 
(2009) gives examples from journalism across political leanings, all of which were 
naïve in their reporting of the 2004 Cracow Festival of Culture for Tolerance, an event 
that some have called the “Polish Stonewall” (Gruszczyńska 2007). She notes how 
these early events were generally mischaracterized in the press as a provocation. For 
example, using images of drag queens from the Berlin Love Parade—that would 
knowingly be perceived as radical in Polish society—instead of actual images from 
Polish LGBT events (Kubica 2009, 135). A public statement by a journalist from the 
Gazeta Wyborcza—an authority among the Polish press—exemplifies the media’s 
ignorance: “No newspapers, at least the important ones, wrote about [KPH] or about 
the festival, unjustly. They only portrayed the dominant Polish feelings” (Voxerbarnt 
2004; cited in Kobica 2009, 135). On most occasions, reporting on “dominant Polish 
feelings” gave little or no voice to the supporters or organizers of LGBT events. While 
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 “The editor of Fronda is very homophobic and has made it [a] central issue, including verbally 
attacking KPH and the events it organizes” (interview no. 129). 
219
 Radio Maryja claims that over 10% of Polish adults listen to their broadcasts on a daily basis. While 
these figures may be exaggerated, third parties have referenced their sizeable influence on “millions” of 
Polish adults (Walton 2002).  
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the Catholic media has not changed its tone, LGBT organizations’ ties to the 
mainstream media have improved considerably in Poland since 2007 (interview no. 
8).
220
 Several activists also point to some working relationships with journalists of the 
mainstream media that result in a more “neutral” depiction of LGBT people (European 
Fundamental Rights Agency 2009a). 
 According to proponents of LGBT rights, the mainstream Slovenian media 
attained fluency on LGBT issues much earlier. Kuhar’s (2003) study on Slovenian 
print media concluded that the representation of homosexuality was favorable or 
neutral. The media also actively reports on hate crimes towards LGBT people (Kuhar 
2008). LGBT activists cited partners and contact points in the media to whom they 
have access for fair reporting. By contrast, the opposing Institute for Family Life and 
Culture is motivated in large part by what they say is underrepresentation by the 
media: “[Our] main purpose is to acquaint visitors with … the values that touch on 
family, culture, life, and solidarity that the mainstream Slovenian media ignore” 
(“Institute for Family Life and Culture” 2013). While activists did remark on the 
tendency to stereotype LGBT people in the media, their accounts differentiate 
themselves from the aggressive homophobia espoused by large segments of the Polish 
media.
221
 
Across the board, in conventional politics and on the streets, Poland’s 
opposition has outpaced its Slovenian counterpart in degree and intensity. The Church 
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 Activists attribute this improvement to domestic activism and the transnational and international 
attention on the situation for LGBT Poles. These factors infused the discourse with new frames of 
reference and more complex, nuanced understandings of sexuality. While substantial minority 
contingents of Polish society had these understandings before outside attention, the domestic media 
often ignored it. Transnational visibility influenced the debate by giving such arguments legitimacy and 
credibility in the broader framework of modern European society. 
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in Poland sits confidently in its role of marginalizing LGBT people by branding them 
as a threat to the Polish nation and to European civilization. The defend the nation 
narrative in Poland has mobilized a fervent opposition to the rights of LGBT people, 
which are equated with an invasion of the domestic sphere. For observers at LGBT 
marches, this frame is easily evident in “that demonstrators [carry] mainly EU flags 
while their opponents [carry] only Polish ones” (Kubica 2009, 141). Polish 
mobilization unites a diverse group of actors under a narrative of nation. In Slovenia, 
perceived threat was lower, and the wellbeing of children frame could not mobilize or 
unite a fragmented and weak domestic opposition. Slovenian LGBT actors 
commanded a discourse that LGBT rights were part of what it meant to return to 
Europe, and the Church was not in a position to “adopt the powerful rhetoric of being 
a ‘traditional,’ ‘national’ or ‘state-Constitutional Church’” (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 
361).
222
 
IV: RESISTANCE AS VISIBILITY?  
RESISTANCE AND DELIBERATION IN THE DOMESTIC SPHERE 
Yet, what effect do the forms of resistance described above have on the ability 
of LGBT movements to generate social and political change in their respective 
contexts? Movements of resistance paradoxically also enhance the visibility of LGBT 
norms and can strengthen the chances of the LGBT movement success in contexts 
where strong transnational channels are established.
223
 Through a process in which it 
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 Scholars also warn that “Although a slow tendency toward less sensational and more accurate 
reporting is visible throughout the 1990s, a high degree of ignorance about lesbianism and biased 
attitudes of journalists, loaded with homophobia, are still present” (Greif 2005, 158). 
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 It is also worth noting that the two countries had different ambitions as European states, with Poland 
more able and willing to play the role of a large power, at least in terms of voting rights.  
223
 The argument here echoes an element of “radical flank theory,” that movements generate negative 
attention when they employ an extreme repertoire that can, in turn, cast the groups from which they are 
distinguishing themselves in a more favorable light (Cross and Snow 2011, 117; Haines 1984; Minkoff 
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fuels deliberation, resistance benefits the cause of the LGBT rights movement by 
making the issue more salient.  
Data derived from the survey of transnationally connected LGBT rights 
organizations show that resistance is preferable to invisibility over time. Expert 
respondents from each organization described the effect of “visibility” on change, 
which I then coded according to 4 different processes depicted in Figure 5.5. Among 
the organizational representatives in new EU-12 states, 39% describe a non-linear 
process, where improvement followed an initial backlash. In this process, 
transnationally embedded domestic actors publicize resistance and international 
attention heightens, which in turn fuels increased visibility and active deliberation the 
in target state. This process suggests a strategic relationship where resistance leads to 
more international visibility, but only if transnationally embedded domestic groups 
exist. Another 22% of survey respondents said that visibility leads to a Type II process 
whereby the LGBT norm generates deliberation once visible, making it salient. In 
these cases, norm brokers illuminate historical narrations of LGBT people in their own 
respective countries, resistance is minimal and states conform to the standards of a 
community to which they belong. Of the respondents, another 11% described a Type 
III process that involved an intensification of anti-LGBT politics by religious and 
nationalist sectors of society. In these cases, the absence of activist networks and few 
                                                                                                                                            
1994). Radical flank theory usually looks at this process within one movement, in that one “flank” 
interacts with another. The insight that radicalization can make the opposition’s position seem more 
moderate, however, applies here as well. The issues embraced by social movements for LGBT rights 
are considered politically radical in most societies (Ayoub 2010; Earl and Soule 2006), but LGBT 
movements’ non-violent tactics may still be socially more palatable than the aggressive tactics—that 
often lead to bodily injury—used by some counter movements (Keck and Sikkink 1998). McAdam’s 
work, for example, has shown that disruptive counter-movement activity, including violence aimed at 
opposing demonstrators, can lead to favorable policy outcomes and enhance societal sympathies for the 
movement (McAdam and Su 2002; McAdam 1999). Tarrow and Dorf (forthcoming) show how the 
religious right in the United States created legal opportunity for the LGBT movement. 
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channels of transnational pressures fail to counter the arguments of the opposition. 
Finally, 17% of respondents described a Type I process. In these cases, no adequate 
levels of visibility had been reached and, thus, change had not occurred.  
Among EU-12 states, an active resistance has occurred in half of the cases 
analyzed. The EU-15 states paint an optimistic picture, whereby over 90% of survey 
respondents described eventual improvement, even if an active resistance had 
mobilized in the past. A mobilized resistance in response to norm visibility is 
common; indeed, it precedes improvement in most EU cases.
224
 These results, both 
among EU-12 and EU-15 LGBT organizations, are quite staggering when taking into 
account the general precaution with which LGBT activists measure success.  
 
Figure 5.1. Type of Process described by Respondents (in Percent), N=125 Organizations, 
DK=8 
 
Source: Author’s Transnational LGBT Organizations Survey (2011) 
 
The predominant theme in the survey and interview data suggests that 
resistance is partly self-defeating because it contributes to making the issue visible. I 
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substantiate these findings with a discussion of the deliberative process and discursive 
advantage that LGBT actors have in the European context. According to actors for and 
against LGBT rights, there are several plausible explanations for this phenomenon, all 
of which rest on the theme of visibility via deliberation. In general, the respondents’ 
explanations centered around two themes: (1) defend the nation frames used by anti-
LGBT groups mobilize an extreme, sometimes violent demographic that eventually 
drifts out of sync with the sensibilities of the general populace, and (2) anti-LGBT 
movements have weaker ties to and lesser support from transnational contexts than the 
LGBT movements themselves.  
Radical Tactics. According to LGBT activists, anti-LGBT activism often fails 
because it employs extreme arguments (emotional, rooted in the past, aggressive, and 
ideological), which can result in increased public sympathy for the LGBT cause. 
While Bob (2012) suggests that opposition movements construct compelling counter-
arguments to LGBT movement claims (e.g., that LGBT rights are against natural 
design), opposition actors who are granted attention on streets and in the media 
generally use highly provocative anti-gay arguments. Especially in cases where the 
Church has issued a defend the nation response, the anti-gay arguments quickly spiral 
out of control when the far right appropriates them.
225
 These arguments, though they 
find receptive ears in most national contexts, do not fare well with European 
discourse. Resistance has made the issue visible to the general public because it 
provokes a strong reaction when there are LGBT groups who can publicize it in the 
European polity.  
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 Cycles of resistance can also reemerge, as we note in the strong mobilization by anti-marriage 
groups in France in 2013 (Paternotte 2013).  
  219 
This was the case in Poland when the nationalist NOP trademarked a 
homophobic symbol (a red circle crossing out two male stick-figures in a sexual 
position) as their logo in 2011. While the use of the symbol by rightist counter 
protesters had not posed problems for the opposition at LGBT events in new EU 
member states for nearly a decade, the NOP’s decision to trademark it backfired when 
a subsequent court case prohibited its use, further legitimizing LGBT groups.
226
 
Before the court banned it, the trademark story was widely publicized by the Polish 
LGBT organizations and reported on by various European institutions and the Polish 
and international press. In another political arena, one interviewee referred to an 
instance in the Polish Parliament in the fall of 2011, where newly elected and openly 
gay parliamentarian Robert Biedroń was told he was “punching below the belt,” a 
reference to his sexuality that brought the Parliament, especially members of PiS and 
PO, to laughter. The disrespectful reaction drew the attention of European institutions 
and media sources. According to one of the activists who contributed to KPH’s press 
release following the incident: “My feeling is that after MPs were laughing at Robert, 
all media is feeling sympathetic with him. Now even the newspapers called it 
homophobic! The PO is embarrassed” (interview no. 140). Finally, at Ruch Palikota’s 
post-election party, which also celebrated Poland’s first gay and transgender 
parliamentarians, the policy coordinator at KPH jokingly whispered, “And what 
exactly am I going to tell our [international] sponsors now? Gross homophobia is 
definitely an easier sell for sympathy than the world’s only transgender 
parliamentarian” (no. 206).  
                                                                                                                                            
225
 Because far-right movements have coopted the issue as their own, more moderate counter arguments 
often take a back seat. 
226
 The symbol is also common in other contexts in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in Latvia.  
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These examples suggest how LGBT actors can engage and strategically 
interact with counter-movement mobilization when they are well connected 
transnationally—even in a context of highly mobilized political homophobia. And this 
process is not limited to Poland; a Hungarian activist and academic described a similar 
process: 
The right-wing has become very strong in the past four years. But I think there 
was a [favorable] shift in the public discourse in response. In 2008, when the 
Gay Pride happened it was very violent, and that was a bit too much for a lot of 
people … even for people who thought that Gay Pride shouldn’t happen. It was 
so violent and so aggressive and damaging—even to the road and to historical 
monuments! It was too much, you know. There were between 1000 and 2000 
marchers and, like 5000 riot police. It was horrible. But that horror made the 
whole thing more visible. By the ‘whole thing’ I mean both extremist violence 
and gay people. And it was not the gay people anymore who were seen as 
violating public morals, but the extremists. In this case, the discourse created 
by left-wing intellectuals drew more sympathy (interview no. 123).   
The bizarre group of (in)voluntary bedfellows, from xenophobic nationalists to 
traditional Catholics, results in a fractured and uncoordinated opposition that has little 
impact on the formation of a compelling frame or network beyond initial mobilization. 
For initial mobilization, frames resting on religion and nationalism were effective, but 
then became too radical to sustain. By contrast, LGBT groups have found a balance by 
using both local and European frames that connect the norm to democratic values and 
human right responsibilities in an international society of states. Pointing to other 
states in their club, they can also employ frames of inevitability that destabilize a 
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counter-movement if its members feel their chances of winning are low (Tarrow 
2011). LGBT groups make the norm salient by connecting activists and grafting 
international ideas to domestic ones, thereby framing the message to fit locally—
especially when confronted with domestic resistance (Chapter 2).  
Transnational Ties. LGBT activists also have a critical advantage in that they 
are embedded both vertically and horizontally in enduring cross-border constellations 
through European institutions and networks of activists, both formal and informal.
227
 
Conservative resistance movements fail to activate a similar identity or establish 
equivalent ties across borders since their philosophies are rooted in nationalism. 
Despite the Catholic Church’s transnational nature, for example, its opposition to non-
heterosexual acts is often deeply rooted in a popular nationalism that precludes the use 
of transnational scripts and channels for legitimate meaning-making. This is in large 
part because the nationalist nature of the opposition worries that an external presence 
can diminish the dominant frame, which revolves around rejecting outside influences 
(interview no. 141, 150). The notion of collaboration between like-minded outsiders 
perplexed one member of the resistance: “You mean having some foreigners, like 
Germans, demonstrate? Why would we have Germans with us? We don’t want 
Germans here. We are doing this for Poland” (interview no. 150). Leftist groups 
dramatically outpace their opposition in transnational presence at these events—and 
not just LGBT groups. On Poland’s Independence Day in 2011, for example, 92 
German anarchists and communists were arrested in Warsaw for protesting against a 
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 There is an intrinsic importance of solidarity in sexual identity that ties them across borders. The 
right has the disadvantage because they cannot activate this identity: they don’t want it.  
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demonstration organized by the All Polish Youth and the ONR (Polskie Radio 
2011).
228
  
Although transnational networks do exist for anti-LGBT groups, in most of the 
cases I analyzed they are non-enduring, infrequent and weak.
229
 Those LGBT actors 
that mentioned the opponents’ potential transnational ties admit that “they are not well 
organized and the coalition is weak. The only thing they have that unites them is ‘us’ 
[LGBT people]” (interview no. 140). In sum, LGBT and anti-LGBT groups differ in 
terms of material resources, the transmission of know-how, and human capital.  
Does resistance change attitudes? Resistance can lead to backlash, but it can 
also produce a visibility of its own, making LGBT issues more salient than before. 
Slovenian attitudes, though they have far out-paced Poland’s, did not improve between 
2000 and 2008. On the contrary, Poland continued making gains, however small, 
when surveyed in the year following an active period of aggressive resistance. In 
Poland, resistance helped activists make the issue “mainstream” (interview no. 140). 
The less-polarizing formal approach of opposition in Slovenia, grounded in pseudo-
scientific rational language of protecting the child, proved more effective than Polish 
mobilization on the streets (interview no. 151). Slovenians narrowly rejected the 
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 “‘For years, the right-wing government and the Catholic Church have promoted a racist, anti-Semitic 
and homophobic atmosphere in Poland,’ the German web site antifa.de declares, adding that last year, 
Polish anti-fascists got “inspired” by the German left-wing blockade of a march in Dresden, an event 
that led to rioting and damage to public property” (Polskie Radio 2011). 
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 For example, the NOP lists ties to groups in Italy (Forza Nuova), the United Kingdom (British 
National Party), Spain (Movimiento Social Republicano), Greece (Χρυσή Αυγή), Cyprus (Ethniko 
LAiko Metwpo E.LA.M.), and Sweden (Svenskarnas parti). LGBT activists claim that transnational ties 
to the right, mainly between evangelical communities in the USA, have been active in funding some 
campaigns, like the Skarga Association’s flyers linking homosexuality to pedophilia—but further 
research established that these transfers are minimal at best (interview no. 147). Transnational guests 
have been more present at some anti-LGBT demonstrations, like in Latvia, where American 
Evangelicals have spoken at counter demonstrations surrounding LGBT prides (interview no. 138, Film 
Baltic Pride) or at Polish conferences on reparative therapy. Stories like this are few and far between, 
however, and the ones we have and can track are visible precisely because pro-LGBT networks have 
actively ridiculed them in the international arena.  
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Family Law that Parliament approved in 2011, which granted same-sex couples the 
right to second-parent adoption in 2012.
230
 Popular resistance in Polish has contributed 
to the norm’s unprecedented degree of national and political attention.  
In sum, resistance can be a pathway to LGBT visibility. As one activist noted: 
“Conservative backlashes have finally opened a possibility for a real dialog on an 
everyday level” (survey no. 80). In most cases, resistance follows the initial visibility 
of the LGBT norm, in a period of protracted discourse surrounding its legitimacy. 
While counter groups can craft competing claims in the domestic realm (Bob 2012), 
they nonetheless introduce a discourse that evokes a reaction from state authorities, as 
various sides of the electorate request it of them. When these authorities look to the 
international level for templates for responding to LGBT issues, the ones they will 
find in Europe generally align with those of the LGBT activists.
231
  
CONCLUSION 
Six hundred meters from the 2010 EuroPride parade route in Warsaw another 
conflict brewed. Calling themselves the “Defenders of the Cross,” supporters of the 
late Polish President Kaczyński had placed a 13 foot high cross in front of the Polish 
Parliament and sparked a heated debated about the separation between church and 
state in Poland (Dempsey 2010). The two demonstrations—one of Poles with crosses 
and flags, and one of LGBT people with European flags—is symbolic of a 
conversation that society is having in Poland, which is reconsidering the place of the 
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 This setback needs to be contextualized. The Slovenians were voting on marriage and adoption 
privileges, which the publics of most states would reject in 2013.  
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 While networks of homophobia do play a role globally (Bob 2012), most notoriously in the “kill the 
gays bill of Uganda,” they are often delegitimized in regions where the systems of knowledge have an 
LGBT rights mandate. According to the president of KPH, “Many American Christian groups are active 
in Africa and elsewhere, but in Europe I think they no longer believe [having an impact] is possible” 
(interview no. 140). 
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Church and of LGBT people within the nation. This continued debate is widespread 
across the state and the society. It includes an open letter by Polish university 
professors distancing themselves from the misuse of science in the January 2013 
parliamentary debate on same-sex partnership, which they called degrading to all non-
heterosexual and transgender people—“who also deserve the respect recommended by 
the Catechism of the Catholic Church’s principles on human rights.”232 It also includes 
remarks in March 2013 by former President and iconic Solidarity activist Lech 
Walesa, who boldly stated that Anna Grodzka and Robert Biedroń should “sit behind 
the wall[s]” of Parliament for being transgender and gay. The parliamentarians 
responded by sitting in the front row and Walesa’s son, another parliamentarian, 
publically distanced himself from his father’s statement.233 This discourse, despite its 
strong homophobic element, is an intrinsically important element of social change.  
The chapter has explored the domestic responses to international norms 
governing LGBT rights in different contexts. I have suggested that different domestic 
contexts attach differing degrees of threat to an otherwise similar LGBT norm. Threat 
perception concerning LGBT norms depends largely on the degree to which the moral 
authority of religious institutions is tied to the histories of political transition and 
national identities. National interpretations of religion thus vary across context. Even 
the hierarchical and transnational Catholic Church takes different national forms in the 
way it connects to the popular nation. The argument thus goes beyond religious 
morality, to place importance on the situational politicization of religion in national 
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 Translated from Polish (“List Naukowców: Pawłowicz Wspiera Kłamstwa Na Temat 
Homoseksualistów” 2013) 
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 Biedroń responded by saying, “Lech Walesa is an important symbol for us all and for the whole 
world. I respect him and I’d rather he used other words, words of acceptance and of respect for other 
people” (Associated Press 2013).  
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identity. It is the role of religion in people’s identities more fundamentally that matters 
for LGBT politics, which can result in distinctive political manifestations for LGBT 
resistance across states. In Poland, high levels of collective threat perception linked to 
the Church’s historically deep ties to the popular nation resulted in zealous 
resistance—one that could legitimately frame LGBT norms as an external threat to 
nation. In Slovenia, the damaged credibility of the Church hampered its ability to 
coalesce an opposition around a national and moral narrative, which in turn greatly 
limited its mobilizing potential against LGBT rights.  
The goal of the analysis is not to paint Slovenia as a success story; the strong 
presence of homophobia in the everyday lives of Slovenian gays and lesbians is well 
documented by scholars (Greif 2005). Instead, the goal is to explore the relative 
accomplishments of two increasingly well-organized and well-connected LGBT 
movements, looking at factors that distinguish domestic responses to LGBT norms.
234
 
In the analysis, threat perception based on popular religiosity and nationalism traveled 
further than alternative explanations, for example, ones rooted in political party power. 
While rightist parties have contributed to anti-LGBT mobilization, these patterns are 
not consistent across cases. In Poland, for example, the conservative PiS coalition 
years from 2005 to 2007 coincided with a heightened resistance in Poland—this was a 
time when the resistance felt particularly legitimized, during a phase of illiberal 
politics following EU accession. Yet resistance to LGBT rights had emerged earlier, 
following a series of events organized by LGBT activists that gave LGBT rights 
visibility leading up to EU accession. Furthermore, the explanation does not hold in 
Slovenia: no resistance movements mobilized after LGBT activists pushed same-sex 
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partnerships through Parliament in 2005, when the conservative SDS party governed. 
This phenomenon—of no mobilization when conservative parties are in power—is not 
unique to Slovenia; it is, for example, that center-right Cameron government in the 
United Kingdom that is pushing for same-sex marriage. In France, despite elite 
support for LGBT rights, a fierce mobilized resistance emerged with the election of 
socialist President Holland and his government’s introduction of same-sex marriage 
(Paternotte 2013).
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 Resistance (in degree and scope) depends on the context, and is 
deeply linked to societal threat perceptions based on religion and nationalism. 
Whether resistance is effectual, however, is a separate question. The pathway 
to LGBT rights in Slovenia has been smoother, but the active resistance in Poland will 
not necessary yield successes for opponents of these rights. Seidman’s argument, that 
the “power of the state was mobilized to keep homosexuals socially invisible and 
publically scandalized,” (Seidman 2004, 247; Weeks 2000) was particularly true of the 
politics of the communist state (Chetaille 2011; Kubica 2009, 136). Yet, in contexts 
like post-Cold War Europe, invisibility is more detrimental to the objectives of the 
LGBT movement than active deliberation fueled by resistance. Instead of keeping the 
issue hidden, the mobilization of an anti-LGBT resistance indirectly puts it on the 
agenda as something that needs to be deliberated in terms of appropriateness. 
Paradoxically, resistance movements themselves reaffirm and cement the notion that 
being European is equivalent to respecting LGBT rights.  
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 Most prominently among them are issues of national identity, like the role of religion, that make a 
state more or less likely to associate ‘accepting LGBT rights’ with its role as an EU member-state. 
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 While the French Revolution may have severed the Church from the state (and only 5% of the 
French population regularly attends Church), the state’s attempt to establish a single creed of nation 
cemented Catholicism in the nation (Zaretsky 2013). Zaretsky cites Tocqueville in his comparison of 
American pluralism to French nationalism, arguing that the Church is paradoxically more relevant for 
resistance to LGBT rights in France.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion: A Politics of Visibility 
 
 
“… [C]ome out, stand up and let that 
world know. That would do more to end 
prejudice overnight than anybody would 
imagine. I urge them to do that, urge 
them to come out. Only that way will we 
start to achieve our rights.” 
 
—Harvey Milk, Gay Rights Activist and 
Politician, 1977
236
 
 
 In the 1980s, activists of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) in 
New York coined the slogan “Silence = Death,” an expression that came to define 
much of the LGBT movement in that decade. In the spirit of Harvey Milk’s 
philosophy, which rejected what he called a “conspiracy of silence,” the activists were 
responding to the Reagan Administration’s silence on the HIV-AIDS epidemic that 
had brought the gay community to its knees. Above the words “Silence = Death,” 
activists added a pink triangle to their logo, symbolizing the patch that National 
Socialists in Europe forced gay concentration camp prisoners to wear during the 
Second World War. In its historical context, the symbol evoked the same theme of 
silence and death: in the 1940s, the silence of a nation and the silence of a social group 
resulted in death in the camps of Dachau, just as it did in the hospital beds of Chelsea 
in the 1980s. At various points during the 20
th
 century, members of a marginalized 
group who had the unique ability to disguise their sexual orientation were compelled 
to come out, to act up, and to make themselves visible.  
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This dissertation has explored the effect of such visibility on the state and 
societal recognition of LGBT people across states in the European region. I set out to 
explain two broad questions: How do international norms spread? and Why do 
societies and states embrace change in some cases and not others? The overarching 
empirical conclusion of this analysis is simple, but consequential: norm visibility 
affects the political efficacy of marginalized groups and their ability to place demands 
on their societies and states. In a reverse logic similar to that of the “Silence = Death” 
campaign, it is this notion of visibility that has driven the primary explanation for the 
transnational diffusion of rights to minority groups. Visibility empowers social groups 
occupying the political margins, moving them to the center of political debate and 
public recognition and making it possible for them to obtain rights to which they have 
claim. Before the terms lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender can become politically 
salient identity markers, they must become visible. The interpersonal relationships that 
form among people who come to openly identify as LGB or T and the actors who are 
mobilized as a result of this process are a testament to the effect that visibility has on 
the ability of minority groups to assert themselves and to demand recognition from 
their societies and states. For the spread of human rights to new domestic contexts, 
visibility has its roots in both domestic and transnational sources. People become 
empowered to act because of the transnational channels that make such norms visible. 
This is particularly true for those hailing from contexts where LGBT rights are not 
part of the popular discourse. 
Empirical evidence related to the LGBT movement has substantiated the 
visibility argument, demonstrating that differences in the transnational channels of 
visibility yielded differing degrees of LGBT recognition across states and societies. 
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Since there is an asymmetry in political will and information between first mover 
states—those in which norms developed earlier—and new adopters, these 
transnational channels of visibility have become critical for the diffusion of LGBT 
norms. When activated, direct, indirect, and brokered channels can make hidden 
political issues visible. Subsequently, it is that visibility which creates the political 
resonance of international norms in domestic politics that can lead to compliance and 
gradual internalization. The extent of a state’s openness to international organizations 
and social information flows has consistently demonstrable effects on diffusion 
because it enables new ideas to enter the domestic discourse, fueling deliberation and 
learning in the domestic sphere.  
Furthermore, the degree to which domestic actors are embedded in 
transnational advocacy networks illuminates the issue and shapes the speed and 
direction of diffusion. These domestic LGBT advocates—or norm brokers—who 
connect new adopters to advocacy groups in first mover states are of central 
importance due to variability in domestic societal interpretations of new LGBT norms. 
Norm brokers make the norm salient by connecting activists and grafting international 
ideas to domestic ones, framing the message to fit locally. Not only do they 
redistribute resources and know-how across borders, they also connect with external 
elites that have the power to sanction states for noncompliance. My findings make a 
strong case for the effect that these transnational actors, and the movements they 
substantiate, have on the ability of norms to become visible and salient in the domestic 
discourse, especially when confronted with domestic resistance.  
In sum, an international norm may exist, but its felt intensity varies across 
contexts due to (in)visiblity. States differ in the degree to which norms become visible 
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depending in large part on the channels that connect the domestic sphere across 
borders. Indeed, for LGBT people in many closed and unresponsive domestic 
contexts, transnational venues provide the only real avenue for initial political 
influence at home. The transnational channels of LGBT visibility have been effective. 
Socio-political channels and the presence of local LGBT actors who are embedded in 
transnational networks have found success in making the norm visible by signaling to 
state and society that compliance with the norm is part of what it means to be a 
member of European society. These successes have occurred in the most unexpected 
of cases, as we witness a rapid, unmistakable shift in both attitudes toward and 
legislation concerning LGBT people across some parts of Europe, Latin America and 
North America.  
Building off the idea that distinctive domestic contexts and social groups attach 
different degrees of perceived threat to external norms, this dissertation has also 
examined how perceived threat moderates norm reception. Thus, the diffusion of 
international norms is often non-linear, as threat perceptions play an important role in 
the success or failure of norm internalization. Norms that are perceived as having 
originated in external contexts meet the most resistance in states where societal 
identities are rooted in nationalism. In these cases, opponents frame their reasons for 
rejecting contentious norms as based on their objectionable challenges to national 
identity. This process reveals a great deal about resistance and backlash, with such 
outcomes being most likely in contexts of ostensible threat. Paradoxically, however, 
resistance is also a source of domestic visibility. LGBT movements have, in most 
cases, bounced back from heightened opposition to find successes following waves of 
resistance.  
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Interview accounts of proponents on both sides of the LGBT issue emphasized 
the importance of visibility—of “coming out” not just as individuals but as a 
collective—to the LGBT movement’s ability to influence change. Coming out is a 
process for making the invisible visible and, in the process, cashing in on the human 
rights and dignity movement that has marked European and world politics since 1945. 
While “coming out” is often associated with the LGBT experience, it is not limited to 
that domain. Visibility has been paramount to the recognition of other movements 
mounted by subordinate groups: consider an example from recent American history, 
when undocumented immigrants used the term “coming out” to mobilize the historic 
waves of immigrant protest. While fears of deportation had long silenced them, 
immigrant rights now occupy a prominent position on the policy agenda. Women’s 
entry into the paid labor force and out of the invisibility of the home provides another 
powerful example. It is this transnational process of “coming out” as a group that 
empowers marginalized people, mobilizing actors to demand change and influencing 
the spread of norms. Studying the LGBT movement is just one way to gain traction on 
this process.  
Invisibility, by contrast, has either failed to awaken or effectively halted the 
path toward recognition for marginalized groups. We can observe a politics of 
invisibility in the “poor people’s movement” in the United States during the last 40 
years, which has moved from regulating to disciplining and finally incarcerating the 
poor and thus making the poor and their grievances largely invisible (Alexander 2012; 
Piven and Cloward 1977; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). Similarly, scholars have 
argued that the disproportionate incarceration of Hispanic and African American men 
is a strategy to make these groups less visible and ultimately to control them (Pattillo, 
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Weiman, and Western 2004). Invisibility also tells us much about the differential 
power dynamics between subgroups within minority categories (Beltrán 2010; 
Strolovitch 2007). For example, Polish Parliamentarian, Anna Grodzka, describes the 
relative invisibility that transgender people continue to face as a group, both within 
society at large and within the LGBT movement:  
… high visibility illustrates a strange paradox that we as transgender people 
experience daily. We are highly visible [physically]
237
 and yet almost invisible 
[politically] at the same time… as a social group our voice is rarely heard 
(Grodzka 2013). 
While Grodzka alludes to the high day-to-day visibility of individuals who live out 
their identity as transgender people, her emphasis is on the vast invisibility that 
transgender people experience as a group. Such invisibility had muted the group’s 
ability to assert itself politically; it is only recently that the “T” has been added to the 
acronyms of many LGBT groups.
238
 The same dynamics of invisibility characterize 
the exclusion of LGBT people of color and LGBT immigrants, who remain targets of 
discrimination and who are often disproportionately powerless. For example, the 
popular perception that Muslim immigrant communities are more homophobic than 
white majorities in several European countries has rendered LGBT immigrants largely 
invisible (Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010): if immigrants are painted as 
homophobes, there remains no space for LGBT immigrants to exist. Such processes of 
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 She elaborates: “Individually you often can't miss us. On a bus or in the street many trans people 
stand out, even if we would like to pass as a woman or a man. And because we are easy to spot, we are 
easy to bully. I have lost count of the number of times I have been shouted at in the street or felt 
threatened by unwanted attention from drunk men who think it’s funny to ridicule someone who looks 
different from the norm. Most of my trans friends report similar treatment” (Grodzka 2013). 
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 Similarly, the International Day Against Homophobia (IDAHO) only added “and Transphobia” 
(IDAHOT) in 2013. 
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invisibility have hampered the development of elements that are crucial to attaining 
rights, such as forming interpersonal relationships within societies, mobilizing actors 
for change, and establishing ties to the sympathetic elites who might help further a 
group’s cause. In the end, this dissertation has spoken to the politics of visibility and 
invisibility and how it can hasten or impede social change. 
LGBT RIGHTS AND THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF DIFFUSION 
 More recently scholars have begun to thoroughly investigate the links between 
international norms and socio-political change in world politics. Yet studies that 
theorize both state-level norm compliance and societal-level internalization remain 
rare,
239
 as are multi-method studies that explore both correlation and mechanism 
across a multitude of cases. The empirical case of LGBT norms offers a unique 
platform from which to address many of these concerns. Not only do sexual minorities 
exist in all societies, the contemporary LGBT movement provides scholars with 
observable consequences of norm diffusion that can be systematically isolated and 
analyzed. The case of LGBT norms thus offers both theoretical and empirical 
novelties that further our understanding of change in world politics.  
The empirical realities surrounding the spread of LGBT rights clearly 
challenge many of the theoretical accounts that exist in the literature. The questions I 
posed at the outset were not answered by traditional explanations for diffusion and 
social change, such as differences in international pressures, the fit between domestic 
and international norms, modernization, or low implementation costs. Although 
conventional explanations helped me to gain traction on the questions, they fell short 
of explaining the timing and patterns of diffusion I observed in the examined cases. 
  234 
For instance, scholars of international relations have argued international norms 
diffuse when they fit with domestic norms. In a review of the field, Price (2003, 593) 
provocatively asked whether  “transnational advocacy is likely to work best where it is 
needed the least.” This dissertation has shown that transnational advocacy can work 
where it is needed (see also, Evangelista 1999); despite the contentious element of the 
norm, highly surprising ‘misfits’ do change. We see this in success stories, such as 
Spain and Portugal, two religious Catholic countries that are among the world’s 
leaders on LGBT rights. Among equally secular countries where we might expect 
more rapid adoption, we observe drastically divergent outcomes—norm resistance in 
Latvia and norm internalization in the Czech Republic, for example. Other types of 
misfits involve strong democracies that have struggled to adopt basic measures to 
protect the rights of LGBT minorities, while lesser democracies have.  
Rational institutional models rooted primarily in cost-benefit logic also fail to 
explain the variation in the spread of LGBT norms. The expectation that human rights 
norms are more easily transmitted when they come with carrots, such as access to the 
bundle of economic benefits accompanying EU membership, is clearly challenged by 
the active opposition that states have levied against formal EU demands to protect 
LGBT people. In one case, Poland boldly ‘opted-out’ of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights using a contrived rationale of protecting the state from having to 
implement same-sex unions. The Charter did not require any state to recognize same-
sex unions. Finally, I did not observe the type of isomorphism around LGBT rights 
that world polity scholars would expect. While the insights of this theoretical 
framework buttress my own understanding of the phenomena I analyzed, the theory 
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itself cannot account for the extensive variation that I have charted, even in a region as 
receptive to transnationalism and norm diffusion as Europe.  
By bridging insights from different fields of knowledge, which are often 
analyzed separately, the explanation offered here addresses many of these limitations 
and develops our theoretical understanding of diffusion processes and change. The 
shortcomings of the theoretical approaches described above largely reflect the 
omission of crucial concepts and mechanisms that the visibility argument uncovers. 
Sociological accounts of the world polity, for example, fail to theorize the agency of 
norm brokers or the mechanism of deliberation. International relations approaches 
often fail to theorize both relational and non-relational channels of diffusion. 
Frequently, both of these approaches overlook the internal domestic dynamics that 
moderate norm diffusion, such as the presence of LGBT advocates as norm brokers, 
resistance, backlash, and movement-countermovement relationships. Finally, there is a 
tendency among separate academic fields to explore only compliance or 
internalization, which limits the potential of any analysis of transnational change. 
International norms concerning marginalized people are clearly intended to influence 
both state and society.   
This dissertation also makes an empirical contribution as the first systematic, 
multi-method analysis of both social and legal change concerning sexual minorities 
across multiple domestic contexts. The transnational mobilization of LGBT people 
and the development and spread of LGBT rights norms offer a unique platform from 
which to study processes of change in international relations and contentious politics, 
as it has truly “emerged at the heart of global political struggles over culture and 
identity” (Kollman and Waites 2009, 1). Despite the extensive research on 
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transnational activism and the human rights regime, however, few political scientists 
have studied the transnational LGBT movement or normative changes concerning 
sexual minorities. The existing studies on LGBT rights generally focus on a small set 
of cases using ethnographic or qualitative methodology. In cases where quantitative 
analysis has been employed, they are limited to one type of LGBT legislation or only 
explore attitudes towards homosexuality; and because their scope is too large and case 
studies are not employed, they generally sidestep the mechanisms behind the 
correlations they chart. Finally, the existing research on LGBT politics often leaves 
issues of resistance unexplored—a serious drawback, considering the contested nature 
of the norm and the backlash it commonly engenders.
240
  
Methodologically, the dissertation utilized an analytically eclectic approach, 
combining large-n quantitative analysis with in-depth qualitative analysis of key cases 
to examine the mechanisms linking the transnational diffusion of contentious norms to 
compliance and internalization. This included the analysis of three datasets: an 
original Europe-wide dataset on five different pieces of LGBT legislation, an original 
survey of the 291 transnational LGBT organizations in Europe, and an international 
survey of attitudes toward LGBT people. The qualitative chapters of this dissertation 
were based on 82 semi-structured interviews with proponents and opponents of LGBT 
rights, archival research, and close observation of LGBT and anti-LGBT movement 
activity. Moreover, this dissertation is unique because it combines state-, group- and 
individual-level analyses and compares their relative effects. Considering these levels 
of analysis in tandem with one another advances our understanding of the diffusion 
process. For example, by theorizing the way transnational diffusion is mediated 
                                                 
240
 A notable exception is the work of Tina Fetner (2008), who carefully explores the dynamic of 
  237 
through attitudes of individuals organized in social groups, comparing that mediation 
to other mechanisms that scholars have identified (e.g., geographic distance or 
political sanction), and measuring the relative impact of such mechanisms. While the 
field has taken great strides in calling for multi-method research designs that explore 
both “why” and “how,” the application of designs that take both variables and 
mechanisms seriously is still relatively rare.  
Having considered the contributions that this dissertation has sought to make, 
let us now turn to the various components of its central argument and its broader 
implications for scholarship in international relations, contentious politics, and 
comparative politics. Thereafter, I will explore the application of the argument beyond 
the European context and address several questions—both explicit and implicit—that 
the dissertation raises. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE VISIBILITY ARGUMENT 
Taken together, the dissertation’s empirical chapters drive the core visibility 
argument, and its various nuances, across a set of cases. They explore variation in the 
presence of transnational channels (supply; Chapters 2-4), domestic resonance 
(demand; Chapter 5), and the mechanisms of norm brokerage, learning, framing, and 
deliberation (for and against the spread of LGBT rights; Chapters 2 and 5) that allow 
the transnational and domestic levels to intersect for successful diffusion. Not only do 
the findings chart the empirical developments related to the LGBT movement in 
Europe, they also have far-reaching implications for theory building related to key 
concepts in the field. This section reflects on fundamental aspects of the argument as 
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they relate to Europeanization political opportunities, transnational actors, diffusion, 
state compliance, societal internalization, threat perceptions, and domestic resonance.  
Cooperative Transnationalism: Political Opportunities and Transnational Actors  
Chapter 2 explored how Europeanization impacts the mobilization of 
marginalized citizens. It shows how LGBT activism relies on transnational 
resources—primarily, social spaces and organizational capacity, which are scarce in 
many member-states but readily available in others—to mobilize. Cross-border 
mobility in Europe has largely given sexual minorities access to LGBT life in external 
contexts. Though LGBT expression and identity are rooted in distinct domestic 
experiences, some LGBT experiences travel. Horizontal opportunities among states, 
alongside top-down, vertical ones provided by Brussels, served as mobilizing 
structures that united distinct groups of transnational actors, mediating new 
transnational channels of visibility for LGBT rights. The key actors involved include 
the political elites often seen in studies of Europeanization, but also the rooted 
cosmopolitans and foreign publics that work with and engage local actors in target 
states. Horizontal opportunities are especially critical for fueling non-institutionalized 
and high-visibility activism that result in deliberation and learning in the target state.  
There are several reasons why these claims apply to LGBT norm brokers. 
When domestic organizations join transnational LGBT networks, they become 
connected to actors in states with advanced resources. These networks are crucial, 
because they aid domestic organizations; channeling know-how, financial resources, 
avenues for political pressure, a voice with which to attract media attention, and 
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foreign publics that can be mobilized for action in various contexts.
241
 Marginalized 
groups have established ties to first mover contexts, and such transnational 
cooperation can open access to political opportunities outside of the nation state. The 
horizontal ties established by norm brokers are a theoretically neglected but 
empirically critical aspect of Europeanization in contemporary politics.  
In addition to exploring the Europeanization of opportunities and actors, the 
chapter used interview accounts to explore the mechanisms by which transnational 
cooperation can influence outcomes. Transnational cooperation alters the tactics that 
transnational actors use when they engage authorities and society in the target state. In 
the case of Europe, norm brokers tactically framed their demands by fusing the issue 
of LGBT acceptance with the democratic responsibilities associated with membership 
in the European polity. Strategically packaging ideas for a given audience was 
imperative when taking into consideration the strongly held views in opposition to the 
LGBT norm. Having “European” frames at their disposal, norm brokers could borrow 
from international scripts and graft this highly contentious norm to the domestic 
context.  
As this analysis has shown, Poland provides an illustrative case in which to 
observe change. It has rapidly attained a high-level of fluency on LGBT issues, despite 
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 A recent example from Romania exhibits all of these trends, with norm brokers drawing 
international attention to LGBT discrimination, framing their opposition in a European discourse, and 
taking political action. In 2010, the ACCEPT Association, a transnationally-linked Romanian LGBT 
organization, brought a case against George Becali to the European Court of Justice (Berbec-Rostas 
2013). Becali, a Romanian politician and owner of a soccer club, had made public statements opposing 
the transfer and employment of a rumored gay soccer player in his club. The Court’s ruling in favor of 
ACCEPT, placed Romania’s implementation of the EU’s anti-discrimination directive under scrutiny 
and has already had far-reaching implications. It placed LGBT rights on the agenda of the Romanian 
equality body and encouraged proposed amendments to the anti-discrimination act. The prominence of 
Becali’s figure has also spurred a societal discourse, with LGBT advocates hammering home a central 
message: “homophobia has no place in sports, has no place in employment, and has no place in a 
European state” (Berbec-Rostas 2013; emphasis added). 
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the fact that domestic political opportunities were closed and the LGBT issue had 
minimal popular visibility at the turn of the century. According to the president of the 
Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH), even the Polish language signaled that 
invisibility: “My first activity with KPH in Krakow was producing a leaflet and 
distributing it in the main square. I realized only later that MSWord in Polish didn’t 
recognize the word ‘homophobia’ and auto-translated it incorrectly on every leaflet” 
(interview no. 140). The situation has changed remarkably in the ten years since 
transnational activism began to flourish, and increased visibility fomented deliberation 
in the domestic context. Similar dynamics play out across the region, as the LGBT 
issue moved from invisibility to visibility in some states. The way in which such 
change has emerged relies, in large part, on the activation of transnational channels.  
In February 2013, a young organization of Balkan activists called Kampange 
Solidarnost hosted a meeting at the SchwuZ,
242
 one of Berlin’s social spaces that 
Polish activists had plastered with flyers calling for mobilization in Poland in 2005 
(group no. 210). Like their Polish counterparts before them, the activists of Solidarnost 
gathered sympathetic ears to draw attention to the situation of LGBT people in the 
Balkans and to discuss how to move forward after the violent repression of the 2012 
Belgrade Pride event. Solidarnost is one of many examples of a cooperative 
transnationalism that has helped to unite disparate actors and to facilitate a movement 
that thinks outside of national and geographic boundaries.  
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 Short for SchwulenZentrum, or Gay Center, was founded in 1977. It grew out of an initiative to 
create a meeting place for communication by the Homosexuelle Aktion West-Berlin (HAW)—an 
organization symbolic of the birth of the German gay liberation movement in 1971. 
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Interpersonal Relationships 
In addition to signaling to the states that accepting LGBT norms is associated 
with part of their membership in the international society, the visibility of LGBT 
people leads to the fundamentally important role of interpersonal relationships 
between societies and LGBT minorities.
243
 While these relationships vary 
tremendously across states—for example, 3% of Romanians report having 
interpersonal contact with LGBT people compared to 69% of the Dutch (Council of 
Europe 2011)—transnational processes can help such ties form, both relationally and 
non-relationally. First, they connect sexual minorities across borders. These include 
the rooted cosmopolitans who mobilize and organize in foreign contexts and return 
home to demand change. They also include LGBT people who are mobilized in 
solidarity to march in foreign contexts. For example, at the EuroPride in Warsaw, 
“visitors from abroad said they’d come specifically because they’d heard the situation 
for gays in Poland was bad. ‘I wouldn’t go on a gay pride march in Brussels,’ said [an 
attendee] from Belgium” (Cragg 2010). Second, international norms dispense ideas 
and images about novel identities that give people models to invoke when they come 
out in their own respective contexts. A member of Lambda Warsaw described a 
situation in Poland that echoes what representatives of LGBT organizations across 
many new adopter states expressed in interviews:  
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 Individual level surveys have shown that knowing LGBT people has a tremendous effect on the 
political landscape for LGBT in the nation state: “It is quite stunning how potent an influence diversity 
in one’s social circle is upon attitudes to minorities… When rating out of 10 how comfortable (with 10 
being completely comfortable) they would feel with an LGBT person attaining the highest elected 
office the land, those with LGBT friends gave an average rating of 8.5, while those without gave an 
average rating of 5.5—a significantly lower rating. This sort of finding is now consistent across three 
waves of this Eurobarometer study and is, no doubt, going to continue being so” (European 
Commission, Special Eurobarometer 317, “Discrimination in the EU”, 2009, p. 119). 
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Polish homosexuals live hidden and in fear. Our organization, however, wants 
our presence recognized in society, that we are here, we are sending a signal to 
gays and lesbians: you are visible and get used to it. It is the end of silence, the 
end of hiding in the closet (Voxerbrant 2004, cited in Kubica 2009, 136–137). 
Third, heterosexual majorities who observe and experience different forms of 
acceptable sexual expression are also influenced by the visibility of LGBT people. The 
American ambassador to Albania, Alexander Arvizu, describes the importance of 
visibility for LGBT acceptance and how international involvement can be most 
effective in its role as a facilitator (as opposed to a sanctioning role):   
Change in Albania, I believe, will come when families and friends are able to 
put faces to the term ‘LGBT.’ I am always impressed at how people’s 
impression of LGBT individuals changes, when they have an opportunity to 
get to know them, when they discover a good friend is gay or lesbian, or when 
they work with them. LGBT individuals in Albania are their own best 
ambassadors. We are looking merely for ways to support them and their 
message of tolerance (Pinderi 2013). 
The visibility of norms governing LGBT rights provides the foundation for the 
interpersonal relationships that psychological and sociological studies have found to 
play an important role in tolerance for LGBT people. 
Compliance and Internalization: Socialization in International Relations 
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated the universality of these processes by 
examining the effect that transnational channels have on legal and social change in 
cross-national statistical analyses. Beyond brokered channels, these chapters also 
tested the effects of other relational and non-relational channels—namely, political, 
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social, economic, geographic, and shared identification. Exploring the dynamics of 
socio-legal change for LGBT people across states, these chapters demonstrated that, 
when activated, a set of transnational channels fosters the visibility of international 
norms that can lead to compliance and eventual internalization in domestic politics. 
Some channels, however, are more effective than others, which should influence how 
we think about processes of compliance and internalization more broadly.  
Throughout, the channels most effective in influencing change are those that 
function through mechanisms of socialization. Sanctioning mechanisms for change are 
also active, but their effects are generally more limited. In the case of LGBT rights, 
the latter are only strongly influential before accession; and they can spawn resistance 
and signify paternalism in domestic contexts where they find little resonance. By 
contrast, the social channels connecting transnational and domestic spheres are highly 
effective throughout the periods analyzed here. They empower local minority actors 
with legitimacy and resources (both discursive, human, and material). While activists 
note that “the influence of the EU is huge” (interview no. 138), they emphasize that it 
is transmitted through the social mechanisms of learning and deliberation. It also 
occurs indirectly via aid to domestic and transnational civil society. “What you get 
with the EU is dialogue,” a dialogue that is new in many of the contexts analyzed in 
this study (interview no. 126).   
Specifically, Chapter 3 suggested that more porous states were more likely to 
adopt pro-LGBT legislation and also pointed to different processes of norm diffusion 
to first mover and to new adopter states. The findings demonstrated that first mover 
states relied less on transnational channels for adopting pro-LGBT legislation than did 
new adopter states. While only social transnational channels also had a strong effect in 
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first mover states, the domestic variables of democracy level and economic affluence 
were robust predictors of adopting pro-LGBT legislation there. For the diffusion of 
LGBT legislation to new adopter states, all transnational channels were beneficial to 
diffusion, while the domestic variables of religion, modernization, and level of 
democracy were not. The brokered ties between norm entrepreneurs were also 
particularly influential in the new adopter states.  
More broadly, authorities—especially in new adopter states—seem to be 
attracted to internationally visible issues, even if the domestic debate concerning the 
LGBT rights norm remains unresolved. States care about their image on the world 
stage and are likely to make changes when their international society encourages them 
to do so. Since President Obama first expressed his support for same-sex marriage in 
2012, for example, five countries
244
 have passed such legislation. For better or for 
worse, the visibility of the marriage issue has brought it to the fore of the political 
agenda, even in countries where LGBT movements did not include same-sex marriage 
among their top priorities. In sum, Chapter 3 showed that the visibility of LGBT 
people—even in external contexts—can translate into political salience that state 
authorities respond to in new adopting states. 
Like state compliance with pro-LGBT laws, the results also suggest that the 
societal internalization of norms governing LGBT rights is largely rooted in a process 
of transnational socialization. For example, a 2012 survey in Ireland—another 
Catholic country with a legacy of intense opposition to LGBT rights—indicated that 
75 percent of Irish citizens said that they would vote “yes” on a referendum to legalize 
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 The five countries are Denmark, Brazil, Uruguay, France, and New Zealand. Nepal, Luxembourg, 
England, Whales, and Scotland have legislation in progress.  
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same-sex marriage (Kennedy 2013). Of those supporters, most used an international 
frame of reputation followed by a more general will to promote tolerance:  
…two out of three people said they felt Ireland’s reputation as a modern 
society will be strengthened by allowing same-sex couples to have civil 
marriages, while three out of five people agree that allowing same-sex couples 
to have civil marriages will promote a more tolerant environment in Ireland 
(Kennedy 2013, emphasis added). 
The findings in Chapter 4 supported these ideas. Evidence showed that societal 
majorities are aware of and respond to international cues of appropriateness 
concerning norms on minority rights. The channels of visibility that tie porous states 
to the international community explained much of the variation in changed societal 
attitudes toward gay and lesbian people. They also help to fuel processes of societal 
deliberation and learning in the domestic realm. According to the results of the 
statistical models presented in this chapter, roughly 70 percent of the variation is 
explained by these macro-level factors, as opposed to individual-level variation. 
However, transnational visibility influences various social groups differently. The 
chapter highlighted the important manner in which threat perceptions can hinder 
processes of norm internalization. Individuals embedded in groups that socialize them 
to perceive the norm as threatening—based on the logic that it challenges their 
religious and national identities—are consistently more reluctant to adopt favorable 
attitudes toward homosexuality. Among these “high threat perception” groups, change 
is more gradual, and increased transnational channels can lead to a phase of worsening 
attitudes toward homosexuals. In these times of heightened international visibility of 
LGBT people, we should expect more positive attitudes among societies in states that 
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are most closely tied to the international community. That said, we should see 
variation in the degree to which individuals will change their positions, based on the 
levels of perceived threat that their social groups ascribe to the norm.  
Finally, a practical implication of the visibility argument is that laws like the 
proposed anti-gay propaganda law in Russia are an impediment to diffusion because 
they criminalize visibility, blocking both deliberation and learning. As an ILGA 
activist notes: “it’s about being open about speaking, and that’s why exactly these 
laws in Moldova, Ukraine and Russia are very dangerous because they would prevent 
the debate” (“Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania Anti-gay Criticism” 2012). Furthermore, if 
visibility matters for change and acceptance, then activism that targets the public 
sphere—like pride parades—should also be supported by proponents of LGBT rights, 
even when they initially produce a societal backlash. Proponents of LGBT rights 
should proceed carefully so as not to over-institutionalize LGBT activism and to, thus, 
avoid removing the issue from public debate.   
Threat Perceptions and Domestic Resistance 
The visibility argument required that I establish systematic differences between 
the degree of transnational channels—both relational and non-relational—and the 
diffusion of norms governing LGBT rights, which I demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The analysis also showed that states differ from one another in terms of their own 
internal responses to LGBT norms. Chapter 5 addressed and expanded upon this issue 
by exploring differences in threat perception across two contexts. In doing so, I 
explored the different domestic political dynamics that occur in reaction to new norms. 
There, I argued that transnational channels, even when they are strong, are moderated 
by differing perceptions of threat—which in the LGBT case is at the intersection of 
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national identity and religion—that produce different responses to international norms. 
Norms come to be perceived as more “external” in some cases, rather than in others. 
Using Poland and Slovenia as case studies, I compared differences in socio-legal 
outcomes for LGBT people and mobilized resistance against LGBT norms. I found 
that when religion is deeply rooted in national identity, resistance to outside norms is 
heightened. The history of the Catholic Church in Poland—including its close ties to 
the political apparatus of the state and its role in Polish democratization—have given 
the Church’s opposition much currency in Poland. In Slovenia, the Church is not 
closely linked to the popular nation and, thus, lacked the legitimacy to effectively 
reject LGBT norms.  
Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 5 showed that domestic resistance to 
LGBT norms is an instigator of issue visibility and the political salience of norms. 
Resistance movements can ironically support the visibility of LGBT norms by fueling 
active deliberation in the domestic realm. As this deliberation begins, anti-LGBT 
movements have two critical handicaps when compared to their LGBT movement 
counterparts. First, resistance movements generally include a broad spectrum of 
societal actors, including ones violent in their approach. Second, the agendas of 
resistance movements are rooted in a nationalist philosophy that generally precludes 
any desire to establish transnational ties. Many members of the anti-LGBT resistance 
willingly dismiss the cross-border vertical and horizontal constellations that have done 
so much for channeling support and framing the arguments of LGBT movements.   
In sum, these findings not only substantiate the importance of visibility for the 
spread of LGBT rights, they also highlight the often non-linear nature of policy 
change, which many studies of diffusion neglect. By looking at processes within the 
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state, I found additional evidence that the development of state and societal responses 
to international norms governing LGBT rights depended on levels of the norm’s 
visibility and on the nature of domestic perceptions of threat associated with the norm. 
The findings should, thus, encourage scholars of diffusion to attend to the internal 
domestic dynamics of the state: the norm brokers that tie the domestic and the 
transnational context, the differing levels of threat perception (defined in part by the 
unique relationships between the church, the state, and the nation), and the varying 
degrees of resistance in domestic realms and their relationships to the LGBT 
movement. The analogy of diffusion—from the field of biology—is problematic 
because it assumes that molecules diffuse into an empty space.
245
 For political 
scientists and sociologists, “empty spaces” do not exist in our objects of study, 
certainly not for the diffusion of contentious norms.  
MOVING FORWARD 
Beyond “Europe”: The Regional and Global Dynamics of Norm Diffusion  
In describing and explaining norm diffusion, the findings related here have 
been primarily rooted in the European experience. I chose to conduct this study in 
Europe because it provides the ideal scope conditions for exploring broadly applicable 
causal relationships and associated mechanisms. As such, I hope that Europe offers a 
solid foundation for understanding more general processes as opposed to obscuring 
them. With the spread of various types of LGBT rights and increasingly evolved 
societal attitudes, we observe some similar dynamics at play across some parts of the 
globe. For example, since Denmark introduced same-sex civil unions in 1989, more 
than twenty states have followed suit. Furthermore, eleven countries now recognize 
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same-sex marriage at the federal level.
246
 Perhaps most impressively, Latin America 
has made rapid and pronounced changes on several forms of LGBT rights in recent 
years (Kohut 2013). In this case, Friedman (2012) has demonstrated the successful 
role that Spanish LGBT actors have played—particularly, in Argentina—spreading 
ideas about how to promote LGBT rights and how to obtain the resources necessary to 
do it. She also taps into the dynamics of network ties and diffusion (between first 
movers and new adopters).  
Any space devoted to considering avenues for future research, however, should 
reflect on parts of the argument that should remain limited to Europe, as well as those 
that might travel elsewhere. Uganda and Russia represent two cases that have attracted 
scholarly attention for reasons of a different dynamic—a heightened level of political 
homophobia via diffusion. I will turn to these difficult cases to discuss aspects of the 
visibility argument that hold in these contexts and to examine the issues they introduce 
which may lead to avenues for further study.  
Uganda. The events surrounding Uganda’s “Kill the Gays Bill” and the 
murder of David Kato, a Ugandan LGBT activist, have placed Africa—and Uganda in 
particular—on the radar of LGBT activism and scholarship, most of which follows a 
narrative about the export of political homophobia. Scholars are correct to highlight 
what they see as a double-edged sword of diffusion: transnational homophobia is used 
to inhibit progress on LGBT rights even as some other parts of the globe experience 
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 Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South 
Africa, and Sweden. Furthermore, in Brazil, Mexico, and the United States, some sub-national 
jurisdictions afford same-sex couples marriage rights. In Asia, some commentators expect that Vietnam 
may have the support of enough delegates to introduce same-sex marriage to the legislative agenda in 
2014 (Maresca 2013). Some have attributed Vietnam’s receptiveness to LGBT norms—despite its 
generally poor human rights record—to the presence of established LGBT activist organizations and the 
muted influence of religion in Vietnamese politics (Maresca 2013).  
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one of the most rapid shifts toward the social and legal recognition of LGBT 
minorities in history.  
Africa is distinct from Europe in that regional structures do not have a 
normative consensus on LGBT rights. The African Union institutions do not moderate 
this domestic debate the way that the European Union does. There is also a rational, 
historically rooted suspicion related to adopting “Western” ways of doing things. This 
provides the conservative opposition with strong ammunition with which to resist 
LGBT norms (even if the LGBT movement, itself, has a long history as a grassroots 
movement that has worked without the support of—and often in opposition to—
powerful states of the Global North). While opposition to European norms highlights 
national frames invoked by the opposition in Europe, in Africa opposing forces also 
draw upon pan-regional frames that denounce meddling in African affairs. These are 
critical factors that dispel the unfounded notion that domestic politics are reactionary 
while transnational politics are progressive. Furthermore, they highlight the caution 
we must take in describing “global” successes of LGBT rights. 
I suspect this dissertation has yielded important findings that contribute to the 
debate in contexts extending beyond Europe, including Africa. First, transnational 
diffusion—be it linked to homophobia or to LGBT norms—has strong transnational 
and domestic components. It is clear that the domestic developments made in these 
contexts cannot be separated from transnational processes. Just as scholars are correct 
to attribute the politicization of homophobia in Uganda to heightened transnational 
involvement by American conservatives (transnational), they would be wrong to 
ignore the numerous domestic roots of Ugandan homophobia. Second, a fundamental 
and overlooked reason why Uganda has captured scholarly and popular attention is 
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that channels tie an active and engaged Ugandan LGBT activist community to a 
transnational network of pro-LGBT groups. Mirroring the reasons why Poland became 
exemplar of LGBT oppression in Europe, despite the fact that other cases score 
equally poorly on measures of LGBT recognition, Ugandan norm brokers are well 
connected across borders. These actors may be equally—if not more—responsible for 
the issue’s visibility than are the American missionaries who involve themselves in 
Ugandan politics. Like their European counterparts, Ugandan and transnational LGBT 
activists (norm brokers) captured the world’s attention by publicizing the issue; 
however, scholarly and popular debates often overlook their agency and efficacy. 
Despite domestic repression, LGBT Ugandans are marching on the streets more than 
they did before (Okeowo 2012) and the “Kill the Gays Bill” was put on ice in part due 
to strong reprimands from various transnational actors, including the European 
Commission and Parliament. On the ground, observers note that “the dynamics of 
being gay in Uganda have changed” (Okeowo 2012). African LGBT politics highlight 
strong regional differences to Europe, yet they are similar in that a combination of 
domestic and transnational currents factor into new discourses on LGBT rights.  
Russia. Russia is a case marred by low LGBT visibility—only 11% of 
Russians claim to have homosexual friends or relatives (“87% of Russians Oppose 
Same Sex Marriage and Gay Parades” 2013)—and high threat perception regarding 
LGBT norms. Like the tie between the Catholic Church and the notion of “Polishness” 
that heightened threat perception in Poland, “Russians today view [Orthodox] Church 
affiliation as a way to reaffirm their ‘Russianness’” (Khazan 2013). While rates of 
religiosity are strikingly low in global comparison, Russians “are still incredibly 
supportive of the Orthodox Church, which wields power both politically, as an ally of 
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the Putin government, and as a symbol of national pride in much of the population” 
(Khazan 2013). In 2006, 60% of Russians claimed to be “nationalists” (Rees 2013). 
Russia differs from Poland in that transnational pressures have not wielded the 
same level of political success during its era of zealous, anti-LGBT backlash. In June 
2013, the Russian Duma unanimously passed an anti-gay propaganda bill, which fines 
individuals or organizations up to $31,000 for promoting homosexuality (Khazan 
2013). The federal legislation is an extension of various city ordinances banning 
LGBT “propaganda,” which aroused ample international attention in 2012. Yet the 
Russian government remains undaunted by international efforts, even sending 
provocative threats to France and the United Kingdom, “warning that both countries’ 
equal marriage plans will hinder the ability of their citizens to adopt Russian children” 
(Rees 2013). At the societal level, recent polls show similarly disapproving positions 
on LGBT people. For example, “16% of respondents thought that gay people should 
be isolated from society, 22% thought there should be compulsory treatment for them 
and 5% thought that homosexuals should be ‘liquidated’” (“87% of Russians Oppose 
Same Sex Marriage and Gay Parades” 2013). In terms of legal rights and public 
assembly, “85% of Russians opposed same-sex marriage, 80% felt same-sex couples 
should not be granted adoption rights and 87% said they did not want gay pride 
parades to take place in Russian cities,” (“87% of Russians Oppose Same Sex 
Marriage and Gay Parades” 2013; Sansalone 2013). 
The response is partly unsurprising in the sense that resistance is common 
when LGBT issues are new. The more states perceive these issues to be “external,” the 
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more resistance they will provoke.
247
 Resistance does not suggest, however, that 
change is unattainable. Instead, it is part of the process of internalization, which 
involves deliberation and learning. Nevertheless key differences remain between the 
cases of Russia and those within the EU. While LGBT activists are well connected to 
their European counterparts—one of the few established channels of LGBT 
visibility—they have not had at their disposal in-group frames of being “European.” I 
suspect that Russia’s political isolation from first mover norm entrepreneurs has 
greatly limited the socialization mechanisms of norm diffusion. International 
condemnation and worldwide demonstrations against homophobia in Russia have had 
no effect (group no. 208).
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 While Russian activists—who the state has formally 
labeled “foreign agents”249—remain optimistic that this form of defiant visibility is 
better than silence, they have had far greater difficulty combating domestic resistance 
amidst a protracted opposition. These happenings in Russia underscore the importance 
of regional differences and the limits of globalization, highlighting the argument that 
being in an in-group is immensely important to the spread of such norms (Checkel 
2005; Deutsch 1957).
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How transnational channels play out in other world regions should perplex and 
fascinate scholars of world politics for years to come, as norms governing LGBT 
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in all modern societies have, at one point, deemed these issues to be threating to the moral and/or 
national order. 
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 A key example is the case Russian activists filed, following Bączkowski and Others vs. Poland, to 
win their European Court of Human Rights case. While Strasbourg reined in Poland’s bans on LGBT 
assembly, in Russia St. Petersburg quickly introduced gay-propaganda bans, and the city of Moscow 
banned LGBT parades for precisely one century. 
249
 In 2013, a St. Petersburg court formally referred to the Russian LGBT Organizations, “Выход,” as a 
foreign agent (“Суд Петербурга Признал ЛГБТ-организацию Иностранным Агентом” 2013) 
[article translated by colleague]. 
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 Hypothetically and retrospectively, the inclusion of Russia in NATO by Western powers in the 
1990s may have paved a different path for LGBT recognition later. 
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rights continue to spread and to meet resistance in various corners of the globe. The 
current happenings in cases like Uganda and Russia hold implications for future 
research, which needs to explore the effects of anti-gay transnational activism, 
acknowledging that standards of appropriate behavior concerning sexual minorities 
smack of outside imposition to some and welcome modernity to others. It also seems 
quite clear that strong regional currents are at play and that we should not expect any 
type of global homogenization of LGBT recognition. In this sense, a central task for 
future study to explore is how distinct regions—their institutional structures, domestic 
understandings and political histories—mediate the effects of transnational channels of 
visibility. Other questions related to the global frames for LGBT recognition arise. 
What is the effect of LGBT activists’ approach to framing the debate on the global 
level—for example, having Latin American states propose pro-LGBT resolutions at 
the United Nations to remove the “Western” tinge of LGBT rights? How do activists 
navigate this in contexts in which “Western” norms are especially suspicious and 
alternative frames for activists are few? Finally, what types of risks does visibility 
entail in contexts that have high threat domestically and that lack identification with 
international communities of first mover states? I suspect that states must be 
embedded in international systems of knowledge that support LGBT norms for 
visibility to lead to positive outcomes for norm diffusion. The level of consensus at the 
macro-level should impact how deliberation in the domestic realm proceeds. For the 
spread of LGBT rights, it is important that states are part of a larger community in 
which the issue is championed.  
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This dissertation also provides a point of departure for another area of study: 
investigating the relative (in)visibility of subgroups within the LGBT categories and, 
more generally, the question of who is left out in the transnational diffusion of LGBT 
norms. Theorists (Binnie 2004; Kulpa and Mizielińska 2011; Puar 2007) have begun 
tackling these questions: Are certain countries (e.g., Poland), religions (e.g., Islam), 
and groups (e.g., immigrants) “othered” and excluded as LGBT identities become 
recognized—and arguably “normalized”—by states? Do more radical queer forms of 
expression also diffuse or are they precluded from transnational debates and identity 
categories that travel across borders? These questions will be important for theory 
building in international relations and contentious politics alike.  
 
In this dissertation, I have attempted to broaden the scope of research in 
international and contentious politics by looking closely at an often-invisible group 
and its transnational interactions. In doing so, I hoped this study might extend and 
integrate existing scholarly agendas, while also yielding important implications for the 
contemporary expansion of LGBT rights. All societies include a sizeable population of 
sexual minorities, and the study of their recognition has powerful analytical and 
practical implications. For a movement that has gained considerable momentum in the 
last decade—arguably unprecedented in speed and suddenness, when compared to 
other human rights movements—this study offers a timely contribution to debates both 
scholarly and popular.  
Several of these scholarly and popular accounts have examined recent global 
trends with awe. Was Victor Hugo right in the nineteenth century when he said 
“[n]othing can stop an idea whose time has come”? And, what does the LGBT 
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movement tell us about Cesar Chavez’s optimism for the civil rights movement: 
“Once social change begins, it cannot be reversed.... You cannot humiliate the person 
who feels pride. You cannot oppress the people who are not afraid anymore.” At this 
historical moment for LGBT rights, these remarks ring true for some sexual minorities 
in some contexts. Looking at the world around us, it might be difficult not to end on a 
note of modest optimism, but I wish to emphasize that such modest optimism should 
not overshadow the persistent oppression of LGBT peoples across societies, the 
resistance and threat provoked by LGBT norms, and the limits of transnational 
advocacy in many corners of the globe. What sets this dissertation apart from the 
discussions above is its hope for a holistic understanding of how and why this 
phenomenon may occur and its acknowledgment that it does not always occur.  
What do the findings of this dissertation suggest for the more general trends of 
LGBT norm diffusion across certain segments of the globe? By way of a linear 
trajectory and specific timeframe, very little. Instead, we know that visibility can 
provoke both recognition and resistance; in many cases resistance follows visibility 
and precedes recognition. Yet, while the process will play out differently across 
contexts—with smooth processes of norm internalization most likely in contexts with 
low threat perception—there is little question that the state and social recognition of 
LGBT people will continue to spread in some world regions. And when it spreads, it 
will extend first to contexts within which norm brokers are active and to places that 
are highly connected to the international community through channels of visibility.   
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
Figures 
Figure 1.6. Variation in Attitudes towards Homosexuality between New and Old EU-Member 
States 
 
Figure 1.7. Variation in Objections towards Homosexual Neighbors between New and Old EU 
States 
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Survey Details 
 
Administered October to December 2011. 
 
One survey sent to each of the 291 transnationally linked LGBT member 
organizations of European LGBT organizations.  
 
The universe of organizations and contact information of organization president or 
next highest representative obtained from archival fieldwork at ILGA International 
and IGLYO, then cross-checked with the online archives of ILGA-Europe.  
 
Survey Questions  
 
1. How many paid employees work for your organization? 
 
[Select: 0-99] 
 
2. How many volunteers work for your organization?   
 
[Select: 0-100] 
 
3. In your opinion, how much influence do European-level institutions – that is, 
institutions like the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European 
Court of Justice, or the European Court of Human Rights – have on your country’s 
politics and policies related to the rights of sexual minorities? (Question adapted from 
O’Dwyer 2010)251 
 
3 - A lot of influence  
2 - Some influence 
1 - Not much influence 
9 - No answer or don’t know 
 
4. In your opinion, how much influence do European-level institutions – that is, 
institutions like the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European 
Court of Justice, or the European Court of Human Rights – have on what people in 
your country think about the rights of sexual minorities?   
 
3 - A lot of influence  
2 - Some influence 
1 - Not much influence 
9 - No answer or don’t know 
 
5. Do you recall approximately when newspapers and other mass media started to 
cover stories related to the question of sexual minority rights?  
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 This question is adapted from a question formulated by O’Dwyer (2010, 236–237), and used in his 
survey (N=28) of Polish activists and politicians. 
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[Survey had sliding bar with years marked 1950 – 2010] 
9 - No answer, not applicable, or don’t know 
 
6. In your opinion, what best explains why these stories started to be covered at that 
time? 
 
a - EU Pressures or EU Accession 
b - Other International Pressures 
c - Domestic Activism 
d - National legislation dealing with LGBT issues 
e - Other [space for free recall] 
9 - No answer or don’t know 
 
7. In your opinion, what has been the effect of your country introducing legislation 
that strengthens the rights and protection of sexual minorities? 
 
4 - Substantial improvement in peoples’ attitudes toward LGBT peoples 
3 - Some improvement in peoples’ attitudes toward LGBT peoples 
2 - No change in peoples’ attitudes toward LGBT people 
1 - Worsened peoples’ attitudes toward LGBT people 
9 - No answer or don’t know 
 
8. Please briefly comment on your perception of the process of change in societal 
attitudes toward LGBT individuals.  For example, did attitudes improve/worsen 
immediately after LGBT issues became visible?  Or did improved attitudes follow an 
initial backlash in attitudes when the issue was first introduced?  
 
[Comment box for text] 
 
9. In your opinion, how does the rate of social and political change that has occurred 
in your country over the last 20 years compare to that of neighboring European 
countries?   
 
[Comment box for text] 
 
10. In your opinion, how well defined is the LGBT movement in your country, in 
terms of its organization and the clarity of its goals? (Question adapted from O’Dwyer 
2010)
252
 
 
3 - Well defined movement with clear, shared goals 
2 - Somewhat defined with some goals, but little consensus about them 
1 - Not very well defined and no clear goals 
9 - No answer or don’t know 
 
                                                 
252
 This question is adapted from a question formulated by O’Dwyer (2010, 236–237), and used in his 
survey (N=28) of Polish activists and politicians. 
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11. How closely does your organization cooperate with other L,G,B and/or T 
organizations in your country? 
 
4 - Very close cooperation and shared goals 
3 - Some cooperation 
2 - No active cooperation 
1 - Disputes among organizations and contradictory goals 
9 - No answer or don’t know 
 
12. On average in the last five years, what has been your organization’s approximate 
annual budget in Euros (please include grant money in your estimation)? 
 
1 - Under 5,000  
2 - 5,001-15,000 
3 - 15,001-30,000 
4 - 30,001-50,000 
5 - 50,001-100,000 
6 - 100,001-200,000 
7 - 200,001-300,000 
8 - 300,001-500,000 
9 - 500,001-1,000,000 
10 - Over 1,000,000 
No answer or don’t know 
 
13. What percentage of your funding comes from international/foreign sources? (For 
example, from international organizations, the governments of other countries or 
foreign civil society organizations.) What percentage comes from domestic sources? 
(For example, from the national government or domestic civil society organizations.) 
 
[Sliding bars for (1) International/Foreign Funding Sources and (2) Domestic Funding 
Sources.  For example, if the respondent attributes 60% of funding to foreign sources, 
the survey software will automatically attribute the remaining percentage (40%) to the 
domestic funding source bar.] 
 
14. Please name the top 5 organizations/institutions/states that provide funding for 
your organization: 
 
[Five spaces for free recall] 
 
15. What percentage of your organization’s activities involves cooperation with 
international organizations? 
 
[Sliding bar ranging from 0 to 100%] 
 
16. Please name the top 5 foreign civil society organizations with which you work 
most closely, in order from 1 (most) to 5.  
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[Five spaces for free recall] 
 
17. What five groups would you say provide the strongest domestic opposition the 
LGBT movement in your country?  Please indicate whether any of the groups are 
religious or nationalist organizations as well as your perception of how well organized 
they are. 
 
(For example, a domestic organization the organizations counter demonstrations at 
pride parades.) 
 
[Five spaces for free recall] 
[Following each space, respondents could select from a list of the organization’s 
motivations and attributes: “Motivation of the Organization (check all that apply): 
Religious, Nationalist, Other” and “Organization Attributes (check all that apply): 
Well Organized, High Membership, Well Funded, Successful”] 
 
18. Are there any foreign opposition groups to the LGBT movement active in your 
country? If so, which would you say provide the strongest source of foreign 
opposition? Please indicate whether they are religious or nationalist organizations as 
well as your perception of how well organized they are. 
 
(For example, the financial support from an American Evangelical group to Polish 
organizations that disseminate school pamphlets linking homosexuality to paedophilia 
would qualify as a foreign opposition group.) 
 
[Five spaces for free recall] 
[Following each space, respondents could select from a list of the organization’s 
motivations and attributes: “Motivation of the Organization (check all that apply): 
Religious, Nationalist, Other” and “Organization Attributes (check all that apply): 
Well Organized, High Membership, Well Funded, Successful”] 
 
19. In your opinion, to what degree are opposition groups (domestic and foreign) 
mobilized in your country? 
 
3 - Strong, well organized  
2 - Somewhat organized  
1 - Weak, unorganized  
9 - No answer or don’t know 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Image 2.1. German and Polish Flags Encircled by the EU Stars: “Gay Solidarity [in Polish]” 
 
Note: Picture taken by author at Berlin’s Christopher Street Day Parade, June 27, 2009 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Discrepancies Among Legislation Data Coding Sources and National Organization 
Cross-Check Source 
 
1. Finland: For the time being there is no cohabitation in Finland (source: SETA). 
 
2. Iceland: Confirmed cohabitation was introduced in Iceland in 1996 (see website 
of samtokin78.is, National Queer Organization). 
 
3. Greece: Law 3769/2009 prohibits any discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation in goods and services in Greece. Same-sex sexual relationships have been 
legal since 1950 (source: Greek organization). 
 
4. Hungary: The law legalizing homosexual acts between adults in Hungary passed in 
1961 and came into effect in 1962 (source: Hatter). 
 
5. Romania: Age limits for homosexual and heterosexual acts were indeed equalized 
in Romania in 2001 (source: Accept). 
 
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Laws against discrimination with respect to employment 
and goods and services were confirmed to have come into effect in 2003 in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the state level (source: Udruzenje Q). 
 
7. Azerbaijan: Confirmed sexual offenses provision Azerbaijan in 2001 (source: van 
der Veur). 
 
8. Norway: Second-parent adoption in Norway passed in 2001 but became effective 
only in 2002 (source: Oddvar Thorbjörnsen, LLH). 
 
9. United Kingdom: Yes on cohabitation since 1999 (source: Stonewall).  
 
10. Germany: Brandenburg did set up a bill on anti-discrimination in the constitution 
in 1992, but it did not pass. 
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Table 3.2. Dependent and Independent Variables Summarized 
Concept Mechanism Measure Coding, Notes or Examples Source 
Dependent Variable   
Legal Status 
 
  
Author’s Legislation 
Dataset 
Combined DV 
 0-5 Ordinal 
Variable 
Combination of the 5 Categories (see below) 
Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
Refers to Sexual Orientation 
 
0,1 Dummy 
One Point for any: Employment, Goods and Services, 
Constitution 
Criminal Law Refers to Sexual 
Orientation 
 
0,1 Dummy 
Hate Crimes Based on Sexual Orientation an Aggravating 
Circumstance AND/OR Incitement to Hatred Based on Sexual 
Orientation Prohibited 
 
Partnership Recognition of Same-Sex 
Couples 
 
0,1 Dummy 
One point for any: Cohabitation Rights, Registered Partnership, 
Marriage Equality 
Parenting Rights of Same-Sex 
Couples 
 
0,1 Dummy 
One Point for any: Joint Adoption, Second Parent Adoption, 
Fertility Treatment
a
 
Discriminatory Sexual Offenses 
Provisions 
 
0,1 Dummy 
One Point for any: Equal Age of Consent, Same-Sex Sexual 
Activity Legal 
Independent Variables 
 
   
Transnational and International Channels  
 
   
Transnational LGBT Organizations 
Brokerage, 
Framing 
Range 0-3 
# of domestic LGBT orgs with membership in transnational 
organization, by year 
Author’s Network 
Membership Dataset 
Social Channels 
Learning Range 21 -
99 
Information Flows: Internet Users (per 1000 people), Television 
(per 1000 people) and Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP 
KOF Index of 
Globalization 
Political Channels 
Learning, 
Sanctioning Range 6-99 
Embassies in Country, Membership in International 
Organizations, Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions, 
International Treaties 
KOF Index of 
Globalization 
Economic Channels 
Competition, 
Sanctioning 
Range 23-99 
Actual Flows: Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, Portfolio 
Investment, and Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (all as 
percent of GDP) 
 
Restrictions: Hidden Import Barriers, Mean Tariff Rate, Taxes 
of International Trade, and Capital Restrictions 
KOF Index of 
Globalization 
  265 
Combined Channels 
Learning, 
Sanctioning, 
Competition 
Range 24-92 Combined Index of Political, Economic, and Social Channels  
KOF Index of 
Globalization 
EU Accession 
Learning, 
Sanctioning 
0,1 Dummy Year state joined EU   
Diffusion Variables 
Emulation 
 
Yearly measure of the number of other states that have 
previously adopted a given policy 
 
Domestic    
LGBT Social Spaces 
 
Range 0-5 
0 – Nothing Going On 
1 – Mention of some activity but not explicitly gay or lesbian 
(e.g., bars, restaurants, cafes) 
2 – Activity mentioned in one main city 
3 – Some gay life in more than one city (this could be little 
activity in each city but dispersed across multiple locations) 
4 – Gay social life in multiple cities 
5 – Widespread gay social life 
 
Spartacus Travel 
Guides, 
using method of 
David Frank et al. 
(2010) 
Catholic or Orthodox  
 
0,1 Dummy 
0- Protestant/Mixed 
1- Catholic/Orthodox 
 
Counter Mobilization  
 
Range 0-3 
Average score reported in reference to domestic opposition in 
expert survey: In your opinion, to what degree are opposition 
groups (domestic and foreign) active and effective in mobilizing 
in your country? 
1 - Weak, unorganized and ineffective 
2 - Somewhat organized and somewhat effective 
3 - Strong, well organized and very effective 
LGBT Organizations 
Survey 
Level of Democracy 
 Range -9 – 
10 
Polity2 Measure (cf. Polity IV codebook) Polity IV Data 
GDP (log) 
 
Range 6-12 
Real Gross Domestic Product per capita and components are 
obtained from an aggregation using price parities and domestic 
currency expenditures for consumption, investment and 
government. 
Penn GDP Data 
Note: Where there have been discrepancies between data sources, the results were crosschecked with national experts at the corresponding LGBT rights 
organizations (see Appendix C). aFor Lesbian couples; refers to national law and/or a lack of laws banning fertilization; all points can be assumed to 
account for >2000, since they require legal recognition and an established use of IVF. 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Chapter 3)      
Variable  Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Legal Status 1.21 1.23 0 5.00          
(1) Transnational  
LGBT Organizations 
0.82 1.42 0 4.00 1.00         
(2) Social Channels 70.28 17.12 21.61 99.02 0.49 1.00        
(3) Political Channels 63.44 27.42 6.59 98.56 0.38 0.50 1.00       
(4) Economic Channels 62.50 18.58 23.07 98.88 0.45 0.78 0.58 1.00      
(5) Combined Channels 62.51 17.70 24.48 92.84 0.51 0.81 0.81 0.92 1.00     
(6) EU Accession 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.39 0.50 0.56 0.57 1.00    
(7) LGBT Social Spaces 3.25 1.48 0.00 5.00 0.31 0.41 0.66 0.45 0.61 0.57 1.00   
(8) Catholic/Orthodox 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 -.18 -.26 -.34 -.37 -.45 -.18 -.34 1.00  
(9) Democracy Level 6.70 5.88 -9.00 10.00 .30 .46 .38 .54 .55 .40 .47 -.31 1.00 
(10) GDP (log) 9.15 0.93 6.34 11.51 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.68 0.67 0.55 .62 -.39 .59 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Table 4.1: Dependent and Independent Variables Summarized 
Concept Measure Coding, Notes, Sources or Examples 
Dependent Variable   
Societal Attitudes Individual Level 
Question F118: “Please tell me for each of the 
following whether you think it [Homosexuality] can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something 
in between.” Scale of 1 (never) to 10 (always).  
Source: EVS 2011 
Societal Attitudes (log) Individual Level As above, but scale 0 to 2.3 
Societal Attitudes 
(Index) 
Composite measure, 
Individual Level  
Question F118 combined with Question: “On this 
list are various groups of people. Could you please 
sort out any that you would not like to have as 
neighbors?” Homosexuals (1). Scale: -1.2 to 1.5. 
Source: EVS 2011 
Transnational and International Channels   
Social Channels State Level 
Information Flows: Internet Users (per 1000 people), 
Television (per 1000 people) and Trade in 
Newspapers (percent of GDP. Range 21 to 99. 
Source: KOF Index. 
Political Channels State Level 
Embassies in Country, Membership in International 
Organizations, Participation in U.N. Security 
Council Missions, International Treaties. Range 6 to 
99. Source: KOF Index.  
Economic Channels State Level  
Actual Flows: Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, 
Portfolio Investment, and Income Payments to 
Foreign Nationals (all as percent of GDP). 
Restrictions: Hidden Import Barriers, Mean Tariff 
Rate, Taxes of International Trade, and Capital 
Restrictions. Range 23 to 99. Source: KOF Index 
Combined Channels State Level 
Combined Index of Political, Economic, and Social 
Channels. Range 24 to 92. Source: KOF Index.  
Geographic Proximity 
Interval variable 
measures distance in 
km, Individual Level 
Distance is measured from respondent’s residence to 
Berlin or Vienna, which ever is closer. Range 0 to 
2,599. Sources: EVS 2011 and NUTS Level 3 
Shared EU 
Identification  
Individual Level 
Question: “Please look at this card and tell me, for 
each item listed, how much confidence you have in 
them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or 
none at all? The European Union” Scale of 1 (none 
at all) to 4 (great deal). Source: EVS 2011 
Threat Variables   
National Pride Individual Level 
Question: “How proud are you to be a: 
[nationality]?” Very proud (4), quite proud (3), not 
very proud (2), not at all proud (1). Source: EVS 
2011 
Church Authority  
Individual Level, 
Dummy  
Question: “Generally speaking, do you think that 
[your church is giving/the churches are giving], in 
your country, adequate answers to the social 
problems facing our country today?” Scale of 0 (no) 
to 1 (yes). Source: EVS 2011 
Religiosity Individual Level 
Question: “Apart from weddings, funerals and 
christenings, about how often do you attend religious 
services these days?” Scale of 1 (never) to 8 (more 
than once a week).  Source: EVS 2011 
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Religious Doctrine  
Individual Level, 
Categorical Variable 
Protestant (1/Reference), Catholic (2), Orthodox (3), 
Other (4). Source: EVS 2011 
Legal Status   
Combined 
State Level, Ordinal 
Variable 
Combination of the 5 Categories (see below). Range 
0 to 5.  
Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation Refers to 
Sexual Orientation 
Dummy 
One Point for any: Employment, Goods and 
Services, Constitution 
Criminal Law Refers to 
Sexual Orientation 
Dummy 
Hate Crimes Based on Sexual Orientation an 
Aggravating Circumstance AND/OR Incitement to 
Hatred Based on Sexual Orientation Prohibited 
 
Partnership Recognition 
of Same-Sex Couples 
Dummy 
One point for any: Cohabitation Rights, Registered 
Partnership, Marriage Equality 
Parenting Rights of 
Same-Sex Couples 
Dummy 
One Point for any: Joint Adoption, Second Parent 
Adoption, Fertility Treatment
253
 
Discriminatory Sexual 
Offenses Provisions 
Dummy 
One Point for any: Equal Age of Consent, Same-Sex 
Sexual Activity Legal 
Controls   
Post-Materialism Individual Level 
Inglehart and Norris 4-point index. Materialist (1), 
mixed (2), postmaterialist (3). 
Education Individual Level 
Question: “What age did you complete your 
education?” Range 0 (no formal education) – 96. 
Source: EVS 2011
254
 
Town size Individual Level 
Size of town. 1 = less than 5,000, 2 = 5,000 to 
49,999, 3 = 50,000 to 499,999, and 4 = 500,000 or 
greater. Source: EVS 2011, following Andersen and 
Fetner (2008) coding.  
Age Individual level  Range: 15-108. Source: EVS 2011 
Gender 
Individual level, 
Dummy 
Women=1. Source: EVS 2011 
Year  Dummies  
Year Survey was conducted  (1990/reference, 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2008, 2009). Source: 
EVS 2011 
 
Note: Where there have been discrepancies between data sources, the results were crosschecked with national 
experts at the corresponding LGBT rights organizations (see Appendix C).  
                                                 
253
 For Lesbian couples; refers to national law and/or a lack of laws banning fertilization; all points can 
be assumed to account for >2000, since they require legal recognition and an established use of IVF. 
254
 This education measure is not ideal, but it is the only consistent measure of education across waves. 
According to Dr. Inge Sieben of the EVS, it is commonly used in studies based on the EVS dataset. 
Andersen and Fetner (2008) also based their education variable on this question. 
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Table 4.4. Estimates for Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Tolerance toward Homosexuality 
in Europe, with Interaction Terms 
 
 
EU-27 EU-27 
  
(1) 
Religiosity x Channels 
(2) 
National Pride x Channels 
VARIABLES DV(untransformed) DV(untransformed) 
Interaction Terms     
Low Religiosity (2) 0.97* 
 
 
(0.201) 
 Low Religiosity (3) 1.55* 
 
 
(0.235) 
 Low National Pride (2) 
 
0.92* 
  
(0.171) 
Low National Pride (3) 
 
1.61* 
  
(0.639) 
Combined Channels (5) -1.28 -1.99 
 
(1.654) (1.634) 
Combined Channels (6) -1.49 -1.64 
 
(1.239) (1.224) 
Combined Channels (7) -1.42 -1.63 
 
(1.201) (1.186) 
Combined Channels (8) -0.58 -0.79 
 
(1.168) (1.154) 
Combined Channels (9) 0.29 0.31 
 
(1.169) (1.154) 
Combined Channels (10) 1.16 1.19 
 
(1.274) (1.259) 
Low Religiosity (2) x Combined Channels (5) -1.40* 
 
 
(0.274) 
 Low Religiosity (2) x Combined Channels (6) -0.75* 
 
 
(0.233) 
 Low Religiosity (2) x Combined Channels (7) -0.57* 
 
 
(0.220) 
 Low Religiosity (2) x Combined Channels (8) -0.47* 
 
 
(0.210) 
 Low Religiosity (2) x Combined Channels (9) -0.17 
 
 
(0.208) 
 Low Religiosity (2) x Combined Channels (10) 0.13 
 
 
(0.241) 
 Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (5) -1.81* 
 
 
(0.335) 
 Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (6) -0.79* 
 
 
(0.275) 
 Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (7) -0.85* 
 
 
(0.260) 
 Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (8) -0.79* 
 
 
(0.247) 
 Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (9) -0.45+ 
 
 
(0.243) 
 Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (10) -0.42 
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(0.278) 
 Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (5) 
 
-0.93* 
  
(0.226) 
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (6) 
 
-0.84* 
  
(0.196) 
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (7) 
 
-0.60* 
  
(0.187) 
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (8) 
 
-0.49* 
  
(0.178) 
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (9) 
 
-0.56* 
  
(0.176) 
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (10) 
 
-0.34 
  
(0.210) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (5) 
 
-0.90 
  
(0.840) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (6) 
 
-0.53 
  
(0.702) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (7) 
 
-0.29 
  
(0.665) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (8) 
 
-0.55 
  
(0.661) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (9) 
 
-0.63 
  
(0.659) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (10) 
 
-0.79 
  
(0.706) 
Other Variables   
EU Identification 0.11* 0.11* 
 
(0.016) (0.016) 
National Pride  -0.33* 
 
 
(0.019) 
 Church Authority -0.47* -0.49* 
 
(0.029) (0.029) 
Religiosity  
 
-0.15* 
  
(0.007) 
Catholic 0.03 0.05 
 
(0.058) (0.058) 
Orthodox -0.45* -0.46* 
 
(0.106) (0.106) 
Other -0.89* -0.92* 
 
(0.084) (0.083) 
Post-Materialism 0.50* 0.50* 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Education 0.06* 0.06* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Town size (5,000-49,999) 0.25* 0.25* 
 
(0.034) (0.034) 
Town size (50,000-499,999) 0.51* 0.51* 
 
(0.038) (0.038) 
Town size (500,000+) 0.75* 0.76* 
 
(0.048) (0.048) 
Age -0.03* -0.03* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
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Gender (Women = 1) 0.76* 0.77* 
 
(0.026) (0.026) 
Constant 2.43* 2.73* 
 
(1.200) (1.186) 
   Observations 43,296 43,296 
Number of groups 69 69 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
   
 
 
Figure 4.6. EU-27 States 
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Table 4.6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Chapter 4)           
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Attitudes (Log) 0.9 0.94 0 2.3 
             
(1) Social Channels 77.01 12.91 21.61 99.02 1.00 
            
(2) Political Channels 77.77 19 6.59 98.56 0.20 1.00 
           
(3) Economic Channels 70.81 15.5 23.07 98.88 0.65 0.37 1.00 
          
(4) Combined Channels 71.57 13.75 24.48 92.84 0.63 0.72 0.87 1.00 
         
(5) EU Identification 2.55 0.88 1 4 0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.00 1.00 
        
(6) National Pride -1.72 0.79 -4 -1 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.08 1.00 
       
(7) Church Authority 0.32 0.46 0 1 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 0.09 1.00 
      
(8) Religiosity -5.05 2.46 -8 -1 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 -0.09 0.10 0.28 1.00 
     
(9) Denomination  2.19 0.91 1 4 -0.11 -0.16 -0.33 -0.38 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.14 1.00 
    
(10) Post-Materialism 1.84 0.62 1 3 -0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 1.00 
   
(11) Education 18.51 5.41 0 96 0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 0.12 1.00 
  
(12) Town size 2.22 1.02 1 4 -0.10 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 0.09 0.06 0.15 1.00 
 
(13) Age 44.95 17.5 15 108 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.23 -0.05 1.00 
(14) Gender 0.54 0.5 0 1 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.00 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Figure 5.2: Defend the Nation Frame 
 
Translations: (left to right) “These are Fascists?,” “These are Poles?”  
Source: (“Redwatch Polska” 2012) 
 
Figure 5.3: NOP Symbols 
  
Source (“Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski” 2011) 
Translations: (left to right): Row 1: “Protected, registered symbols of the NOP;” Row 2: “Hand with 
sword, aka. Phalanx,” “Ban fags,” “Celtic cross;” Row 3: “White-red flame,” “The EU – you choose, 
you loose,” “Cross and sword;” Row 4: “Eagle in crown with cross, fasces with ax” 
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113. Anonymous   
114. Anonymous 
115. Anonymous  
116. Anonymous 
117. Anonymous  
118. International Group of Trans-Activists Bratislava, Activist, January 25, 2011 
119. Inakost, Chairman of the Board, January 25, 2011 
120. Inakost, Activist, January 25, 2011 
121. Informal Group of LGBT Christians, President, January 25, 2011 
122. Rainbow PRIDE Bratislava, Spokesperson and Executive Director, January 26, 
2011 
123. Labrisz, Board Member, January 29, 2011 
124. Fundacja Równosci [translated from German], President, February 21, 2011 
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125. Maneo/LSVD:Berlin Bradenburg [translated from German], President, March 24, 
2011 
126. European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights, Secretary, April 26, 2011 
127. Die Grünen [written interview], Parliamentarian, April 4, 2011  
128. Die Grünen [written interview], Parliamentarian and Party Chair, June 1, 2011  
129. Kampania Przeciw Homofobii (KPH), Project Coordinator, October 12, 2011 
131. Kampania Przeciw Homofobii (KPH), Łódź, Local Chapter Coordinator, 
23 October 2011. 
132. US Embassy to Poland, Public Affairs Officer, October 24, 2011 
133. Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Poland, Chief Specialist, October 25, 2011 
134. Associazione Radicale “Certi Diritti,” Politician and Activist, October 28, 2011 
 
135. Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) Spain, Activist, October 28, 2011 
136. European Gay and Lesbian Sports Federation (EGLSF), Former President, 
October 28, 2011 
137. European Gay and Lesbian Sports Federation (EGLSF), Organizer, October 28, 
2011 
138. Mozaika/ILGA Europe, President Mozaika and Co-Chair of the ILGA Europe 
Board, November 12, 2011 
139. Lambda Warszawa, Chairman, November 15, 2011 
140.  Kampania Przeciw Homofobii (KPH), President, November 16, 2011 
141. All Polish Youth, Former Chairman, November 25, 2011 
142. European Parliament’s Human Rights Unit, Head, March 6, 2012 
143. ILGA Europe, Senior Policy Coordinator, March 3, 2012 
List of Focus Groups and Panels Cited 
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144. International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer Youth and Student 
Organization (IGLYO), Program Coordinator, March 8, 2012 
145. Friedrichstadt Palast GmbH, Employee, May 4, 2012 
146. Lambda Istanbul, Activist, July 16, 2012 
 
147. American Society for the Defense of Tradition [phone interview], Family and 
Property (TFP), Secretary, March 18, 2013 
148. European Commission, Head of Unit Human Rights and Democratisation, April 
8, 2011 
149. Chancellery of the Federal Republic of Germany, Advisor, July 5, 2011  
150. Anonymous  
151. The Peace Institute (Slovenia), Researcher, April 23, 2013 
152. US Embassy to Germany [invited to participate during videoconference meeting 
with the US State Department and others on transgender rights], Head of Human 
Rights and LGBT Portfolio, April 17, 2013 
153. Transgender Europe (TGEU) [invited to participate during videoconference 
meeting with the US State Department and others on transgender rights], Executive 
Director, April 17, 2011 
154. DIC Legebitra [email interview], Head of Informational Center, May 6, 2013 
Questions Answered during Focus Groups and Activist Panels 
200. ILGA-Europe Workshop: National Government Focal Points on LGBT Equality 
Mainstreaming Policies in Europe; Participants: Polish Ministry for Human Rights in 
Foreign Affairs and Dutch Company Pride Platform: Gays in Work Place; October 28, 
2010 
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201. ILGA-Europe Workshop: Developing a Coherent and Comprehensive Approach 
to Strategic Litigation at European Level; Participants: Human Rights Law King’s 
College London, ILGA Europe, Council of Europe; October 28, 2010 
202. ILGA-Europe Workshop: How to Create Synergy in International Cooperation; 
Participants: COC, RFSL, Norwegian LGBT Organization (LLH); October 29, 2010 
203. ILGA-Europe Workshop: How to Create Synergy in International Cooperation 
Brainstorming Session; Participants: NGO Estonian Gay Youth, Homosexuelle 
Initiate (HOSI) Wien, ILGA-Europe, The Norwegian LGBT Organization (LLH), The 
Norwegian LGBT Organization (LLH); October 29, 2010 
204. ILGA-Europe Workshop: Expressing Our Differences, Challenging Our 
Prejudices, Developing Our Alliances; Participants: MEP Denmark, Dutch Institute 
for Gender Studies, European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance; October 
29, 2010 
205. Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw, Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), September 26 – October 7, 2011 
206. Ruch Palikota Party Election Night Celebration, October 9, 2011 
207. Warsaw Pride House Panels and Events, July 15-17, 2010 
208. Demonstration Against Anti-Gay Propaganda Bill at Russian Embassy Berlin, 
February 15, 2012.  
209. Q&A Session with Activists at Berlinale Premiere of “Out In Ost-Berlin: Lesben 
und Schwule in der DDR,” February 17, 2013 
210. Kampagne Solidarnost Activist Meeting in SchwuZ Berlin, February 11, 2013 
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